From: Diego Guerrero (diego.guerrero@cps.ucm.es)
Date: Wed Feb 19 2003 - 07:54:24 EST
Cyrus wrote: "The US war posture cannot be attributed to oil." I agree, and
since I have just written the short article below (sorry, in Spanish), let
me send it to you. All the best,
Diego
IRAK, PETRÓLEO, ECONOMÍA
Tanto si hay guerra contra Irak como si no; lo mismo si -caso de haberla- se
lleva a cabo en menor o mayor tiempo, o con más o menos "éxito" o fracaso
(según qué parte dé su versión); una cosa es clara: el problema principal
que tiene el mundo no se habrá terminado en absoluto.
Lo que se ventila en esta guerra anunciada no es fundamentalmente la
cuestión del petróleo, a pesar del romo economicismo del que hacen gala
tantos (especialmente, los no economistas). Ese es un problema permanente
desde que el petróleo es la fuente de energía por excelencia para las
técnicas productivas actuales. Que los gobiernos de los países dominantes se
comportan rapazmente es sólo otra manera de decir que existen imperios y que
su política de rapiña es precisamente eso que se suele llamar "imperialismo"
. Pero esta política existe tanto en periodos de guerra como en periodos de
paz. Por tanto, lo fundamental ahora es preguntarse por qué ciertas
situaciones de paz dan paso necesariamente a situaciones de guerra, o si,
por el contrario, la tesis recién sugerida no se acerca a la verdad tanto
como cree el autor de estas líneas.
Pero cuando uno repasa sus libros de historia del bachillerato, así como los
que ha leído en plena madurez intelectual, no puede menos de sorprenderle
que siga sin haber una auténtica explicación seria de las dos Guerras
Mundiales sufridas durante el siglo XX. No es que sea indudable que nos
espera la III Guerra Mundial, pero sí es cierto que ya se empiezan a oír,
aún esporádicamente pero cada vez con mayor frecuencia, referencias a la
necesidad de evitar una nueva conflagración de esa naturaleza (y a ver
pancartas con ese lema: en la manifestación de Madrid del sábado 15 de
febrero, sin ir más lejos).
La excelente película de Costa-Gavras (Amén, aún en cartelera) me hizo
recordar el otro día la espeluznante reflexión de Ernesto Sábato en Sobre
héroes y tumbas: "que el pueblo más alfabetizado del mundo era el que había
instaurado los campos de concentración para la tortura en masa y la
cremación de judíos y católicos". Reflexión que tiene una prolongación aun
más atroz: ¿duda alguien de lo fina que es la frontera que separa el mundo
de lo racional de la irracionalidad más extrema? ¿Querrá alguien recurrir a
la experiencia histórica para desmentir cuán rápidamente pueden países hasta
entonces amigos pasar a convertirse en suficientemente enemigos como para
declararse una guerra recíproca?
Sería una temeridad ponerse a jugar ahora a las adivinanzas, pero tantos
como se creyeron alguna vez el mito del fin de la historia deberían repasar
sus manuales de la escuela para descubrir por qué ese ave fénix que algunos
creyeron muerto hace no mucho renace con más fuerza -¡y no siempre para
bien!- cuanto más abundantes son las cenizas de las que resurge. No es el
momento de escribir de qué parte pueden estar, en el hipotético conflicto al
que se alude, los Estados Unidos o Francia, China, Alemania o Rusia, pero
quizás sea el momento de empezar a pensar en esa posibilidad como algo que
no es tan absurdo como parece.
Pero en lo que puede contribuir un economista a esta reflexión es en poner
quizás cierto orden en el marasmo de datos y estadísticas que nos rodea. Los
últimos 30 años de la economía de los países capitalistas desarrollados son
un gran fracaso si se los compara con los treinta anteriores. No sólo el
paro ha seguido aumentando década a década en la media de los países ricos
de la OCDE, sino que la tasa anual de crecimiento se ha reducido a la cuarta
parte, la inversión se ha hundido, la acumulación de capital se ha
ralentizado, el ahorro se ha visto esquilmado, y los desequilibrios
financieros se han multiplicado hasta un nivel desconocido nunca. Sobra
capital en la OCDE y sobra capital en el mundo, donde no sólo China, pero
también China, y otros países han ido haciéndose con una parte del tejido pr
oductivo (sobre todo industrial) mundial a costa de la participación de
otros que tenían una parte mayor en él pero que tienen necesariamente que
retroceder para dejar sitio a los recién llegados.
Desde luego, esta lucha competitiva es algo que ocurre de forma continua.
Pero no es lo mismo que tenga lugar en un contexto expansivo (donde lo que
hay que repartirse es una tarta cada vez más grande, y en nuestro caso una
tarta que crecía como nunca antes lo había hecho) que en el marco de una
onda larga depresiva caracterizada por tres décadas de estancamiento
relativo. No debe olvidarse que el estancamiento se genera como un intento
de solución del problema que está en la base. Aparte de otros recursos que
tiene el sistema para intentar desarrollar políticas anticíclicas -ya sea
mediante el recurso a la intervención estatal, ya mediante el estímulo al
crédito privado, que es la base de la sucesión de burbujas (inmobiliaria,
'nueva economía', Bolsas, hipotecas, dólar...) en la que se desenvuelve
recientemente nuestro jabonoso y resbaladizo mundo-, la mano invisible de
los capitalistas les lleva a desinvertir cuando las expectativas de
beneficio no son suficientes.
¿Pero qué ocurre si esa desinversión no se puede convertir, al ritmo
adecuado, en nuevos flujos de inversión dirigidos a nuevos campos
inexplorados... que, una vez hollados, se revelan, unos antes (las famosas
nuevas tecnologías) y otros después (la ingeniería financiera de ese ángel
de la guarda, destinado a despeñarse pronto a los infiernos, que se llama
Alan Greenspan), como nuevos callejones sin salida? ¿Qué pasa si, después de
refugiarse en el sector financiero, el sector financiero falla también? ¿Qué
sucede si los mercados mundiales, después de ver lo que ha ocurrido en Japón
en los últimos 14 años, empiezan a convencerse de que va a ocurrir algo
parecido en los Estados Unidos? No sé qué es lo que pasa, pero sé que lo que
puede ocurrir no es nada bueno.
Por favor, comparen la situación actual con la de la década de los treinta
del siglo XX. No exageren en los calificativos, que ya no hay ni
estalinistas ni nazis, al menos en sentido estricto. Pero sí que hay
capital, sí que hay una tasa de ganancia que no se recupera lo suficiente,
sí que hay una masa de beneficios que no crece al ritmo necesario, y también
una tasa de acumulación que se mueve con el mismo perfil que mostraba en los
años 1930s.
En esas condiciones no puede sorprender que la (llamémosla) irracionalidad
gane enteros en el conjunto del gran capital mundial. Si el yuan, la divisa
china, no sólo no se desliza hacia la senda que sería del gusto de los
Estados Unidos, sino que parece no hacerlo por consistentes razones de
fondo -no sólo crece el país, sino que parece que va a convertirse en el
tercero de la historia capaz de poner en órbita naves espaciales
tripuladas-; es decir, si la amenaza para cierta fracción del capital
mundial no sólo no se despeja sino que tiene visos de crecer, ¿qué se puede
esperar sino que los conflictos secundarios en el seno del propio capital
pasen a primer plano -como cada vez que hay una guerra-, desbanquen
progresivamente al conflicto fundamental (llamémosle conflicto
capital-trabajo), y terminen por adquirir la temible fuerza de toda dinámica
que por sí sola se vuelve explosivamente ingobernable?
Cuando los que tienen algo que repartir no terminan por ponerse de acuerdo,
cuando los capitalistas, que también son seres humanos, optan por no
suicidarse (económicamente hablando) y, por tanto, no parecen dispuestos a
destruir voluntariamente parte del capital que sobra en el mundo -porque
resulta que, fatídicamente, una fracción les pertenece a ellos, y semejante
operación quirúrgica no es ni mucho menos indolora-, ¿qué se puede hacer
sino dar una voz de alerta?
Si las cosas siguen marchando como lo están haciendo, la tradicional lógica
de la "lucha de clases" y la nueva lógica de los "nuevos movimientos
sociales", junto a la sistémica lógica de la acumulación del capital a
escala mundial, pueden dar paso conjuntamente a la falta de lógica que tan a
menudo nos acompaña a los humanos. Pero recuérdese a Sábato: esto puede
ocurrir en las mejores familias, y de hecho empieza sucediendo casi siempre
entre las familias mejor acomodadas.
Ahora que hemos accedido al mundo rico, los españoles deberíamos darnos
cuenta de que existe un riesgo que no padecimos en el siglo pasado. Es
verdad que tuvimos una espantosa guerra civil, pero pasamos de lado frente a
los dos guerras mundiales. ¿Nos llevan el progreso material y nuestra
aparente creciente presencia en la escena internacional camino de participar
en una próxima conflagración mundial?
Ojalá me equivoque. Pero les pido a los que sin duda me llamarán
"catastrofista" que piensen por un momento cuán equivocados pueden estar
ellos, los anticatastrofistas, como ha demostrado tantas veces en la
historia.
Diego Guerrero es profesor de Economía Política en el Departamento de
Economía Aplicada V de la UCM.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Cyrus Bina" <binac@mrs.umn.edu>
To: <ope-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2003 4:01 AM
Subject: [OPE-L:8481] Re: Re: RE: Re: Socialism and War
> Dear Rakesh,
>
> Let me take this opportunity and write up a few lines on the issue of oil
> and its real (not alleged) connection with the past and present
> impending war with Iraq. You have indicated, among others: "That is, the
US
> propaganda machine is now selling the invasion of Iraq as an attempt to
> break up putative monopoly power and to prevent the Sa'udi dissipation of
> rent in the financing of anti-Western terrorism."
>
> My position (both theoretically and historically) is as follows:
>
> 1. The oil sector is a globalized entity, belong to the post-cartelization
> era. This sector was the first "industry" to be globalized in the
> mid-1970s, following the oil crisis of 1973-74 that led to quadrupling of
> OPEC "posted prices." Transnationalization (globalization) of oil led to
> elimination of the regime of "posted" pricing of oil and relied on the
> emerging institution of "spot" pricing. Spot prices are the result of
REAL
> competition among the various producing units and regions of the world.
By
> "real" competition, I mean the actual competitive processes that are
> dynamically setting up oil producing regions (including the oil
> producing OPEC members) against one another. This competition (as opposed
> fiction of "pure" or "perfect" competition ala neoclassical economics) is
> Marxian and/or Schumpeterian in its meaning and thus does not necessarily
> negate the process of integration (concentration and centralization) of
> capital. Indeed, competition is a permanent feature of CAPITAL and
capital
> accumulation and it becomes sharper and more potent with further
> centralization of capital. Finally, without competition (so defined)
value
> formation in capitalism is meaningless.
>
> 2. The Oil crisis of 1973-74 was not a simple shock. Although was
triggered
> by the Arab-Iraeli War of October 1973 and motivated by OPEC member's
> (particularly by Libya and Algeria) desire to increase their share of oil
> rent, the cause of this crisis was deeply embedded in the change in the US
> oil production cost structure (the center gravity of oil production in the
> world). US oil cost structure was (and still is) the highest in both
> exploration and development of oil worldwide. Being the center of gravity
> (within the largest market!) and being in need of restructuring, in
> conjunction with the newly developed spot markets in oil, is the force
> behind the unprecedented increase in the price oil, the reflection of
which
> was the quadrupling of OPEC "posted prices" between October 73 and March
74.
> Given further developments that led to the establishment of globalized oil
> (i.e. worldwide reorganization of the entire oil industry on the basis
> objective conditions and regulation of market, including pricing of oil
> based upon spot and futures markets, formation of differential oil rents,
> capping of unproductive well, decisions on further exploration and
> development, etc.). Globalization of oil also reshaped OPEC in terms of a
> rent collecting agency in its present configuration (see, "Limits of OPEC
> Pricing: OPEC Profits and the Nature of Global Oil Accumulation," OPEC
> Review, Vol. 14 (1), Spring 1990). Hence, the oil crisis of 1973-74
> reflectively laid the cornerstone of the globalization of oil and nailed
the
> coffin of Seven Sisters for good. The era of post-cartelization had
begun.
> At the time, I thought that only neoclassical economists and fools would
> speak of oil cartel and cartelization; only neoclassical economists and
> fools would venture to call OPEC a monopoly. But, to no avail, I soon
> realized that many economists in heterodox tradition, including those with
> "radical" and/or "Marxist" orientation repeat the same nonsense, although
> with different intent. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
> "anti-monopoly" posture such as this makes its entrance into the
collection
> of other enlightened reasons to go to war against Iraq.
>
> 3. The US war posture cannot be attributed to oil. First of all, this
> argument is motivated by the lack of adequate analysis about the
historical
> evolution and eventual implosion of the post-war international
> ("inter-state") system of the Pax Americana (1946-1979?). The United
States
> was at the apex of this hegemonic system. The US hegemony was entwined
with
> the global hegemony of Pax Americana. Pax Americana was much more than
the
> United States. On the one hand, it included the "Western alliance" and
> Japan. On the other hand, and more importantly, it had its hands on the
> large number of countries that are known as the "Third World," in Asia,
> Africa, and Latin America. It is in this context that one has to look at
> the three simultaneous US containment strategies on behalf of the Paz
> Americana, namely, containment of the Soviet Union and its satellites,
> containment of nationalism and democracy in the "Third World" (Coups
> against, Mossadegh (1953), Arbenz (1954), etc.), and finally ideological
> containment people at home (i.e., through McCarthyism, etc.). This
> behavior and these activities were exhibited and done from sheer strength.
> This was the time that some scholars call it the "Golden Age" of
capitalism.
> Thus, hegemony of Paz Americana can be defined in these and other concrete
> historical tendencies. I am holding to the meaning of HEGEMONY ala
Gramsci
> and thus dismissing, for example, the interpretations attributed by the
> scholars within the orthodox international relations tradition. Roughly,
> from mid-1960s to mid-1970s, the international system of Pax Americana
> started to decline. At the very beginning of the 1970s, Bretton Woods,
the
> Pax Americana's international monetary system collapsed (officially,
August
> 15, 1971). There were many other challenges throughout third decade,
> including the collapse of Pax Americana's worldwide tentacles, such as the
> Shah Mohammad Reza in Iran, Somuza in Nicaragua, etc. The Pax Americana
> imploded and collapsed under its own weight. This goes also for its
global
> hegemony. The United States, which was once residing at its apex also
lost
> its hegemony. This also has been compounded by the transnationalization
of
> capital and the emerging hegemony of global social capital at more
> theoretical. Thus, we entered the era that can be loosely identified as
the
> era of globalization. I am not talking about the so-called "corporate"
> globalization. I am looking at a qualitatively new stage in development
of
> capitalism (see, e.g., my "Globalization: The Epochal Imperatives and
> Developmental Tendencies," in Gupta (ed.) Political Economy of
> Globalization, Gluwer, 1997). One of the characteristics of this era is
> that it particularly negates the "hegemony" a nation-state. Finally, for
> those who look at the barrel of gun and sheer military capability, and
> quickly conclude that the holders of those powers have hegemony, should
> think twice: once reexamining the meaning of hegemony itself (ala Gramsci)
> and once by comparing the doctrine of CONTAINMENT (the most important
> doctrine during the era of Pax America) and doctrine of PREEMPTION
> (officially unveiled by the current Bush administration). By doctrine, I
> mean a systematic policy, not a sporadic practice. Containment then was
the
> reflection of coexistence and also the fact that a hegemon, to say the
> least, had a place worth preserving in the global polity and economy. In
> other words, the hegemon had the system at its finger tips. The doctrine
of
> preemption and its systematic practice, on the other hand, is the
reflection
> of the fact that the bully not only lost its old place (that is why there
is
> such a haste in destruction) but also does not wish to settle for an
> ordinary place like everybody else, so to speak. Would you call this
> hegemony? On the contrary, I would argue that these trigger happy
positions
> are as the result of the US appreciable weakness, not its strength. These
> postures are none other than sorry gestures against the lost hegemony. It
> is within this historical context that the question of OIL can be properly
> studied and analyzed. Oil is globalized and operate under the regulation
of
> market, which a part and parcel of the era of globalization. In this
sense,
> speaking of going to war for oil is untenable. The question must be
> properly focused on the wholesale reaction of the US government against
the
> lost hegemony. Therefore, nostalgic act of conquest and control will
remain
> as major motivation. This motivation is, in my opinion, thousand time
more
> dangerous than "blood for oil." Because "blood for oil" hugely
> underestimates the potency of this systematic position on the part of the
> United States. Indeed, attributing this to oil amount to a small potato.
> Once the weight of real US motivation is measured, then the question of
oil
> in Iraq is easy. How? One has to look at the transformation of oil and
> formation of differential oil rents, a part of which falls into the Iraqi
> economy. Appropriation of this rent (differential oil rent) is not the
> END, it is the by product of bloody search for the lost hegemony (see,
e.g.,
> "The Rhetoric of Oil and the Dilemma of War and American Hegemony," Arab
> Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15 (3), Summer 1993; "Global Oil and Inviability
of
> Pax Americana," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27 (28), July, 192;"On
> Sand-Castles and Sand Castle Conjectures: A Rejoinder," Arab Studies
> Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1 & 2), Winter/Spring 1995).
>
> 4. Finally, allow me to present a few words on the worldwide formation of
> differential oil rents. This goes back to my theory of oil rent (The
> Economics of the oil Crisis, 1985), in which, following Marx, I have
proved
> that in the post-cartelization era (since 1974), via global competition,
oil
> rents of the various magnitudes have formed in the industry. Despite the
> popular misconceptions (even among the left), these rents are NOT monopoly
> rents. These rents, instead, are the reflections of cost structures (oil
> exploration and development) associated with the different oil producing
> regions of the world. Different oil regions show different productivity
in
> the production (extraction) of oil. In competition, these differential
> productivities translate into differential profitability. If the least
> productive oil region remains in the battle of competition (i.e., being
able
> to have average [normal] profit), then more productive oil regions, in
> addition to their normal profit, receive differential rents. The
magnitudes
> of these differential oil rents depend upon the differential productivity
of
> oil production as a whole. Thus, more productive oil regions appropriate
> larger rents than the less productive oil regions (for more theoretical
> detail and empirical results: The Economics of Oil Crisis, 1985; "Some
> Controversies in the Development of Rent Theory, Capital & Class, No.
1989;
> "Price Formation and Competition in the International Energy Industry,"
> Energy Economics, Vol. 11 (3), 1989; "The Law of Economic Rent and
Property:
> Applied to the Oil industry," American Journal of Economics and Sociology,
> Vol. 51 (2), April, 1992).
>
> As I have indicated to Jerry, with apology, the other day, I am
overwhelmed
> by deadlines, excessive commitments, unending public lectures, etc., in
this
> grim and unfortunate period. I hope these few lines would reveal the
> application of my oil rent and the analysis globalization of oil, the era
of
> post-Pax Americana and globalization for the US foreign policy in the
Middle
> East and elsewhere.
>
> All the best,
>
> Cyrus
>
> (Tuesday night, February 18, 2002)
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <rakeshb@stanford.edu>
> To: <ope-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu>
> Sent: Monday, February 17, 2003 6:58 PM
> Subject: [OPE-L:8478] Re: RE: Re: Socialism and War
>
>
> > On Sunday the San Francisco Chronicle ran an article in which one of
> > leading myths or justifications for war was elaborated.
> >
> > This is the idea that the US should invade Iraq in order to
> > impose a US-approved government which will allow foreign, especially
> > American, direct investment and step outside of OPEC and then ramp up
> > the production of oil... which will in turn break the putative quasi
> > monopoly power of the alleged Saudi-dominated OPEC... which will in turn
> > accomplish two things--first, lower the price of oil and stimulate the
> > world economy and, two, reduce the rents now seized by the Sa'udi state
> > and used to finance jehadis and Islamic terrorism.
> >
> > That is, the US propaganda machine is now selling the invasion of Iraq
> > as an attempt to break up putative monopoly power and to prevent the
> > Sa'udi dissipation of rent in the financing of anti-Western terrorism.
> >
> > In my opinion the propaganda machine has no other justification left for
> > war. No one believes in the the imminent danger posed by Iraqi weapons
> > of mass destruction, and no one believes that there is a connection
> > between the Ba'ath Party and Al-Qaeda. In fact after Kanan Makiya's (aka
> > Samir Al-Khalil) recent break with his former CIA sponsors, no one even
> > believes that the US will impose a democratic regime in Baghdad.
> >
> > But this anti-monopoly, anti-terrorism justification is based on the
> > dubious premise that OPEC is a price-fixing cartel. Of course this
> > premise has been blasted by Cyrus Bina as well as Hans Singer and
> > Kunibert Raffer in their recent book on the North South divide (see
> > chapter on oil as a special commodity).
> >
> > So in my opinion the most important contribution for OPE-L to make is in
> > the popularization of Cyrus' theory of the workings of the global oil
> > market.
> >
> > It was nice to see that Cyrus has recently posted to OPE-L.
> >
> > All the best, Rakesh
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
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