Re Andy B's discussion of the distinction between 'aspect' and 'entity'
[5851]:
i) for Hegel's understanding of 'thing', see _Hegel's Science of Logic_,
Book Two, Section Two, Chapter 1 ("Existence"). See particularly
Section A: "The Thing and its Properties" (London, George Allen &
Unwin Ltd, 1969, pp. 484-492).
ii) Instead of 'aspect', why not say (as Hegel does) that a 'thing' has
properties? Isn't the value-form a property of value?
iii) By your reading, what is the 'thing-in-itself' re value? Note that,
as Hegel wrote elsewhere (_Hegel's Logic_, p. 72), "there is nothing
that we can know so easily" as the thing-in-itself. He wrote that the
thing-in-itself "expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that
consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific
thoughts of it. It is easy to see what is left -- utter abstraction, total
emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world' -- the negative of
every image, feeling, and definite thought" (Ibid).
In solidarity, Jerry
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