A Reply to Michael A. Lebowitz

                           Kenneth Lapides


[The following is the text of Michael A. Lebowitz's 1993 critique (Science & Society, Vol.
57, No. 1) of my paper "Henryk Grossmann and the Debate on the Theoretical Status
of Marx's Capital" (Lapides 1992) with my comments inserted (in double brackets, small
caps and bold face) where appropriate.]

     "What are the implications," Kenneth Lapides (156) asks, "for our grasp of Marx's
theoretical legacy if we take the view that there truly is a missing book on wage-labor?
Where are we politically, in other words, if we accept the notion, as stated by Lebowitz,
that Capital fails to provide 'an adequate basis for considering the struggle of workers to
realize their own goals'?" While these are indeed important questions, it seems rather
premature to pose them before considering and evaluating the evidence in question.
Trepidations about the answers should not divert Marxist scholarship from the process
of absorbing the information now available in such "new" work as the Grundrisse, "The
Results of the Immediate Process of Production" and, most recently, The Economic
Manuscript of 1861-63.  
     [[Lebowitz implies that I posed these questions prematurely, yet they
were asked only toward the end of my paper, after a large body of
evidence had been presented and considered.  He also falsely suggests
that I felt "trepidation" about the answers to these questions.  The
concern reflected in my questions refers to his effort to deny the
existence of fundamental aspects of Marx's theoretical legacy.  But most
importantly, Lebowitz implies that I failed to consider material from The
Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 when in fact I very clearly did.  It's odd
though that he should now take such an interest in this particular
work, since his book Beyond Capital, published in 1992, includes not one
reference to any of the four of its five volumes that had by then been
published (beginning in 1988).  This suggests that he was indifferent to (or
unaware of) this work's publication (i.e., those portions not included in
Theories of Surplus Value) until he read my discussion of it.  K.L.]]
     There is a long tradition which holds that Marx, in embarking upon Capital,
decided to abandon the original six-book plan of his economics. Now, determined in
particular to exorcise the spectre of a missing "Book on Wage-Labor", Lapides has joined
that tradition. Thus, in presenting Henryk Grossmann's theory as to how and why
Marx abandoned his original plan, Lapides declares (133) that Capital "represents Marx's
complete analysis."  And, yet, insofar as he himself identifies something significantly
missing from Capital, his is a curious defence of that proposition.  
     [[There is nothing "curious" about an attempt to work out what
Capital might have included had Marx lived to finish it by examining his
manuscripts and correspondence.  I see it simply as intellectual honesty
to embrace the proposition that Capital is analytically complete though
not fully elaborated in all areas. K.L.]]
     Noting the "important new material on wage-labor" in the "Results of the
Immediate Process of Production" and in Value, Price and Profit (which together
constituted Marx's "most detailed analysis of the economic aspects of trade unions,
particularly their impact on wages"), Lapides points out that this material was not,
however, included in Capital. Was Marx "saving these writings for subsequent inclusion
in a projected chapter on wage-labor?" Lapides' guess (141-2) is yes, and its place was in
the unfinished Volume III of Capital: "there is evidence to suggest that he may have
intended concluding Capital with a section on the trade unions and the workers' wage
struggle." 
     So, does Lapides' attack (152) on the "mantra-like repetition" of references to "the
Book on Wage-Labor" (which he finds in Roman Rosdolsky, Maximilien Rubel and the
writer) merely come down to a dispute over whether there a missing "book" or just a
missing "chapter"? Although Lapides attaches great importance to the fact that after 1859
Marx referred not to a separate book but (repeatedly) to a "chapter" or "section" on
wage labor or the theory of wages, variations in the specific terminology Marx used at
different times are not a precise guide to length or significance.
     Just as a "book" for Marx was not necessarily identical to a volume (which
Lapides indicates), so also was a "chapter" not necessarily to be understood as a brief
treatment; Marx's reference (1973: 817) to his chapter on wage-labor in the Grundrisse
(at the same time that he elsewhere was describing it as a separate book) occurred in the
context of his "chapter" on capital, which comprises over 600 pages. [[Lebowitz
would prefer that we forget that the Grundrisse was a rough draft, the
first of several preliminary versions of Capital, and that as Marx's work
progressed his outline became not only more precise but was more
consistently described. K.L.]]    In any event, what matters is the existence and
significance of a missing treatment (however designated) of wage-labor, and to explore
this requires a theoretical analysis rather than a mere playing with phrases.  [[The
implication here is that Lebowitz will supply "theoretical analysis" while
I have been merely "playing with phrases."  Not once does he even
acknowledge, for example, that Grossmann's seminal discussion of Marx's
Economics was made available (in part) by my translation. K.L.]]
     Yet, at the level of theory, Lapides' article has little to offer to Marxist
scholarship. Not only does he appear to not understand (or acknowledge) what is
present in the work he considers, but the centerpiece of his study (the 1929 article by
Henryk Grossmann on the change in Marx's original plan) is both dated and fatally
flawed. [[Only someone hopelessly biased could suggest--without evidence
or explanation--that I do "not understand or acknowledge" the content
of the work I translated.  I believe my paper--which is both supportive
and critical of Grossmann's analysis--demonstrates rather the opposite. 
To dismiss Grossmann's work as "dated" indicates a narrow, doctrinaire
outlook, self-defeating for any scholarship.  Everything eventually
becomes "dated"; the point is to learn what we can from the past.  As I
said: "Grossmann's argument is not the last word on the subject.  Indeed,
it should not be forgotten that his was the first attempt to penetrate
Marx's 'economics' in terms of its methodology" (Lapides 1992, 151).  Nor
does Lebowitz's assertion that it is "fatally flawed" survive scrutiny, as
we shall see. K.L.]]   Grossmann argued that Marx scuttled his 1858 plan for 6
separate books by mid-1863 and did so because his new understanding of the process of
reproduction of capital necessitated a new plan. [[Lebowitz fails to mention that
this was not the only reason Grossmann gave as the basis for his
conclusion. K.L.]]  Unfortunately for that argument, the new elements Grossmann
identified ("individual functions of industrial capitals which are carried out during their
circuit--the production process, the circulation process, the process as a whole") were
already present in the Grundrisse (dating from 1857-8); they could not therefore explain
a subsequent change in plan.   [[Lebowitz misstates Grossmann's argument. 
He does not claim that they are "new elements [which he has] identified." 
This is what he said: "in the 1859 plan the division of the work into six
parts...is from the standpoint of dealing with the following subjects:
capital, landed property, wage-labor, foreign trade, etc.  In the
composition of the work according to the definitive plan of 1863,
however, it was organized from the standpoint of knowledge
[Erkenntnis]: out of methodological considerations, individual functions
of industrial capitals...were to be intellectually abstracted from the
manifold reality and presented separately, regardless of the material"
(Lapides 1992, 148).  The fact that these elements may or may not be
present in the Grundrisse is irrelevant to Grossmann's argument; he is
simply saying that Marx is approaching his material from a different
methodological standpoint. K.L.]]  This is precisely why Rosdolsky (whose work
was centered around a study of the Grundrisse) described Grossmann's effort as a
"complete failure" (Rosdolsky: 24-5, 25n).  [[This is quite a stretch from
Rosdolsky's actual words: "the reasons Grossmann himself gives [for
Marx's change of plan] are so inadequate that we have to regard his
attempted explanation as a complete failure," while his only remark at
all pertinent to Lebowitz's contention appears in a brief footnote: "It is
sufficient here to mention that Marx first became occupied with the
problem of reproduction in 1858 (Rough Draft)..." (Rosdolsky 1977, 24,
25n).  Lebowitz writes: "Lapides, who defends Grossmann's 'brilliant
insight' against Rosdolsky and argues that the latter 'disdains any
examination of Grossmann's line of thought,' characteristically does
not mention the basis for Rosdolsky's position" (68n).  In fact, as I wrote,
Rosdolsky does disdain examining Grossmann's argument, merely stating:
"It would be a pure waste of time to look at these superficial attempts at
an explanation any more closely (Rosdolsky 1977, 25)" (Lapides 1992, 151).
K.L.]]  There is, of course, a simple explanation for Grossmann's mistake: insofar as the
Grundrisse was not available to him, he could not be expected to know its argument.
The same excuse obviously cannot be made for Lapides.  [[Lebowitz again resorts
to needless personal sniping.  And as we saw, the contents of the
Grundrisse are not relevant to Grossmann's argument about Marx's
methodological change. K.L.]]
     There are many such examples of theoretical lapses in Lapides' article. Rather
than pursue them, however, space limitations dictate a focus on the evidence for the
significance of the "missing book".  
     [[After making various false allegations and failing to
substantiate a single one, Lebowitz now reveals the bankruptcy of his
position.  If he really had evidence of "many...theoretical lapses" it is
impossible to believe that he would not specify them. K.L.]]

A Pertinent Question

     There is a simple question that must be answered by all those who view the
analysis in Capital as complete. Where did Marx remove the assumption that the
standard of necessity for workers is constant?    Even though he was well aware of the
historical and social element in the value of labor-power, Marx nevertheless assumed in
Capital (Marx, 1977: 655) that "the quantity of the means of subsistence required is given
at any particular epoch in any particular society, and can therefore be treated as a
constant magnitude."
     [[At last we come to a theoretical question free of gratuitous
personal insult and innuendo that have so marred Lebowitz's critique. 
It deserves a thorough examination, after which it too will be seen to
fall apart as a basis for his argument.  But because he regards it as the
foundation for his thesis, on which he ultimately rests his case, it
should also be tested independently from this defense of my paper.  I
hope to be able therefore to give an extended response to this particular
argument elsewhere, perhaps in S&S.
     For now I will make these few observations: It is a rather dogmatic
reading of Capital to imagine that Marx's methodological assumptions
are rigid and absolute, controlling his entire discussion.  They are not,
and the evidence for this will be presented in due course.  Marx is too
fluid a thinker to impose any kind of strait jacket on his analysis.  For
example, in the words just cited by Lebowitz from Capital, that "the
quantity of the means of subsistence required...can...be treated as a
constant magnitude," Lebowitz omits Marx's qualification that he is
speaking only of "the means of subsistence habitually required by the
average worker" (my emphasis).  Lebowitz also fails to mention that Marx
gives two important factors accounting for "great variations" in the
value of labor power which, he says, are to be "excluded in the
following investigation" (Marx 1977, 655).  In other words, Marx's method
is more complex and his analysis more multi-dimensional than Lebowitz,
with his simplistic approach, is able to acknowledge.
     To take this a step further, Marx states that for purposes of
analysis commodities, including labor power, are bought and sold at
their value, and thus workers receive as wages the value of that labor
power.  Readers of Capital will recall that Marx observes more than
once that this is not the case in reality.  The same applies to its
methodological corollary, that this value is assumed to be held to a
constant quantity so that other factors in a dynamic equation may be
analyzed.  Throughout Capital Marx discusses the value of labor power
in a manner that clearly shows this.  (See, e.g. Chapter 17, "Changes of
Magnitude in the Price of Labour Power and in Surplus Value.")  Thus, he
never says, to quote Lebowitz, that "the standard of necessity for
workers is constant."  He does not even use that expression--he speaks of
"the standard of necessary labour," not the "standard of necessity,"
which suggests something else.
     Not only was Marx "well aware," as Lebowitz puts it, of the
historical and social element in the value of labor-power, he elevates it
to a major position within his theory, going far beyond what all
previous economists had said on this question.  As I have argued:
     "An emphasis on the traditional standard of living forming part of
     the value of labor power, what Marx calls the 'historical or
     social element,' is now regarded as a hallmark of his wage theory,
     but as we saw, political economy had long known of this element
     in the wage equation.  What he did that was new was to highlight
     this aspect of wages, to free it from the false views encumbering it,
     and to bring it into association with his theory of the class
     struggle.  By bringing it into prominence and transforming it into
     an active principle of wage determination, he showed workers that
     the value of their labor power lay to a certain extent in their
     own hands" (Lapides 1998, 177).
Marx discussed the historical element in Capital and in other texts, such
as Value, Price and Profit.  The "number and extent of [the worker's] so-
called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are
themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore
to a great extent on the degree of civilisation of a country. . . . there
enters into the determination of the value of labour power a historical
and moral element" (CW35, 181).
     Finally, Lebowitz's contention that Marx never relaxed "the
standard of necessity" reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of his wage theory.  In Marx's theory "necessary labor" is that
portion of the work day during which the worker (re)produces values
equivalent to the value of his or her labor power, i.e., the wage.  As
Marx makes clear, this value is one thing, while the actual mass of
commodities consumed by the worker, what we call real wages, is quite
another.  Lebowitz's specious use of the expression "standard of
necessity" blurs this distinction.  Thus, for purposes of analysis the value
of labor power may be assumed to be constant without suggesting at all
that the worker's standard of living is inflexible.  Marx makes this point
very carefully, in Capital and the 1861-63 Manuscript (see below).  K.L.]] 
     Now, unless one understands why Marx made this assumption in the first place,
the significance of its appearance (and the failure to remove it) in Capital will remain
obscure. But, the evidence is there for anyone to see. As Marx (1973: 817) argued in the
Grundrisse, it is necessary to make such fixed suppositions in order to focus first upon
the theoretical questions immediately on hand: "only by holding them fast at the
beginning is their development possible without confounding everything." Recognizing
that the standard of necessary labor changed,  however, he fully intended to relax this
assumption: "To consider those changes themselves belongs altogether to the chapter
treating of wage labour."  [[Here Lebowitz inserts the following footnote:
"One can find in the Grundrisse here the basis for the observation by
Rubel that Lapides (155) claims was 'pure invention.'"  What had I written? 
"Rubel's claim that Marx declared 'that Capital was to treat neither
"wage labor" nor "landed property"' is pure invention."  I stand by this
and will now show that both Rubel and Lebowitz distort the record to
fit their argument.  Rubel writes: "The more attentive reader will even
remark that Marx was explicit in this regard, formally declaring that
Capital was to treat neither 'wage labour' nor 'landed property.'  In
Capital he deliberately called attention to these rubrics, the first time
at the beginning of a discussion of wages in their diverse forms, where he
states: 'An exposition of all these forms, however, belongs to the special
study of wage-labor, and not therefore to this book (MEW23, 565)" (Rubel
1981, 193).  (It should be noted that Marx did not write "this book" but
"this work."  A small difference, perhaps, but a significant one, especially
in this context.)  Marx's words are from the beginning of Chapter 20 of
Capital, "Time Wages," not the Grundrisse (as Lebowitz seems to believe).
The reader can judge whether or not Marx's intention was accurately
reported by Rubel.  Restoring Marx's words to their original context is
also illuminating.  He writes: "Wages themselves again take many forms, a
fact not recognisable in the ordinary economic treatises which,
exclusively interested in the material side of the question, neglect every
difference of form.  An exposition of all these forms however, belongs
to the special study of wage labour, not therefore to this work.  Still
the two fundamental forms must be briefly worked out here....Next it is
to be noted that the laws set forth, in the 17th chapter, on the changes
in the relative magnitudes of price of labour power and surplus value,
pass by a simple transformation of form, into laws of wages....It would be
useless to repeat here, with regard to the phenomenal form, what has
been already worked out in the substantial form" (CW35, 542-43). It
should be obvious that the claim that Marx's words just quoted mean
what Rubel and Lebowitz say they mean is plainly untrue.  All Marx is
saying is that a study of each and every form that wages take is a
separate inquiry. Any conscientious author would make the same point.
K.L.]]  The same point is apparent in the 2 April 1858 letter (Marx and Engels, 1983:
298) in which Marx told Engels about his six-book plan and where he explained that
wages initially would be assumed to be at their minimum: "Movements in wages
themselves and the rise and fall of the minimum will be considered under wage labour."
Again, the reason offered was one of analytical method: "Only by this procedure is it
possible to discuss one relation without discussing the rest." 
     The particular theoretical question on hand (which justified the assumption of a
fixed set of necessaries) was the need to understand the nature of capital. Marx was very
clear and consistent in his view that changes in the needs of workers were not properly
part of the subject matter of Capital. That is now demonstrated by the recent
publication of Marx's Economic Manuscript of 1861-63: 
The problem of these movements in the level of the workers' needs, as also that of the
rise and fall of the market price of labour capacity above or below this level, do not
belong here, where the general capital-relation is to be developed, but in the doctrine of
the wages of labour.... All questions relating to it [the level of workers' needs] as not a
given but a variable magnitude belong to the investigation of wage labour in particular
and do not touch its general relationship to capital. (Marx: 1988, 44-5) [Footnote:]
Lapides proposes (140) that the new availability of this Economic Manuscript of 1961-63
"has placed on the agenda a reevaluation of Marx's intentions as to his 'economics'", but
he does not seem to find any significance in these passages.  [[Although my paper
was primarily devoted to the translation of Grossmann's 1929 essay, the
significance of The Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 for Marx's plan of
work is examined more fully in my book on Marx's wage theory. K.L.]]
     To understand the nature of capital, in short, we do not need to explore
variations in the level of workers' needs. Indeed, "the only thing of importance is that it
[the level of workers' needs] should be viewed as given, determinate" (Marx: 1988, 45).
As Marx subsequently noted in "The Results of the Immediate Process of Production",
"for the analysis of capital it is a matter of complete indifference whether the level of the
worker's needs is assumed to be high or low"; and, he once again indicated that
consideration of variations in the standard of necessity belonged in the "investigation of
wage labour in particular":
     The level of the necessaries of life whose total value constitutes the value of
     labour-power can itself rise or fall. The analysis of these variations, however,
     belongs not here but in the theory of wages. (Marx: 1977, 1068-69)

     We now have a consistent thread from the Grundrisse (1857-8) to the "Results"
(1864-5). Does it extend as well to Capital? Well, we know that Marx did in Capital
exactly what he planned to do--- hold the standard of necessity constant. But, we know
more than that. Marx very clearly indicated that the "investigation of wage labour in
particular" was outside the scope of Capital. He did so at the beginning of Chapter 20 of
Volume I of Capital when noting the various forms that wages take: "An exposition of
all these forms belongs to the special study of wage-labour, and not, therefore, to this
work" (Marx: 1977, 683. Emphasis added.) In short, there can be no question at all as to
a missing work on wage-labor.  [[According to the rules of evidence, the fact
that Marx mentioned that "the special study of wage-labour" was beyond
the scope of his work cannot be taken to indicate, much less prove, an
identity between that special study and a putative "missing work." K.L.]]  

On the Matter of the Lacuna

     For Lapides, the idea that the "Book on Wage-Labor" was unwritten, leaving a
significant "theoretical lacuna" (134) in Marx's economics, is sufficiently disturbing to
require a defense of the merits of Capital. [[What I find "disturbing" is not "the
idea that a 'Book on Wage-Labor' was unwritten" but rather Lebowitz's
assertion that Marx's actual theory of wages and wage labor, a theory
that is indispensable to the progress of the working-class movement, does
not exist. K.L.]]  It is all somewhat besides the point. Once it is acknowledged that
there was a special study of wage-labor which Marx saw as a work separate from Capital,
the matter becomes one of attempting to determine the contents of that missing work. 
[[To repeat, Lebowitz conflates two different, logically distinct
questions: "a special study of wage-labor" and a "missing work." K.L.]] 
And, this is a process for which bibliographical evidence must be supplemented by
theoretical understanding. Since this is the subject of a book (Lebowitz, 1992),  the
question obviously cannot be explored in any detail here. [[Lebowitz has accused me
at OPE-L of "scholarly dishonesty" because my book on Marx's wage
theory does not cite this critique of my Grossmann paper.  As I explained
to the list at the time, I did not believe that his critique satisfied normal
criteria to warrant inclusion--that it was lacking in substance, and in
any case I did refer to his book Beyond Capital.  But Lebowitz repeated
his insulting accusation, even insisting it was "for the record."  Yet now
we see that he himself admits that the issue on which we disagree
"cannot be explored in any detail here" and refers readers instead to his
book.  So who is guilty of dishonesty?  K.L.]]  However, we can say one thing
for certain: it is incontestable that the investigation of wage labor in particular was to be
the place where the assumption that the standard of necessity is constant was to be
removed and the analysis of its variations pursued.
     A simple point, but the implications are major. For one, if a fixed standard of
necessity is no longer assumed, then productivity increases in the production of
necessaries in themselves will not lead to a reduction in necessary labor and the value of
labor-power. Instead, the effect of the falling value of necessaries will be to increase what
workers can purchase with their money-wages and, thus, the level of the necessaries of
life which become second nature to them.  So, there is an obvious question for those
who view the analysis in Capital as complete: what does it mean for Marx's discussion of
relative surplus value if productivity increases produce corresponding increases in the
standard of necessity? Clearly, the requisite conditions for the generation of relative
surplus value must be explored much more precisely under these circumstances
(Lebowitz, 1991, 1992).
     [[Here in fact is the scenario that Marx envisages, both in the
manuscript of 1861-63 and in Capital: "they [the workers] achieve a
certain quantitative participation in the general growth of wealth"
Marx 1971, 312; "Indeed, relative surplus value might well rise
continuously, and the value of labour capacity, hence the value of
average wages, fall continuously, yet despite this the range of the
worker's means of subsistence and therefore the pleasures of his life
could expand continuously.  For this is conditioned by the quality and
quantity of the use values (commodities) he can appropriate, not by their
exchange value" (CW30, 245).  In short, given a sufficient development in
the productivity of labor, "The worker's life situation would have
improved despite the fall in the value of his labour capacity" (CW30, 250). 
(This is also restated later, CW34, 65-66.)  And in Capital, he writes: With
an increase of productivity it is possible that "both the labourer and the
capitalist may simultaneously be able to appropriate a greater quantity
of these necessaries, without any change in the price of labour power or
in surplus value."  Moreover, it is possible for an ongoing fall in the
price of labour power "to be accompanied by a constant growth in the
mass of the labourer's means of subsistence" (CW35, 523). (See Lapides 1998,
156, 192.) K.L.]]
     Removal of that fixed assumption which allowed Marx to explore the nature of
capital "without confounding things" means we have to consider more closely the place
of class struggle in determining the standard of necessity. Again, this is a question not
explored in Capital, which has nothing to say about the struggle for higher wages. 
[[This is untrue.  Though Marx does not say much about the struggle for
higher wages in Capital he does refer to it several times.  And as I show
in my paper (Lapides 1992, 142) and in my book (Lapides 1998, 229, 234) he
indicated that he intended to discuss this question further (which he
did do in other texts; see, e.g. Lapides 1998, 179) in "Volume II" of Capital.
K.L.]]  Although we understand quite well how and why capital struggles to "reduce
wages to their physical minimum" (Marx: 1985, 146), there is no consideration in Capital
of how (despite capital's own tendency) workers would not permit wages "to be reduced
to the absolute minimum; on the contrary, they achieve a certain quantitative
participation in the general growth of wealth" (Marx: 1971, 312). There is, of course, a
premise for workers making any such gains; it is that matters not be left to "isolated,
individual bargaining". Accordingly, if the "investigation of wage labour in particular"
is to analyze changes in the standard of necessity, it must include examination of the
manner in which the unity of workers is critical to their ability to press "in the opposite
direction" to capital (Marx: 1985, 146).  
     [[Lebowitz seems unaware of the fact that Marx was among the
first to promote the idea that unity and organization are indispensable
to the workers' ability to resist the tyranny of capital.  This was also
fully examined by Engels in his Condition of the Working Class in
England, a work that Marx deeply appreciated and whose contents he
saw no reason to repeat.  Engels' book, in which "the Marxist position on
trade unions...was staked out for the first time" (Lapides 1987, x), is not
mentioned once by Lebowitz in Beyond Capital. K.L.]]
     Similarly, insofar as the problem of the "movements in the level of the workers'
needs" was set aside, it is understandable that there is nothing in Capital about the
manner in which new needs are constantly created for workers. Yet, we know that Marx
consistently stressed that the very expansion of capitalist production provides the
foundation for the growth of workers' needs. The creation of "new needs arising from
society itself", he (1973: 409) argued, is "a condition of production founded on capital".
And, that was not a merely incidental characteristic of capitalism. It is this creation of
new needs for workers, Marx declared (1973: 287) in the Grundrisse, "on which the
historic justification, but also the contemporary power of capital rests". As he
commented (1977: 1062) in the "Results", the very growth of capital means that the
worker's "subjective poverty, his need and dependence grow larger in proportion. His
deprivation and its plentitude match each other exactly." Is it far-fetched, then, to
suggest that the "doctrine of the wages of labour" includes within it the consideration of
the growth of needs and the immiseration which lead workers to struggle for higher
wages?
     There is certainly much more which belonged not in Capital (where the general
capital-relation was to be developed) but in the special study of wage-labor. In
considering the standard of necessity and its changes, we are necessarily concerned with
the question of the production and reproduction of the wage-laborer. There is some
evidence that Marx intended this discussion to take place in the missing work. He
explicitly noted (1973: 520-1), for example, that there was a second moment of
production ("Moment IV"), which qualitatively differed from the moment of production
which fell within the circuit of capital; its place was clear: "Moment IV belongs in the
section on wages etc." Of course, here as elsewhere, a convincing argument requires
more than bibliographical evidence; it calls as well for theoretical demonstration.
Nevertheless, even to raise this issue poses critical questions: if the production and
reproduction of the wage-laborer, the necessary condition for the reproduction of capital,
was itself specifically to be explored in the section never written, how can we argue (as
Grossmann and Lapides do) that Capital "constitutes in essentials a self-contained
system" (Lapides, 144)?  [[The words "self-contained system" are Grossmann's;
I do not make this claim. K.L.]]
     That there are theoretical lacunae which can be attributed to the missing study of
"wage labour in particular" seems incontrovertible. How important these are, however,
is a matter which can not be resolved here. Their consideration, on the other hand,
would appear to deserve more attention than Lapides was prepared to grant.  [[I believe
that I have amply demonstrated my commitment to the study of Marx's
life-long interest in the fundamental questions pertaining to wage
labor. K.L.]]

The Renewal of Marxist Scholarship

     It is neither surprising nor unusual that the initial reaction to the proposition that
something significant was lost because of the absence of the special study of wage labor
is to worry about the political implications. [[As I have said, my concern is not
over "the proposition that something significant was lost" but that
"something significant," Marx's very real theory of wage labor, a theory
that needs greater study and to which I devoted an entire book, is
alleged to be "missing." K.L.]]  "There is much at stake in this debate," Lapides (158)
tells us. Nevertheless, a conscientious study of Marx's theoretical legacy requires us to
take seriously the material now available in the works that have recently become
available to us. Just as the Grundrisse has allowed for significant new insights into the
nature and development of Marx's thought, so also may a careful examination of the
Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 and the various draft materials for Capital. [[To
repeat, Lebowitz showed no interest in the complete text of the Econo-
mic Manuscript of 1861-63 prior to reading my article, which, he claims,
"has little to offer Marxist scholarship."  K.L.]]  (In this respect, the apparent
suspension of the publication of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels is a serious
blow to Marxist scholarship everywhere.) There will be some, of course, who would
prefer to hold on to the tradition of the Marx they know without any amendments.
[[As Lebowitz knows, I have labored for more than twenty years to
challenge deeply-held assumptions concerning Marx and to radically
broaden our knowledge of his legacy.  I have brought to greater public
awareness his theory of the labor movement (Lapides 1979, 1987) and his
theory of wages and wage labor (Lapides 1992, 1994, 1997, 1998).  These
theories for too long have been falsified and neglected by scholars; if
Lebowitz had his way they would be entombed forever, beneath a stone
marked "missing book on wage labor."  K.L.]]  However, a more appropriate
maxim for Marxist scholarship is that of the relentless criticism of all that exists,
relentless in the sense that it is not afraid of the results it arrives at.  [By attacking my
efforts to extend our knowledge of Marx's theory of wage labor,
Lebowitz is the one who appears to be afraid of the results arrived at. 
His misrepresentations, false innuendoes, personal vindictiveness, and
unsupported allegations indicate someone who is himself deeply fearful
of genuine scholarship that happens to undermine the credibility of his
pet thesis. K.L.]]

REFERENCES

Lapides, Kenneth. 1992. "Henryk Grossmann and the Debate on the
Theoretical Status of Marx's Capital." Science & Society, 56, No.2 (Summer
1992).

Lebowitz, Michael A. 1976. "Marx's Falling Rate of Profit: A Dialectical
View." Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol IX, No. 2 (May).

Lebowitz, Michael A. 1982. "The One-Sidedness of Capital." Review of
Radical Political Economics. Vol. 14, No.4 (Winter).

Lebowitz, Michael A. 1987. "The Political Economy of Wage-Labor." Science
& Society. Vol. 51, No. 3. (Fall).

Lebowitz, Michael A. 1991. "The Significance of Marx's Missing Book on
Wage-Labor." Rethinking Marxism. Vol. 4, No.2 (Summer).

Lebowitz, Michael A. 1992. Beyond Capital: Marx's Political Economy of the
Working Class. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. 1983. Collected Works of Marx and
Engels, Vol. 40. New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl. 1971. Theories of Surplus Value, Vol. III. Moscow: Progress
Publishers.

Marx, Karl. 1973. Grundrisse. New York: Vintage Books.

Marx, Karl. 1977. Capital, Vol. I. New York: Vintage Books.

Marx, Karl. 1985. Value, Price and Profit. In Collected Works of Marx and
Engels, Vol. 20. New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl. 1988. Economic Manuscript of 1861-63. In Collected Works of
Marx and Engels, Vol. 30. New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl. n.d. Theories of Surplus Value, Vol. I (Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House).

Rosdolsky, Roman. 1977. The Making of Marx's "Capital". London: Pluto
Press.

[[Supplementary References
Lapides, Kenneth.  1979.  "Karl Marx on the Trade Unions." Workers
           World, April 27: 8.
þþþ, ed.  1987.  Marx and Engels on the Trade Unions.  New York:
           Praeger. 
þþþ.  1994.  "Henryk Grossmann on Marx's Wage Theory and the
           'Increasing Misery' Controversy." History of Political
           Economy 26(2), Summer: 239-66.
þþþ.  1997.  "Grossmann's Model of Capitalist Breakdown: A False View
           of Marx's Wage Theory."  Science & Society 61(2), Summer: 229-
           36.
þþþ.  1998.  Marx's Wage Theory in Historical Perspective: Its Origins,
           Development, and Interpretation.  Westport: Praeger.]]