From: Paul Adler (padler@USC.EDU)
Date: Sat Nov 18 2006 - 01:52:55 EST
I'd be very interested to see your paper, Howard. I like your reasoning here! Thx Paul At 6:23 PM -0500 11/17/06, Howard Engelskirchen wrote: >Hi Paul and Dogen, > >Paul, I don't think anything about the 'building >the house in the head' story compromises the >dialectic of theory and practice that you >suggest in the way you suggest. First, Dogen is >quite right that the whole purpose of the >introduction Marx provides is to discuss the >labor process at a level of abstraction common >to all forms of labor. Second, what >characterizes the causal structures of nature we >are is intentional activity. That's Marx's >point. Intentionality is a projection into the >future. About the same time Marx was working >out this analysis, the American philosopher >Charles Pearce was beginning to think >systematically about how we use signs. The >representations we make of the house in our head >are signs of what it will be. They guide and >discipline the labor process and our thinking >about it. But there is nothing in Marx's >analysis to suggest that the sign we form to >guide practice functions as a mechanical >template imposed on a person's labor the way a >robot might be programmed or without regard to >class relations and the other points you mention. > >A couple of points on the broader questions >raised by this thread. All things in process, >including social relations, reflect a trajectory >of movement and change. They therefore point >forward to an end or a goal. If we want to >refer to the process taken as a whole, then we >are going to have to use signs that capture its >telos. But this is a simple matter of reference >to a process, an essential feature of science, >not of some inevitable Hegelian or other >idealist unfolding of spirit. Causal >explanation in social life (and no doubt of many >natural phenomena as well) requires a broader >conception of cause than we've become familiar >with in science since the Renaissance >-- traditional science has tended to narrow the >conception of cause to efficient cause only. >That was not Marx's 'come from' and to >understand explanation it's worth having a look >again at Aristotle. > >The same point holds for the question of form, >which relates to the ontological question Dogen >raised. I've argued that Marx's analysis of >social forms can be thought of much the way >Aristotle thought that the things of the world >were composites of matter and form. For Marx >the social relations of labor can be thought of >as composites of labor and form. Recognizing >this not only puts an important emphasis on the >forms of the labor process, but also makes it >possible to see the way Marx's analyses >foreshadowed today's sophisticated scientific >realism. Scientists search for the causal >structures of the world and Marx identifies >causal structures of labor and form. I've >discussed these issues in "Why Is This Labor >Value: The Commodity Form of Labor as a Social >Kind." 'Social Kind' here is used the way we >think of water as a natural kind. The essay >will be published in Pearce and Frauley, eds., >Critical Realism and the Social Sciences: >Heterodox Elaborations, by the University of >Toronto Press. If anyone is interested in the >argument, I can send a copy. > >Howard > > > >----- Original Message ----- >From: <mailto:wpc@DCS.GLA.AC.UK>Paul Cockshott >To: <mailto:OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU>OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU >Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2006 4:47 PM >Subject: Re: [OPE-L] marx's conception of labour > >I think, Dogan, that the possibility of our >building a house in our head before we build it >in reality is an idealist hangover in Marx. His >section on the architect and the bee has for 30 >years struck me as one of the least satisfactory >in the whole of Das Kapital. > > >One can have a general intention to build a >house, but nobody builds it in their head, least >of all an architect. An architect builds it on >paper before building labourers build it out of >bricks. The whole of marx’s analysis there >abstracts from class relations, from the >division of mental and manual labour, and from >the interaction between mental processes and the >material tools of mental labour – in the >architects case, rulers pencils, paper etc. > >For a detailed elaboration of this critique see > ><http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/infoworkmeaning.pdf>http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/infoworkmeaning.pdf > > >By the way I have been reading Dogan’s book on >Smith, have only got through first third so far, >but it opens up an entire new window on Smith >for me. I had never paid much attention to his >Theory of Moral Sentiments before. > > > > >From: OPE-L [mailto:OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU] On Behalf Of Dogan Goecmen >Sent: 16 November 2006 15:05 >To: OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU >Subject: Re: [OPE-L] marx's conception of labour > >It refers to the projected aims of the concret >work to be done. To build a house it must have >been built in our heads and so on. > >Cheers >Dogan > > >In einer eMail vom 16.11.2006 15:00:36 >Westeuropäische Normalzeit schreibt >Gerald_A_Levy@MSN.COM: > > > I present first the general aspects of Marx’s concept of labour: >> ontological, teleological and sociological. > > >Dogan: > >What is the teleological aspect of Marx's concept of labour? > >In solidarity, Jerry > > -- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Prof. Paul S. Adler, Management and Organization Dept, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0808 Tel: (818) 981-0115 Fax: (818) 981-0116 Email: padler@usc.edu Bio sketch, c.v., and course outlines at: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~padler/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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