Nicky recently wrote: >Thanks Rakesh, for all these posts: Don't encourage me. rb > > INTERVIEW: Chomsky (ZNet).. > > Interview with Chomsky > April 2, 2002 > > Z: Is there a qualitative change in what's happening now? > > I think there is a qualitative change. The goal of the Oslo process was > accurately described in 1998 by Israeli academic Shlomo Ben-Ami just > before he joined the Barak government, going on to become Barak's chief > negotiator at Camp David in summer 2000. Ben-Ami observed that "in > practice, the Oslo agreements were founded on a neo-colonialist basis, > on a life of dependence of one on the other forever." With these goals, > the Clinton-Rabin-Peres agreements were designed to impose on the > Palestinians "almost total dependence on Israel," creating "an extended > colonial situation," which is expected to be the "permanent basis" for > "a situation of dependence." The function of the Palestinian Authority > (PA) was to control the domestic population of the Israeli-run > neocolonial dependency. That is the way the process unfolded, step by > step, including the Camp David suggestions. The Clinton-Barak stand > (left vague and unambiguous) was hailed here as "remarkable" and > "magnanimous," but a look at the facts made it clear that it was -- as > commonly described in Israel -- a Bantustan proposal; that is presumably > the reason why maps were carefully avoided in the US mainstream. It is > true that Clinton-Barak advanced a few steps towards a Bantustan-style > settlement of the kind that South Africa instituted in the darkest days > of Apartheid. Just prior to Camp David, West Bank Palestinians were > confined to over 200 scattered areas, and Clinton-Barak did propose an > improvement: consolidation to three cantons, under Israeli control, > virtually separated from one another and from the fourth canton, a small > area of East Jerusalem, the center of Palestinian life and of > communications in the region. And of course separated from Gaza, where > the outcome was left unclear. > > But now that plan has apparently been shelved in favor of demolition of > the PA. That means destruction of the institutions of the potential > Bantustan that was planned by Clinton and his Israeli partners; in the > last few days, even a human rights center. The Palestinian figures who > were designated to be the counterpart of the Black leaders of the > Bantustans are also under attack, though not killed, presumably because > of the international consequences. The prominent Israeli scholar Ze'ev > Sternhell writes that the government "is no longer ashamed to speak of > war when what they are really engaged in is colonial policing, which > recalls the takeover by the white police of the poor neighborhoods of > the blacks in South Africa during the apartheid era." This new policy is > a regression below the Bantustan model of South Africa 40 years ago to > which Clinton-Rabin-Peres-Barak and their associates aspired in the Oslo > "peace process." > > None of this will come as a surprise to those who have been reading > critical analyses for the past 10 years, including plenty of material > posted regularly on Znet, reviewing developments as they proceeded. > > Exactly how the Israeli leadership intends to implement these programs > is unclear -- to them too, I presume. > > It is convenient in the US, and the West, to blame Israel and > particularly Sharon, but that is unfair and hardly honest. Many of > Sharon's worst atrocities were carried out under Labor governments. > Peres comes close to Sharon as a war criminal. Furthermore, the prime > responsibility lies in Washington, and has for 30 years. That is true of > the general diplomatic framework, and also of particular actions. Israel > can act within the limits established by the master in Washington, > rarely beyond. > > Z: What's the meaning of Friday's Security Council Resolution? > > The primary issue was whether there would be a demand for immediate > Israeli withdrawal from Ramallah and other Palestinian areas that the > Israeli army had entered in the current offensive, or at least a > deadline for such withdrawal. The US position evidently prevailed: there > is only a vague call for "withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian > cities," no time frame specified. The Resolution therefore accords with > the official US stand, largely reiterated in the press: Israel is under > attack and has the right of self-defense, but shouldn't go too far in > punishing Palestinians, at least too visibly. The facts -- hardly > controversial -- are quite different. Palestinians have been trying to > survive under Israeli military occupation, now in its 35th year. It has > been harsh and brutal throughout, thanks to decisive US military and > economic support, and diplomatic protection, including the barring of > the long-standing international consensus on a peaceful political > settlement. There is no symmetry in this confrontation, not the > slightest, and to frame it in terms of Israeli self-defense goes beyond > even standard forms of distortion in the interests of power. The > harshest condemnations of Palestinian terror, which are proper and have > been for over 30 years, leave these basic facts unchanged. > > In scrupulously evading the central immediate issues, the Friday > Resolution is similar to the Security Council Resolution of March 12, > which elicited much surprise and favorable notice because it not only > was not vetoed by the US, in the usual pattern, but was actually > initiated by Washington. The Resolution called for a "vision" of a > Palestinian state. It therefore did not rise to the level of South > Africa 40 years ago when the Apartheid regime did not merely announce a > "vision" but actually established Black-run states that were at least as > viable and legitimate as what the US and Israel had been planning for > the occupied territories. > > Z: What is the U.S. up to now? What U.S. interests are at stake at this > juncture? > > The US is a global power. What happens in Israel-Palestine is a > sidelight. There are many factors entering into US policies. Chief among > them in this region of the world is control over the world's major > energy resources. The US-Israel alliance took shape in that context. By > 1958, the National Security Council concluded that a "logical corollary" > of opposition to growing Arab nationalism "would be to support Israel as > the only strong pro-Western power left in the Middle East." That is an > exaggeration, but an affirmation of the general strategic analysis, > which identified indigenous nationalism as the primary threat (as > elsewhere in the Third World); typically called "Communist," though it > is commonly recognized in the internal record that this is a term of > propaganda and that Cold War issues were often marginal, as in the > crucial year of 1958. The alliance became firm in 1967, when Israel > performed an important service for US power by destroying the main > forces of secular Arab nationalism, considered a very serious threat to > US domination of the Gulf region. So matters continued, after the > collapse of the USSR as well. By now the US-Israel-Turkey alliance is a > centerpiece of US strategy, and Israel is virtually a US military base, > also closely integrated with the militarized US high-tech economy. > > Within that persistent framework, the US naturally supports Israeli > repression of the Palestinians and integration of the occupied > territories, including the neocolonial project outlined by Ben-Ami, > though specific policy choices have to be made depending on > circumstances. Right now, Bush planners continue to block steps towards > diplomatic settlement, or even reduction of violence; that is the > meaning, for example, of their veto of the Dec. 15 2001 Security Council > Resolution calling for steps towards implementing the US Mitchell plan > and introduction of international monitors to supervise the reduction of > violence. For similar reasons, the US boycotted the Dec. 5 international > meetings in Geneva (including the EU, even Britain) which reaffirmed > that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the occupied territories, > so that critically important US-Israeli actions there are "grave > breaches" of the Convention - war crimes, in simple terms - as the > Geneva declaration elaborated. That merely reaffirmed the Security > Council Resolution of October 2000 (US abstaining), which held once > again that the Convention applied to the occupied territories. That had > been the official US position as well, stated formally, for example, by > George Bush I when he was UN Ambassador. The US regularly abstains or > boycotts in such cases, not wanting to take a public stand in opposition > to core principles of international law, particularly in the light of > the circumstances under which the Conventions were enacted: to > criminalize formally the atrocities of the Nazis, including their > actions in the territories they occupied. The media and intellectual > culture generally cooperate by their own "boycott" of these unwelcome > facts: in particular, the fact that as a High Contracting Party, the US > government is legally obligated by solemn treaty to punish violators of > the Conventions, including its own political leadership. > > That's only a small sample. Meanwhile the flow of arms and economic > support for maintaining the occupation by force and terror and extending > settlements continues without any pause. > > Z: What's your opinion of the Arab summit? > > The Arab summit led to general acceptance of the Saudi Arabian plan, > which reiterated the basic principles of the long-standing international > consensus: Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories in the > context of a general peace agreement that would guarantee the right of > every state in the region, including Israel and a new Palestinian State, > to peace and security within recognized borders (the basic wording of UN > 242, amplified to include a Palestinian state). There is nothing new > about this. These are the basic terms of the Security Council resolution > of January 1976 backed by virtually the entire world, including the > leading Arab states, the PLO, Europe, the Soviet bloc, the non-aligned > countries -- in fact, everyone who mattered. It was opposed by Israel > and vetoed by the US, thereby vetoed from history. Subsequent and > similar initiatives from the Arab states, the PLO, and Western Europe > were blocked by the US, continuing to the present. That includes the > 1981 Fahd plan. That record too has been effectively vetoed from > history, for the usual reasons. > > US rejectionism in fact goes back 5 years earlier, to February 1971, > when President Sadat of Egypt offered Israel a full peace treaty in > return for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, not even bringing > up Palestinian national rights or the fate of the other occupied > territories. Israel's Labor government recognized this as a genuine > peace offer, but decided to reject it, intending to extend its > settlements to northeastern Sinai; that it soon did, with extreme > brutality, the immediate cause for the 1973 war. The plan for the > Palestinians under military occupation was described frankly to his > Cabinet colleagues by Moshe Dayan, one of the Labor leaders more > sympathetic to the Palestinian plight. Israel should make it clear that > "we have no solution, you shall continue to live like dogs, and whoever > wishes may leave, and we will see where this process leads." Following > that recommendation, the guiding principle of the occupation has been > incessant and degrading humiliation, along with torture, terror, > destruction of property, displacement and settlement, and takeover of > basic resources, crucially water. > > Sadat's 1971offer conformed to official US policy, but Kissinger > succeeded in instituting his preference for what he called "stalemate": > no negotiations, only force. Jordanian peace offers were also dismissed. > Since that time, official US policy has kept to the international > consensus on withdrawal (until Clinton, who effectively rescinded UN > resolutions and considerations of international law); but in practice, > policy has followed the Kissinger guidelines, accepting negotiations > only when compelled to do so, as Kissinger was after the near-debacle of > the 1973 war for which he shares major responsibility, and under the > conditions that Ben-Ami articulated. > > Official doctrine instructs us to focus attention on the Arab summit, as > if the Arab states and the PLO are the problem, in particular, their > intention to drive Israel into the sea. Coverage presents the basic > problem as vacillation, reservations, and qualifications in the Arab > world. There is little that one can say in favor of the Arab states and > the PLO, but these claims are simply untrue, as a look at the record > quickly reveals. > > The more serious press recognized that the Saudi plan largely reiterated > the Saudi Fahd Plan of 1981, claiming that that initiative was > undermined by Arab refusal to accept the existence of Israel. The facts > are again quite different. The 1981 plan was undermined by an Israeli > reaction that even its mainstream press condemned as "hysterical," > backed by the US. That includes Shimon Peres and other alleged doves, > who warned that acceptance of the Fahd plan would "threaten Israel's > very existence." An indication of the hysteria is the reaction of > Israel's President Haim Herzog, also considered a dove. He charged that > the "real author" of the Fahd plan was the PLO, and that it was even > more extreme than the January 1976 Security Council resolution that was > "prepared by" the PLO, at the time when he was Israel's UN Ambassador. > These claims can hardly be true, but they are an indication of the > desperate fear of a political settlement on the part of Israeli doves, > backed throughout by the US. The basic problem then, as now, traces back > to Washington, which has persistently backed Israel's rejection of a > political settlement in terms of the broad international consensus, > reiterated in essentials in the current Saudi proposals. > > Until such elementary facts as these are permitted to enter into > discussion, displacing the standard misrepresentation and deceit, > discussion is mostly beside the point. And we should not be drawn into > it -- for example, by implicitly accepting the assumption that > developments at the Arab summit are a critical problem. They have > significance, of course, but it is secondary. The primary problems are > right here, and it is our responsibility to face them and deal with > them, not to displace them to others. >
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