It goes without saying (or does it?) that socialists should support international working-class solidarity and oppose imperialist wars, but what are the specific causal mechanisms which specially change wages during wartime? At least two mechanisms seem to be at work: 1) As a nation enters a war, the industrial reserve army is dried up as workers (voluntarily or involuntarily) become part of the armed forces and as the remaining workers are employed, especially producing additional military goods. This has traditionally meant that war-time under capitalism has meant a prolonged period of 'full employment'. Indeed, the meaning of what 'full employment' is can change during war-time if members of working-class families who weren't traditionally part of the waged working-class become wage-earners (e.g. in the US during WW2 when large numbers of women became part of the waged working-class). This combination of full employment and a shift in production from commodities which enter into the reproduction of the working class to military goods has often manifested itself in a condition of 'excess demand' for commodities which enter into the reproduction of labor-power (as customarily understood): i.e. there tend to be 'shortages' of commodities that workers can exchange their wages against. The response, predictably, is for capitalists to increase the prices of those commodities. The result is the frequently observed phenomenon of 'war-time inflation' (of course, other forms of 'war profiteering' also tend to happen). A consequence of this inflation is for the living standards of workers to be decreased during war-time. Expressing this with more familiar Marxist terms, this causes real wages to be epressed below the value of labor-power during war-time. Some might think that 'wage and price controls' might be used to mitigate this affect. Yet, the experience -- at least on the several occasions when 'controls' have been adopted in the US -- has been that the state has rigidly enforced wage controls (e.g. a 'wage freeze' -- plus no-strike pledges -- during WWII) but has simultaneously granted enough 'exemptions' to the price controls such that the prices of commodities sold to the working-class (and to the capitalist class for luxury consumption) tends to increase. The above is a relatively non-controversial analysis -- although I'm sure there are those who could argue that it could be entirely explained without the use of 'value-theoretic' terms. Indeed, it might even be expressed using Keynesian analysis. 2) As a capitalist nation prepares for and enters war, the state uses institutions -- such as the the media, educational institutions, and religious institutions -- to drum-up support for a war. Typically, bourgeois political parties tend to unite behind this call for war and 'labor leaders' (sic) of trade unions support the calls for war (indeed, much of the 'Left' in the 20th Century has supported their national bourgeoisie in calls for war). Beyond that, 'patriotism' and nationalism have remained very strong (conservative) beliefs among the working-class. Indeed, I don't think it would be unfair to say that more workers internationally identify themselves as citizens of a particular nation than as workers. This has meant, in practice, that workers have voluntarily agreed to war-time sacrifices 'for the greater good'. The consequence of this nationalism is a depression of wages below the value of labor-power during war-time. This is a powerful stimulus to the economic growth of individual capitalist nations. Examples of strikes during 'popular' wars are very rare (e.g. the Montgomery Ward strike and the threatened coal miners strike during WWII in the US). This reinforces the trend for there to be a depression of wages below the VLP. If, however, popular support for an imperialist war weakens (as happened in some nations during WWI), then there is a heightened potential for increased wages. Of course, international working-class solidarity and mass opposition to war would tend to mitigate against this trend and could lead to (among many other things) increased wages and bargaining power for workers. Yet, promoting international working-class unity has proven in practice to be more easily suggested than done. Indeed, sad to say, workers are often the most ardent supporters of war -- even though they are also the most frequent victims. Many leftists will nonetheless (hopefully) attempt to build anti-war movements but such efforts are often dangerous to those activists (as internal opposition to war is often criminalized) and tends to take a protracted period of struggle to change the consensus about the war. Thus, eventually, there was mass opposition to the Vietnam War in the US, but it took many years and sacrifices before the anti-war movement gained mass support. In some more recent wars (e.g. the Gulf War), the wars have ended before there is time for mass opposition movements to grow. (*NB*: in the case of 'short wars', the first mechanism described above is unlikely to happen. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there is sufficient time for the second mechanism to manifest itself as a generalized depression of wages either). *Question*: Does a depression of wages below the VLP during one period (conjuncture) imply that there are others periods (conjunctures) in which wages rise above the VLP? Or, should we conceive of the latter possibility as an increase in the VLP itself as traditionally and customarily understood? In solidarity, Jerry
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