One of the world's stranger relationships
By Charles J. Hanley
AP Special Correspondent
Posted April 16, 1997
EDITOR'S NOTE -- King Abdel Aziz brought sheep for slaughter. President
Roosevelt brought his own Navy cruiser. From the start, at that 1945
meeting, Saudi Arabia and America were an odd couple. This is the first in a
three-part series looking at where the ''special relationship'' is headed.
PRINCE SULTAN AIR BASE, Saudi Arabia -- Whenever she goes to town, Donna
Caswell first straps on her body armor. Then the U.S. Air Force
sergeant drapes herself from head to toe in a black robe.
The first protects her against America's Saudi enemies, the second against the
ire of its Saudi
friends.
''It's, well, interesting,'' Caswell says.
A half-century after they first joined forces, the ''special relationship''
between the United States
and Saudi Arabia stands at the heart of global geopolitics -- and at the top of
any list of
''interesting'' alliances.
One partner is dynamic and democratic, the other traditional and feudal. One is
open, the other
closed and repressive. One celebrates diversity, the other hides half its
population in veiled
anonymity.
A single shared interest binds superpower to desert kingdom: One needs to buy
oil, the other
needs to sell it.
''I don't know much about the Saudis,'' another Air Force sergeant, Sal
Galaviz, admitted to a visitor
to this remote base. ''All I know is they're our allies -- 'good guys,' like
us.''
But the ''good guy'' marriage of convenience is proving, in some ways, an
inconvenient one.
Irritations and disagreements trouble the military partnership. Two terror
bombs have brutally announced grassroots Saudi opposition to the Americans.
And Saudi infidelity to one of its vows -- to expand its defense forces -- may
eventually take some charm out of the relationship.
About 20,000 U.S. servicemen and women are on duty
in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, keeping an
eye on Iraq, Iran and the industrial world's oil
supply.
From this tent city on the desert's edge, some 80
Air Force warplanes, ready to defend the kingdom, fly patrols over
southern Iraq. Three hundred miles away, the Gulf's
waters are crowded with up to 35 Navy warships. Scattered
elsewhere, equipment is being ''prepositioned'' for
thousands of Army soldiers to be flown in during a crisis.
The U.S. military commitment strengthened as
America's dependence on imported oil grew through the 1990s. Few
contrary voices were heard in Washington.
''There still seems to be a consensus that it is in
our best interests to be there in the way we are,'' Ray Mabus, until
recently American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said
in a telephone interview.
That ''way'' is expensive. Analysts estimate the Persian Gulf commitment costs
U.S. taxpayers at least $40 billion a year. In some Washington quarters,
that looks excessive.
''How do we want to deal with our energy problems? By having a war every
several years?'' asked Joseph Romm, the Energy Department's conservation
chief. ''Clearly you need to have an approach that reduces American dependence
on foreign oil.''
Mounting costs are also now raising questions in Congress. Senior Republican
senators say they want a review of what they call ''serious policy issues''
regarding the Gulf commitment.
Other U.S. officials have a more immediate concern: Local hostility to the
American troops is inflaming the opposition to the Saudi monarchy. The
''solution'' -- the U.S. military shield -- is becoming part of the problem.
In Riyadh, the capital, Saudi officials sound reassuring.
''I don't think there's a strong resentment of the Americans. They're not a
colonial force,'' said royal adviser Abdel-Aziz Al-Fayez. But he conceded,
''Not
everybody has the same feeling.''
Since the bombings, which together killed 24 Americans in November 1995 and
last June, the U.S. profile has been lowered. American forces have been
consolidated in two locations -- a high-security compound outside Riyadh and
the Prince Sultan Air Base 80 miles south of the capital.
The few who travel off-base follow strict security rules. And women, like
postal specialist Caswell, must also don the full-length ''abaya,'' to avoid
harassment by Muslim religious police enforcing ''the veil'' on females.
Everyday dealings are tense in other ways, too. The Air Force must disguise
chapels as ''morale centers,'' for example, because other religions are
outlawed
here. And a Saudi commander recently declared the U.S. side of this base off-
limits to his troops because 400 Air Force women work there.
Larger handicaps also burden the U.S. mission:
--The Saudis won't allow U.S. Navy vessels to make port visits.
--They rebuffed an American proposal to stockpile military equipment on Saudi
soil for a ''crisis'' brigade.
--They refused to allow the Air Force to hit Iraqi targets from here last
September during reprisal strikes for Iraqi military operations in northern
Iraq.
--Since bankrolling the Gulf War, the Saudis have declined to contribute to
U.S. operations like a huge 1994 deployment of American troops in Kuwait.
Although little cash is forthcoming for operations, Pentagon officials are
quick to point out the Saudis are writing big checks for other things -- $62
billion
in U.S.-made armaments between 1990 and 1995.
Saudi Arabia's role as the U.S. defense industry's biggest foreign customer is
a special link in the special relationship. It also points up a shortcoming:
Too
many ultramodern warships stay in port and too many missiles in boxes because
the Saudis are undermanned and undertrained.
''Their ranks are too thin,'' a U.S. admiral in the region said privately.
''After a week's operation, they're tired.''
After the Gulf War, the Saudis said they would double their armed forces to
200,000 men by
1998. They would be a ''pillar'' of Gulf defense, the Pentagon said. Islamic
clergy, ashamed the
nation had been rescued by non-Muslims, petitioned the king for even more -- a
half-million-man
army.
But international experts estimate Saudi strength at only 105,000 as of last
year, when Saudi
defense spending was actually reduced by 9 percent. The Defense Ministry
declined a reporter's
requests to discuss such subjects.
''Saudi Arabia is pretending it is building a strong army,'' concluded Said
Aburish, London-based
author of a study of the ruling House of Saud.
He and other knowledgeable observers believe the Saud family faces a dilemma:
The U.S.
military presence is provocative to their people, but a powerful Saudi army
might threaten family
rule.
And so the odd couple continues to dig in -- side by side, but not too close --
in the desert. And
what about when Saddam Hussein, the enemy, eventually falls from power in Iraq?
Will the U.S.
military leave?
The Saudi ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, says he sees no
need for a ''permanent structure.'' But one Gulf specialist, former Israeli
government adviser Alexander Bligh, sees a different outcome.
''As long as there is oil in Saudi Arabia,'' he predicted, ''the Americans will
be there.''
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