

# The Scientific Method

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## Abstract

The nature of the scientific method is controversial with claims that a single scientific method does not even exist. However the scientific method does exist. It is the building of logical and self consistent models to describe nature. The models are constrained by past observations and judged by their ability to correctly predict new observations and interesting phenomena. Observations do not prove models correct or falsify them but rather provide a means to rank models: models with more ability to predict observations are ranked higher. The observations must be carefully done and reproducible to minimize errors. They exist independent of the models but acquire their meaning from their context within a model. Model assumptions that do not lead to testable predictions are rejected as unnecessary. Both observations and models should be peer reviewed for error control. Consistency with observation and reason places constraints on all claims to knowledge including religious.

## 1 Introduction

The root problem in science is how do we obtain reliable information on the nature and properties of the real world, whatever the real world may be. This is essentially the question of epistemology: what is knowledge and how is it obtained. On the one hand there is the real world, presumably distinct from the mind. On the other hand, there is the mind which wants information on the nature and properties of the real world. The question is how do we connect the two. There is a limited number of tools at our disposal to address this issue, only four: observations, pure thought, innate knowledge, and divine revelation. The use of observations to learn about the real world, done correctly, leads to science. Done incorrectly it leads to superstition, pseudoscience or abnormal science. The bulk of this paper is addressed to the question of the use of observation to obtain knowledge about the nature of the real world. It builds on the examples and arguments given in ref. 1 and can be considered a more formal companion to that work.

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## 2 Basic Epistemology

Following Descartes, we have the idea that we can be certain of very little and start with the position of extreme skepticism. Perhaps much of what we regard as reality is an illusion: a dream that does not correspond to reality or the work of a demon deceiving us. As the next step we rely on Descartes' famous statement:<sup>2</sup> I think therefore I am. Hence we have two facts. To this we can add a few others like: I observe. The theorems of pure mathematics probably<sup>a</sup> also fall into the category of certain knowledge. This is not knowledge about the real world but knowledge within the confines of the logical systems of mathematics. One piece of certain knowledge is that there is very little other certain knowledge (see discussion in Sec. 4). Even that there is a real world outside the mind must be held as uncertain: this manuscript may be a figment of your, the reader's, imagination. This extreme is referred to as solipsism. In science what are we to make of claims like Isaac Asimov's<sup>3</sup> that he was happy to have lived at a time when the basic working of the universe is known? In theology, what are we to make of claims of proofs of God's existence or non-existence? What does all this imply about the nature of knowledge? Some would claim that to be knowledge a thought must be justified, be true and be believed.<sup>4</sup> The problem is that, as just argued, very little is known absolutely to be true. So if knowledge consists only of things that are known absolutely to be true very little remains of knowledge outside pure mathematics.

How do we proceed? We make assumptions and test these assumptions. The assumptions we call models. Knowledge consists of model building and testing and is always tentative and as argued below frequently approximate. As discussed in Sec. 3 concepts like dog, cat, and knowledge can also be considered as contributing to knowledge. But we must for the most part give up the idea of sure and certain knowledge. Thus we start model building. A first, frequently made assumption is that there is a reality outside the mind. A second possible assumption is on the existence of God. Since all nontrivial knowledge about the world, as a matter of principle, is uncertain everyone should, at this level, be an agnostic. This concept of agnosticism is not very useful so instead we can define theist, deist, agnostic and atheist by the properties of their preferred models. The preferred model (sometimes called controlling narrative) of theists would have God actively involved in human affairs or the world, for the deist a God not involved in human affairs and so on. We proceed step by step to make assumptions or models and test them. The assumptions and models always remain tentative and frequently approximate. Thus Asimov's knowledge is tentative and approximate but never-the-less comprehensive and useful. Testing procedures are described in the following sections.

## 3 Pure thought, innate knowledge, and divine revelation

Before addressing the use of observation to learn about the real world we turn to the other three tools. The first of these is pure thought. As a pure abstraction not related to

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<sup>a</sup>There are claims that logic is itself empirically determined and hence uncertain.

experience, this would be mathematics which relies only on logic (arguably logic is not empirically based). As a means to learn about the real world, pure thought would be synthetic *a priori* knowledge as proposed<sup>5</sup> by Kant (b. 1724, d. 1804). Synthetic *a priori* knowledge is nontrivial knowledge about the world obtained without recourse to observation. The idea of synthetic *a priori* knowledge was dealt a serious if not mortal blow when Euclidean geometry, Kant's archetypal example of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, was shown to be not *a priori* true with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and to be only approximately true as a description of the universe's local geometry with the advent of general relativity. Innate knowledge would be Plato's ideals or forms and also perhaps logic. Plato's ideals do not exist as such. However they address a real concern: How does the continuing concept of "dog" arise from all the various and changing examples of "dog" we encounter. In the case of a concept like dog, the human mind appears very good at creating general concepts from a series of specific instances. The precise definition of a concept like "dog" frequently has "fuzzy" edges since it is not clear where the concept like dog ends and a concept like "wolf", "jackal" or "hyena" begins. The concepts are empirically determined by the human mind's marvelous pattern recognition ability and in science they are judged by their usefulness in creating and testing models.

Divine revelation, if it exists, could be the most reliable source of knowledge since it would give information not limited by the constraints of normal sensory input. However, divine revelation is communicated using words and language which brings it into the realm of observations — either sight or sound. In addition words derive their meaning from their context even more than observations, and are less precise than mathematics. Narratives also derive much of their meaning from their context. It is sometimes unclear if a given narrative is meant as history, parable, humor or perhaps all three; the determination depending on its context which may be lost, rather than purely internal evidence. Words also change their meaning over time: "let" at the time of King James I was used to mean "prevent" rather than allow. In addition when divine revelation, in the form of sacred texts for example, are translated from one language to another subtlety and meaning are lost. Even copying texts can introduce errors and "helpful" scribes have been known to "improve" manuscripts. Moreover many, including deists and atheists (in the strong sense of the word), would claim that divine revelation does not even exist. Even if it does exist, there are many conflicting claims as to what is the correct divine revelation. Some of the latter uncertainty is related to the interpretation of words and narratives as illustrated by the disagreements among the various Christian denominations. The overriding problem with divine revelation as a source of knowledge is this: Which, if any, of the many conflicting purported divine revelations are valid and how do you tell?

Observation and reason provide objective criteria to choose between the conflicting claims of divine revelations. The argument<sup>6</sup> is essentially that of John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704): "Revelation can not be admitted against the clear evidence of reason." and "If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted." Reason should be supplemented with observation. If a purported divine revelation claims that when stones are dropped they fall upwards we are safe in rejecting this as not being a true divine revelation. A similar point was made by Augustine (b. 354, d. 430):<sup>7</sup>

Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge he holds to as being certain from reason and experience. Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn. The shame is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside the household of the faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss of those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as unlearned men.

This is consistent with Deuteronomy 18:22<sup>8</sup> “When a prophet speaks in the name of the Lord, if the thing does not come about or come true, that is a thing that the Lord has not spoken. The prophet has spoken it presumptuously: you shall not be afraid of him.” If someone makes a claim based on his understanding of divine revelation that is inconsistent with observation he/she is a false prophet and the purported divine revelation is invalid. The example of a dropped stone given above is extreme, but what about the shape of the earth? Even more pertinent is the nature of planetary motion. Do the planets circle the earth or the sun? In the early sixteen hundreds, the Catholic Church and some of its theologians argued strongly that the claim the earth circled the sun was in direct contradiction with divine revelation and a threat to Christianity. Based on observation and Deuteronomy 18:22 we see that they spoke presumptuously and were false prophets. Young earth creationists and other people of that ilk fall into a similar category and speak presumptuously. They are not to be feared as spokesmen for God. Or in the words of Augustine, what they doing is “disgraceful and dangerous”.

Observations can, however, be made consistent with a young age for the universe through the Omphalos hypothesis,<sup>9</sup> but the cure is worse than the disease. The Omphalos hypothesis says that while the universe is young it has been created with all the appearance of an old universe. The Omphalos hypothesis, raises significant and disturbing questions for both science and theology. Consequently it was rejected by all sides when first published. In science it is the question of equivalent models<sup>1</sup> that make the same predictions for all observations but are internally different. Such models can only be discriminated between using simplicity or a similar criteria. Thus the Omphalos hypothesis challenged the idea of the times that scientific induction could give absolute truth. In theology, the Omphalos hypothesis raises the question if special creation can occur without some false history being implied. The answer<sup>9</sup> from Philip Gosse(b. 1810. d. 1888) is that it cannot: a creation at a finite point in time, by its very nature, implies God must implant a false history. This has tended to be rejected by Christian apologists even more emphatically than an old universe and with good reason. It portrays God as a deceiver who planted false histories. Charles Kingsley, author of *The Water-Babies* and a friend of Gosse, was asked to review Gosse’s book. Refusing, he wrote to Gosse:

Shall I tell you the truth? It is best. Your book is the first that ever made me doubt [the doctrine of absolute creation], and I fear it will make hundreds do so. Your book tends to prove this - that if we accept the fact of absolute creation, God becomes God-the-Sometime-Deceiver. I do not mean merely in the case of fossils which pretend to be the bones of dead animals; but in ... your newly created Adam's navel, you make God tell a lie. It is not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here ... I cannot ... believe that God has written on the rocks one enormous and superfluous lie for all mankind. (reproduced from Hardin<sup>10</sup> and the Wikipedia<sup>11</sup>).

If God made the rocks lie can his words be trusted? Presumably not<sup>b</sup> and thus in the end the Omphalos hypothesis would destroy what it sets out to preserve — the reliability of the literal interpretation of Genesis. At one fell swoop it unwittingly questioned and seriously challenged absolute knowledge in both science and Christian fundamentalism.

## 4 The Scientific Method

Science is the construction of parsimonious, internally consistent models that can reliably predict future observations. With this definition the rest of the scientific method follows. It also sidesteps questions about what the real world ultimately is and even the nature of truth itself. This definition is not the usual definition of science. There is nothing here about explaining or understanding phenomena, nothing about naturalism either methodological or otherwise nor anything about scientific induction or falsification. The alternate approaches to science are either approximations to this approach, partial descriptions that emphasis one aspect of science or in a few cases simply wrong. The relationship between other approaches to science and the one given here is the topic of Sec. 5

Observations are any sensory input. At the simplest level they are direct sensory input — sight, sound, taste, smell and touch. At the next level we use instruments to augment our senses, for example Galileo's telescope. Observations also include controlled experiments where the experimental arrangements are actively manipulated in order to isolate different effects and test specific aspects of the models. The experiments are designed to maximize the information that can be obtained while eliminating uninteresting and spurious effects. An extreme example is the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider (CERN, Geneva, Switzerland) which is about the size of a five story building and involves approximately 1500 physicists from 36 countries. As the instrument gets larger and more complex the observations become more model dependent. A model of the apparatus is needed or even models of parts of the apparatus. However, even when the apparatus is as simple as Galileo's telescope, a model is needed to understand its behavior. One of the attacks against Galileo was that he was seeing an artifact of the

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<sup>b</sup>Even without the Omphalos hypotheses a literal reading of Genesis challenges God's veracity. Contrary to God's statement in Genesis 2:17, Adam did not die the day he ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil but rather, like the much maligned snake correctly stated, he acquired knowledge of good and evil.

telescope. A not unreasonable attack since telescopes can indeed add artifacts, for example, diffraction rings. Thus we have the idea that observations are not freestanding but take on their meaning within the context of a model or models.

The term “model” is carefully chosen. It implies the approximate and tentative nature of knowledge. It also avoids the ambiguity of the word “theory” which means something different to many people than it does in science. A model, in the present usage, is anything constructed in the mind that is used to describe and predict observations. Knowledge consists two things. The first is the generation of useful concepts such as dog, cow, or knowledge while the second is model building and testing. Model building is a creative activity with relatively few useful guide lines while model testing is based on a model’s efficacy in obtaining a given end and is usually more algorithmic. In science, models are tested or judged by their ability to correctly predict observations. In religion, models are judged by their ability to get the model’s adherent to heaven, enlightenment or nirvana. However in practice this test is usually replaced by a test based on consistency with a given sacred text or a given master’s teaching. In mathematics, models<sup>c</sup> are judged purely by their logical consistency. In capitalism, models are judged by their ability to generate wealth for the person using the model. In politics it is the model’s ability to get people elected and in auto mechanics it is the model’s ability to aid in car repair. The ability to make correct predictions is frequently important in judging models in religion (for example the quote from Deuteronomy given above), capitalism and other areas.

The idea that we do not have absolute knowledge goes back at least to Socrates (b. 470?,d. 399 BCE) with the idea of ironic modesty (from Plato’s *Apologhma*). Ironic modesty is the claim, attributed to Socrates, that he was wiser than his contemporaries because he alone realized how very little he knew. There were also Greek schools of skeptics (Academic and Pyrrhonian for example) that claimed true knowledge, especially empirical knowledge, was impossible. René Descartes (b. 1596, d. 1650) in the beginning of his “Meditations” makes similar skeptical arguments (before making unwarranted assumptions to get around the problem). David Hume (b. 1711, d. 1776) pointed out<sup>12</sup> that one could never deduce a generalization valid for all instances from a finite series of observations. Thus he showed scientific induction is invalid. This was largely ignored by the scientific community for 200 years. The solution to all these problems follows from the idea<sup>13</sup> of Karl Popper(b. 1902, d. 1994) that all scientific models (or theories) are tentative. This should be generalized to the idea that most knowledge is tentative and approximation. The only exceptions are simple statements like: I am, I think, I observe and perhaps a few others.

As Hume showed, models can not be proven correct. Despite Popper’s claims,<sup>13</sup> in most cases models cannot be falsified either.<sup>1</sup> Thus observations neither prove models correct nor disprove them. What observations do is provide the information necessary for ranking models. Old models are displaced by newer models that are ranked higher based on their ability to correctly predict observations. Paraphrasing the United States’ gun lobby: observations do not kill models, models do. This ranking of models is the first part of the scientific method.

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<sup>c</sup>In mathematics a model would be the set of postulates and theorems that make up the logical system under study.

Comparing models is very much a part of what Popper actually proposed. For example consider the quote<sup>14</sup> from him:

Now there can be little doubt that all these essentialist views stand in the strongest possible contrast to the methods of modern science. (I have the empirical sciences in mind, not perhaps pure mathematics.) First, although in science we do our best to find the truth, we are conscious of the fact that we can never be sure whether we have got it. We have learnt in the past, from many disappointments, that we must not expect finality. And we have learnt not to be disappointed any longer if our scientific theories are overthrown; for we can, in most cases, determine with great confidence which of any two theories is the better one. We can therefore know that we are making progress; and it is this knowledge that to most of us atones for the loss of the illusion of finality and certainty. In other words, we know that our scientific theories must always remain hypotheses, but that, in many important cases, we can find out whether or not a new hypothesis is superior to an old one. For if they are different, then they will lead to different predictions, which can often be tested experimentally; and on the basis of such a crucial experiment, we can sometimes find out that the new theory leads to satisfactory results where the old one breaks down. Thus we can say that in our search for truth, we have replaced scientific certainty by scientific progress. And this view of scientific method is corroborated by the development of science. For science does not develop by a gradual encyclopaedic accumulation of essential information, as Aristotle thought) but by a much more revolutionary method; it progresses by bold ideas, by the advancement of new and very strange theories (such as the theory that the earth is not flat, or that 'metrical space' is not flat), and by the overthrow of the old ones.

Ranking implies that there must be at least two models to rank. This is not a problem since there is always the default or null model that says all outcomes for a given observation are equally possible. Thus any model that makes some correct predictions but no false ones would rate higher than the null model. On the other hand a model that makes only false predictions would rate lower than the null model. We can improve the null model slightly by having it say that all past observations are the way they are because that is the way they are and that any outcome for a future observation is possible. This revised null model is scientifically equivalent<sup>d</sup> to the "Because God did it that way" model.

Thinking in terms of models makes some concepts much clearer. For example, it is meaningless to ask if a model airplane is a fact, rather one should ask how accurate the model is. It cannot be one hundred per cent accurate since then it would be replica not a model. Even replicas are rarely 100% accurate. A similar situation holds with most models including scientific ones. Asking if Newtonian mechanics, general relativity or evolution are facts is meaningless, an error of categories. One should ask how accurately they describe and predict observations. Rather than fact or not fact, scientific models are

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<sup>d</sup>see ref. 1 for the definition of scientifically equivalent.

judged on their ability to mirror reality; a mirroring that can not be exact since models are constructions of the mind while reality presumably exists outside the mind. This is very much in line with the skeptical denial of the possibility of absolute knowledge. However, while models cannot be considered as absolutely true they can be judged and ranked. Thus we have: Aristotelian dynamics, Newtonian mechanics, special relativity and general relativity in order of increasing accuracy of the predictions for the motion of macroscopic objects. In an absolute sense all these models are wrong since they do not correctly predict observations on microscopic systems. In spite of not being absolutely true, all these models make useful predictions for some range of observations. They are probably approximations to some unknown model of everything — at least that is the hope. Similarly we can rank animals reproducing after their kind and evolution based on their ability to make predictions of future observations. Again both these models are useful although evolution ranks higher based on its predictive ability. The ability to rank models is the point missed by Socrates, the skeptics, Descartes and Hume. Even with naive falsification, there is only a two level categorization, falsified or not falsified, rather than a ranking.

The current approach to epistemology, with its emphasis on the tentative and approximate nature of knowledge, is anti-dogmatic: the absolute truth of fundamentalists (either scientific or religious) is a mirage. Even the present description of the scientific method and the nature of knowledge should be considered tentative and approximate. Note this circumvents one of the problems with extreme skepticism. If all knowledge is invalid then even the claim that “all knowledge is invalid” is invalid. Claiming all knowledge is tentative and approximate does not lead to a similar contradiction.

What properties must a model have in order to be scientific? First we want to be able to make unambiguous predictions. This implies that the models should make unique predictions for some set of observations. To this end we want the models to be internally consistent and logical so that they do not predict both this and that. At the very least you need a well-define set of rules that unambiguously lead to testable predictions.

Parsimony or simplicity is also an important, indeed crucial, property of models. For a given model it is always possible to make a more complicated model which makes the same predictions. Comparison with observation can never discriminate between these models. This is the problem the Omphalos hypothesis highlighted. Instead of having the universe created 6000 years ago we could have it created last Tuesday or five minutes ago. One can add such assumptions indefinitely: a universe created last Tuesday, invisible unicorns, flying spaghetti monsters, etc. However since models are judged by their ability to make predictions, this gains us nothing. Models should be stripped down to the minimum assumptions consistent with maintaining their ability to make predictions. Or rephrasing: The models are simplified by removing untestable assumptions. If nothing else this makes the models easier to use. Thus models should be simple, logical and self-consistent. It is the requirement of parsimony that eliminates the Omphalos hypothesis and similar untestable hypotheses from consideration as science.

In order to predict future observations it is important to describe past observations. This is an *a posteriori* statement rather than an *a priori* one. While there are few if any hard and fast rules on how to construct models there is one very useful guideline: The more one knows about past observations and the patterns in them the more likely



one will be able to construct models that can predict future observations. Models that incorporate patterns from past observations typically have more predictive power. Thus to some extent, model formation is pattern recognition. Galileo recognized a pattern in pendulum's period: the period was independent of the amplitude of the motion. He then used this to predict the periods for future observations. In this case, the pattern is fairly obvious and the procedure looks like scientific induction (see Sec. 5). Most new models in science arise from a careful, and frequently long, study of past observations. The scientist has to decide which patterns in the observations are real and which of the real patterns are important. However describing past observations and the patterns in them is not enough, the real test of any scientific model is its ability to predict future observations.

One of the first things one realizes in working with observations is that it is easy to make mistakes. While an observation is never "wrong" it may be misinterpreted. There are some visual impressions in my eyes but if it is a dog or a cat is a question of interpretation. It may even be an hallucination and not a real visual impression. This is also a question of interpretation. Since error and misinterpretation are ubiquitous, error control is extremely important. Error control is the distinguishing characteristic between science and superstition or pseudo-science. There are three main aspects of error control: care, reproducibility and peer review. Double blind trials in medicine are an example of the care required to obtain reliable results. Scientists are frequently criticized for the care they take to control errors but this is necessary to prevent science from being overrun with bogus results. Reproducibility is a major check on both error and fraud. Repetition is not doing exactly the same experiment again and again. Rather, the subsequent experiments should be as different as possible to eliminate common sources of error.

Reproducibility does not mean the scientific method cannot be used to study historical events because the event cannot be reproduced. The model that Napoleon died of arsenic poisoning can be tested by looking for arsenic in a currently existing sample of his hair. Models based on stomach cancer would not have high levels of arsenic and thus can be ranked lower if arsenic is found in high concentrations. The models of past events can make predictions for future observations that can be tested. Other historical events, such as the history of the earth, can be studied similarly.

Next for error control is peer review. This is a simple concept. The people who know about a topic are peers of the person who did the original experiment and they look to see if there are any errors. It is only the peers who would have the knowledge to spot errors. If you want to know if a model about sheep farming is reasonable you ask a sheep farmer. If the model is about Irish history you ask an historian specializing in Irish history not a sheep farmer (although one could, in principle, be both sheep farmer and an Irish historian). If the model is about nuclear physics you ask a nuclear physicist. Peer review is this idea applied in a systematic manner.

A model airplane by, its very nature, is never an exact replica of the original. Thus it is always "wrong". However we can compare different airplane models to see which is the most accurate. We can also ask which is the most useful for a given museum display. This may well not be the most accurate. The same considerations apply to scientific models or indeed any models in the mind. By their very nature they are approximate but the accuracy of different models can be compared models and ranked. Similarly the

most accurate scientific model is frequently not the most useful for a given calculation. Quantum theory is not used to calculate planetary motion.

## 5 The Pretenders

In this section we consider the relationship between other proposed descriptions of the scientific method.

**Appeal to Authority:** Life is not long enough to do all observations and model calculations by oneself. Thus, inevitably one has to rely on other people who may be considered authorities. There is nothing wrong with this. The error occurs when the authority is assumed infallible or nearly so. The late medieval church fell into this trap with Aristotle. They took his word as the gospel truth and were caught by surprise when his models of natural history were shown to be inferior to those developed by Galileo and his contemporaries. The British physicists fell into the same trap with Newton. Taking Newton as their authority rather than observations they fell behind their competitors on the continent. In science careful, reproducible, peer reviewed observation must take precedent over any other authority in judging models.

An additional comment on the medieval church and Aristotle is in order. In the twelve hundreds the works of the classical scholars was rediscovered, in particular the philosophy of Aristotle. Two of the early participants in this revival were Roger Bacon (b. 1214 d. 1294) and Thomas Aquinas (b. 1225 d. 1574). Aquinas, a Dominican friar, accepted Aristotle's conclusions and blended them into Christian philosophy. He consequently was made a saint by the Catholic church in 1323. His emphasis on Aristotle's conclusion contributed to the conflict between the church and science at the time of Galileo. Roger Bacon, a Franciscan friar, in contrast to Aquinas emphasized the empirical aspect of Aristotle's work. Bacon's procedure<sup>15</sup> of hypothesize, test against experiment, refine and retest is the precursor of the scientific method and is very similar to the model building and testing procedure described in this work. Bacon essentially discovered the scientific method. However, Bacon's ideas were largely ignored for several generations. It seems that, then as now, people prefer the convenient answer from an authority even if it is wrong to a reliable procedure even if it leads to better knowledge. Therein lies the danger in the appeal to authority.

**Scientific Induction:** For much of the history of science, from Galileo to Einstein, the scientific method was considered to be scientific induction. Scientists began with observations, cautiously proceeded to a tentative hypothesis describing the observation, progressed to more secure but still provisional theories, and only in the end achieved, after a long process of verification, the security of permanent laws. In 1904 Newton's laws of motion and gravity would have been considered the prime example of permanent laws derived by induction. One year later they were no longer considered exact, at least not by Einstein. Twenty years later, not only had general relativity shown Newton's laws of gravity to be approximate but quantum mechanics had undermined much of the philosophy built up around classical mechanics. The clock work universe dissolved in quantum

uncertainty. The models in science are frequently built up by looking for patterns in past observation and extrapolating these to future observations. The main error in scientific induction is assuming the deduced law is permanent infallible knowledge. The induced patterns are modified based on the new observations and the procedure repeated. As the quantum replacement of classical mechanics illustrated no model can ever be assumed absolutely true just because it has passed all the tests to the present time. In addition the procedure for going from observations to a model is not always straight forward or algorithmic. Rather it is a creative activity. General relativity was not deduced from experiment in any simple way. Rather it was sheer genius on Einstein's part.

**Paradigm Shifts:** A paradigm,<sup>16</sup> the set of interlocking assumptions and methodologies that define a field of study, is also a model. It is the main model in a field of study and sometimes referred to as the controlling narrative. The overarching model, controlling narrative or equivalently the paradigm provides the foundation for all work in the field and a common language for discourse. While observations exist independent of the paradigm, their interpretation depends on the paradigm. No natural history nor any set of observation can be interpreted or even usefully discussed without the framework provided by the paradigm. Paradigms determine the important questions to be considered. They can also act to prevent progress when members of a community are too committed to their current set of models.

Thomas Kuhn (b. 1922 d. 1996) discusses<sup>16</sup> two kinds of science — normal science and extraordinary science. Normal science is puzzle solving within the context of a paradigm while extraordinary science is the overthrowing of the paradigm. The present analysis gives a different view of the distinction although the distinction itself remains useful. In extraordinary science the model being challenged is the main model in the field, the paradigm (or model) which provides the framework for the field. In normal science it is the subsidiary models, those models that in principle could be derived from the main model, that are being tested. Normal science can often resemble scientific induction with models apparently deduced from observations. This is especially true in cases like the color of crows or the period of a pendulum where a regularity is apparent in the observations.

Extraordinary science generates paradigm shifts, a change in the world view in the given field. This change of world view is closely related to Kuhn's incommensurability<sup>16</sup> (see also Feyerabend<sup>17</sup>). Proponents of the new model and the old model use a different language and different concepts. They have different ideas about what the important questions are. Their whole framework for understanding observations is different. Hence, it may be difficult to compare the old and new models in detail. Despite these dramatic differences, the old models are frequently good approximations to the new model for a limited range of observations. By approximation I mean that the new and old models give nearly identical predictions for some range of observations.

Paradigm shifts do not occur because the old paradigm is falsified nor because the new paradigm is proven correct. It is not even because the practitioners have grown tired of the old paradigm. Rather it is because the new paradigm or model ranks higher than the old paradigm based on parsimony and its ability to correctly describe past observations

and predict new ones. In the end this is what science always reduces to.

**Falsification:** Popper claims<sup>13</sup> that models can not be proven correct but they can be proven incorrect. The problem here is that no theory or model exists in isolation but is always supported by subsidiary theories and models. Thus any test is not just of one model but of all the subsidiary ones simultaneously. This objection to falsification is known as the Duhem-Quine thesis.<sup>18</sup> There is also the question of the interpretation of the observations and the possibility of modifications to the model to remove the incorrect prediction. With enough imagination any negative result can be explained away. The white crow is really a black crow covered with snow or the sun is reflecting (specular reflection) off the black crow in such a way it looks white. However, modifying models to circumvent falsification usually reduces their predictive power. In the case of creationist natural history and the Omphalos hypothesis it prevents any meaningful prediction. While the Omphalos hypothesis can “explain” any observation, it is consistent with any possible observation and has no predictive power. Contrary to the impression given by some histories of science, the 1887 Michelson-Morley experiment did not immediately falsify the ether model. A 1902 high school physics text book<sup>19</sup> defines physics as: “Physics is the science which treats of matter and its motion, and of vibrations in the ether”. Although they developed the mathematics needed for special relativity neither Lorentz nor Poincaré abandoned the ether. Creative people came up with explanations such as ether entrainment and the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction to explain the unexpected results. Both explanations reduced the ether’s predictive power. Ether entrainment say that the ether is dragged along by the earth. Thus the measured speed of light depends on how strongly the ether is entrained and accommodates a wide range of values rather than the single number of the original ether model. Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction adds an extra assumption that does not lead to other new predictions. Thus it added an assumption for this one type of observation and the number of predictions per assumption decreased. In the end, the ether model was eliminated, not directly by observation, but by Einstein’s special theory of relativity which had fewer assumptions and more predictive power than the competing model. Using observations as the criteria, special relativity ranked higher than the ether model. In general, models are not disproven by observations but are replaced by newer models with more predictive power.

In cases like the ether or special creation the loss of predictive power resembles falsification. In many cases falsification can be considered a useful approximation to the more general procedure of model testing through predictive power. To some extent the difference with Popper is one of emphasis.

**Natural Explanations/Methodological Naturalism:** One view is that science is trying to provide natural explanations of phenomena. Thus we have to define natural and explanation. One commonly accepted distinction is between natural and super-natural. Natural is what science has described and super-natural is what it has not described. In the present context this usage would be circular since we are trying to describe the scientific method. When the term “natural explanation” is used in science it is frequently a code for “explanations” of the form “God did it” are rejected.

The related term naturalism has two distinct meanings. One is that the super-natural is rejected and not dealt with or claimed to be nonexistent. The other meaning is that all phenomena are treated equally whether or not they are natural or super-natural. This second definition has the great advantage that it does not require the artificial distinction between natural and super-natural. In the current context, as in marketing, natural and naturalism have mainly a rhetorical value. What we want to exclude from science is not the supernatural but rather assumptions that have no predictive power. This is the *only* reason to reject the “Because God did it that way” type of model. However, the “Because God did it that way” explanation rarely has predictive power so in practice the “super-natural explanations” do end up being rejected. As Laplace said<sup>20</sup> in response to Napoleon’s question on why his books on celestial mechanics had no reference to God: “je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là”. He did not say he rejected it because science is methodological naturalism. That would have been poor methodology, then or now. The important point is that the rejection is done *a posteriori* not *a priori*. The foes of science have effectively used the methodological naturalism description of science to score rhetorical points: Scientists have closed minds, they reject my hypothesis out-of-hand without giving it a fair hearing. Thus it is important to reject methodological naturalism as the definition of the scientific method while realizing, along with Laplace, that something very similar follows from the model building and testing procedure. However, if a supernatural model makes clear, unambiguous and precise predictions for observations, by all means, science must consider it.

The discussions in this paper should not be taken to imply that science and religion are intrinsically antagonistic. They are not. Science is the development and testing of models based on observation. Religion, in its epistemological content, is the development and testing of models against divine revelation. There is no reason *a priori* that these two approaches should be conflict. To the theist or deist science is just the studying of Gods work as made manifest through observation. The conflict between science and religion is purely *a posteriori*. Some proposed divine revelations are inconsistent with observation. As discussed previously we are justified in rejecting such proposed divine revelations as being false. Thus science is only in conflict with false religions, actually only with a subset of false religions — those that are inconsistent with observation.

“Explanation” is an equally rhetorically loaded word that is best avoided. It carries the idea of understanding. An explanation is something that gives the hearer the impression that he understands the phenomena. This is a very subjective criterion. Does quantum mechanics explain or describe quantum entanglement? Do I need the many-worlds interpretation to “really” understand quantum mechanics? Is everything else just cookbook physics without real understanding? Does evolution just describe the origin of the species and do we need intelligent design to “really” explain it? These questions cannot be uniquely answered. They depend on what a person thinks is needed for a satisfactory explanation. If we take the role of science to be providing explanations this lack of uniqueness is a serious problem. Many worlds and supernatural explanations can only be eliminated by fiat rather than as part of the more general procedure. The model building and testing procedure avoids the problem. Nothing is rejected by fiat. The scientific method is not making explanations but building models and testing them. Subjective criteria, like what constitutes an explanation, are avoided. We construct the

model and compare it with other models using observations and simplicity as the criteria. This may sound cookbook like — just follow the instructions, but in science there are only the two criteria: parsimony and comparison against observation.

Models constructed using parsimony and comparison against observation are frequently considered to be explanations, especially by observers who have grown up with them. Newton's law of motion are generally accepted as explanations of planetary motion in contrast to the Ptolemaic and Copernican models which are considered only descriptive. However, it is more precise to say that Newton introduced a higher level of abstraction using ideas farther removed from the observations. It is this higher level of abstraction that allows the models to be taken as explanations. However the role of science is not to provide explanations, a subjective concept, but to build models. Providing explanations is seductive but the ultimate insult to a scientific model is this: It explains everything, but predicts nothing!

**Anything Goes:** In areas of science that are undergoing active development we are faced with incomplete data, wrong data, approximate models and general confusion. It is like doing a jig-saw puzzle with some pieces missing, some pieces from a different puzzle and the picture on the box being wrong in undisclosed ways. Out of this the scientist tries to find order by constructing models. In the jig-saw analogy he is trying to construct the picture that should be on the box. The construction of the new models requires judgment on which data are correct and most relevant. It requires selective abandonment of old models. For example, Galileo had to replace the Aristotelian laws of motion in order to make the Copernican model work. The acceptance of statistical mechanics was delayed because the physicists of the time assumed Newtonian mechanics was correct while in the end quantum mechanics was required. From the general confusion in a developing area it is not surprising that Paul Feyerabend (b. 1924, d. 1994) concluded<sup>17</sup> that there was no method in science. Hence the title of his book: "Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge". To this extent he is correct: models are not derived by any logical procedure. Model creation is indeed chaotic requiring creativity, good judgment and even good taste as to what is important and relevant. However, above the chaos sit two judges: predictive power and simplicity. In the end, order emerges from the chaos by insisting the models be as simple as possible and that they make predictions that can be tested against future observations.

**The EPR view of Science** Although Lorentz and Poincaré developed the mathematics for special relativity they were unable to accept that the ether was unnecessary. This crucial insight was made by Einstein who was thus credited with the discovery of special relativity. In turn, Einstein helped lay the foundation for quantum mechanics but was unable to accept its implications. In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published a paper<sup>21</sup> (the EPR paper) on quantum mechanics stressing its incompleteness when judged using classical concepts. While usually used to judge interpretations of quantum mechanics it provides an interesting insight into the concept of the scientific method of that time. This paper preceded the work of Kuhn<sup>16</sup> and Popper<sup>13</sup> by more than twenty-five years. In contrast to these later developments in the understanding of the scientific

method, the EPR paper presents a very nineteenth century view of science. For example the second paragraph begins with:

In attempting to judge the success of a physical theory, we may ask ourselves two questions: (1) “Is the theory correct?” and (2) “Is the description given by the theory complete”

Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is certainly not correct in an absolute sense since it does not include relativity. Even quantum field theory, which is consistent with special relativity, is not correct in an absolute sense since it is not consistent with general relativity. Thus the answer to the first question is “No”. This is true of most physical models and will continue to be true until we have a theory of everything. Even then we will be unable to demonstrate that the answer is “Yes” because all scientific knowledge is tentative. In addition to being tentative knowledge is also approximate.<sup>3,1</sup> Since science is the art of the reasonable approximation a better question would be: “Is the model approximately correct?”.

The EPR paper defines completeness in terms of reality which in turn requires reality to be defined. The whole emphasis on reality runs counter to Kuhn’s<sup>16</sup> idea that observations take their meaning from models. Reality in classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are inherently different in line with Kuhn and Feyerabend’s<sup>17</sup> contention that different paradigms are incommensurate. There is not a one-to-one correspondence between the concepts in different models even when they are given the same names. We can say quantum mechanics is quantum mechanically complete but not complete according to the concepts of classical mechanics. There is no reason it should be since the concepts of reality and completeness are different (incommensurate) in the two models. If string theory is even approximately correct, reality is something peculiar happening in some weird number of dimensions. This is different from reality in either classical or quantum mechanics.

The questions asked in the EPR paper should be compared with the Niels Bohr’s understanding:<sup>22</sup> “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.” This is a rejection of the absolutism implied by the EPR questions. In light of the tentative and approximate nature of physical models and the incommensurate nature of the concepts in different models, EPR’s two questions should be replaced by one question: “How much predictive power does the model have?” This would destroy much of the force of the paper as an attack on quantum mechanics. However quantum entanglement, which was introduced in the EPR paper, is a very interesting and has stimulated much productive research. .

**Science and technology** There is sometimes confusion between what is science and what is technology. Science is the development of models with predictive power. Technology is the use of these models to build devices to serve some function. The development of technology frequently involves model building and testing using procedures very similar to those used in science. Thus while the distinction between science and technology is in principle clear, in practice it is not with some activities legitimately considered to

be both. For example, while Edison was primarily a technologist, he produced some very interesting science: for example the Edison effect relating to the current in light bulb with an additional electrode. Although Edison saw no use for the effect it eventually lead to the vacuum tube and the cathode ray tube.

The important part of science for technology is its ability to make correct predictions. When the on switch is pushed we predict that the TV will turn on. Much science, both pure and applied has to be correct<sup>e</sup>, in order for that to happen. Contrary to some claims, the success of technology in building devices is a validation of science and the predictive power of its models. Without this predictive power, which is the essence of science, technological innovation would slow to a barely perceptible crawl. In return, technology allows science to address interesting new questions and answer old perplexing questions.

## 6 Conclusion

The scientific method is the building of logical and self consistent models to describe nature. The models are constrained by past observations and judged by their ability to correctly predict new observations and interesting phenomena. Observations usually do not prove or falsify models but rather provide a means to rank models. The observations exist independent of the models but acquire their meaning from their context within a model. Observations must be carefully done and reproducible to minimize errors. Models assumptions that do not lead to testable predictions are rejected as unnecessary.

The alternate understandings of science and epistemology have been proposed at various times in human history. As argued in the previous section many of these can be considered as approximations to the current understanding valid for a limited range of situations, much like classical mechanics can be considered an approximation to quantum mechanics. Among the rejected pretenders are appeal to authority, scientific induction, falsification, paradigm shifts, natural explanations, methodological naturalism and anything goes. The present description of science should also be considered tentative and approximate.

The scientific method does not lead to sure and certain knowledge but rather to approximate and tentative, but never-the-less useful, knowledge. This is the best that can be done: General epistemological arguments, dating back to the ancient Greeks and amplified at various times since, eliminate *all* claims to nontrivial sure and certain knowledge. In all areas of knowledge, testing against observations is a powerful filter especially when coupled with predictive power. This filter is particularly useful in eliminating superstition, pseudo-science and bogus claims of divine revelation.

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<sup>e</sup>By correct we mean that the scientific models must make correct predictions for observations.



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