From: dashyaf@EASYNET.CO.UK
Date: Wed May 21 2003 - 06:40:21 EDT
Michael, An excellent contribution, concrete and realistic. The address of the web site given for Roque's contribution was slightly wrong - it should be www.ratb.org.uk. David Yaffe At 01:17 21/05/03 -0400, you wrote: >Dear friends and comrades, > I confess to impatience with people who talk about gross human rights >abuses and repression with respect to the recent trials of so-called >dissidents in Cuba--- without any sign that they have done any >investigation beyond reading an Amnesty International press release (if >that). The most significant repression in Cuba (where I have been-- except >for trips to Venezuela--- since early February) has been the repression of >law-breaking--- first and most significantly against an emerging drug >network and extending to prosecution of people renting apartments without >licenses, serving food obtained through the black market in the paladares >and even to people selling peanuts on the street without a license. >(Policing and fines for traffic violations are also up substantially.) >Since so many people rely heavily on getting a little (and in some cases, a >lot) on the side, this crack-down has had great impact, and my personal >view (not the Cuban official position) is that it is an important part of >the explanation as to why there was an upsurge in hijackings (not only the >ones which made the headlines but also the 27 foiled plots)--- and why >people with criminal records were prominent in these. > That's not the repression, though, that people mean when they go > on about >the plight of independent journalists, librarians, trade unionists, human >rights activists, etc--- as if these people were tried for this rather than >for receiving money and instructions from the US. Please, folks, take a >little time to read the text of the Helms-Burton Act--- eg. sections 205 >and 206 on the regime change demanded (character of the 'transition >government' and who cannot be part of it) or sections 109 and 115 on the >money to be provided for the overthrow of the existing government openly >through the USAID and secretly. Look, too, at the official US declarations >of the over $22 million devoted to this purpose by the USAID. And, finally, >read some of the evidence on-line (eg., copies of hand-written notes giving >instructions and sending money for the establishment of the Varela Project, >'conceived, financed and directed' from the outside) or, for a shorter >version, look at the text of Felipe Perez Roque's press conference >(available on-line at many sites, including www.ratb.ork.uk). When you've >read some of the statements by the Cuban undercover agents who were >receiving as much as $450 US a month--- over 20 times the average Cuban >salary) and their evidence about writing articles for foreign circulation >on specific subjects suggested by US officials, you'll understand why the >so-called dissidents are viewed in Cuba as mercenaries working on behalf of >the US government to overthrow the Cuban government. Of course, it's so >much easier to recoil with horror at the concept of independent >journalists, etc being persecuted! > In contrast to my feelings about the defenders of those mercenaries, I >respect people whose criticism of Cuba proceeds from their view of the >absolute sanctity of human life--- including those who signed statements of >condemnation or demonstrated against Cuba for this reason-- if they have >done so in opposition to capital punishment in their own countries and in >the United States (including that country's heinous torture of people--- >teenagers among them--- in occupied Cuba, i.e. Guantanamo). There have been >very strong statements about capital punishment made on this list--- >suggesting that capital punishment must be viewed as a moral (and/or >political) absolute and that no circumstances could ever justify it. >Accordingly, having resorted to capital punishment recently, from this >perspective Cuba must be condemned. (This position is to be distinguished >from one which argues that the use of capital punishment was a tactical or >strategical error--- one which has reduced support for Cuba at this >critical time.) > I think that it is unquestionable that state murders cannot be > part of the >society that we want to build. From my perspective as a Marxist, though, >central to a dialectical world-view is that parts do not exist separate >from a whole; their properties are those that they acquire from being in a >particular whole--- ie., from a particular combination with other parts. >(Eg., money has different qualities if it mediates exchange between >independent peasants and craftsmen than it does mediating exchange within >capitalism.) From this perspective, one always has to consider context and >combination. If you are willing to accept in principle that under some set >of extreme circumstances, ie., in a particular context, capital punishment >may be acceptable, then our discussion becomes not one of absolutes but, >rather, whether the context in Cuba in any way justified capital >punishment. (I.e., as George Bernard Shaw said in another context, we've >established the principle, and we're just haggling over the price.) But, >then, you really DO have to investigate the context--- and not be satisfied >with making ill-informed comments about repression in Cuba. > Although I've argued in the past about the necessity to separate the >capital punishment question from the spy trials, I now think that the two >issues need to be understood together--- i.e., that the actions of the >Cuban government in both cases must be placed in a particular context. >There are two questions that I think everyone needs to ask: (1) why, after >several years of a moratorium on capital punishment (which has meant that >terrorists who bombed hotels, resulting in a death, in Cuba are still alive >in prison despite receiving a death sentence), did the government apply the >death penalty in the case of the hijackers of a small ferry? (2) Given the >clear isolation and ineffectiveness within Cuba of the 'dissidents', why >did Cuba choose this time to surface 12 undercover agents who were so >well-placed that they included the head of the Pro-Human Rights Party, the >'dean of Cuba's independent reporters' (so trusted by the US Interests >Section that he had a permanent pass into the US Interests Section) and the >secretary of one of the best-known dissidents-- so trusted that she had her >e-mail password)? I.e., why throw away years of investment in intelligence >now? > In part, the obvious answer is the escalation of the US campaign to >overthrow the Cuban government--- starting from James Cason's taking of >office as Head of the US Interests Office in Havana. (His actions--- >including the setting up of a Cuban political party--- are >well-documented.) Add to this the recent welcoming of hi-jackers in the US; >rather than returning them to Cuba and sending the signal that hijacking is >not rewarded, they are out on bail (and walk the streets of Miami along >with other Cuban terrorists). Add to this the fact that, despite an annual >quota established by treaty for a minimum of 20,000 legal immigrants from >Cuba, since October (the beginning of the year), the US Interests Section >had by March given out only 505 visas. Add to that recent statements from >US officials that they would view a mass illegal emigration from Cuba as a >threat to national security, the demands in Miami that Cuba be next after >Iraq and Rumsfield's comment that there was no intention of attacking Cuba >'now'---- and you can understand why Cuba might feel that the US was >attempting to provoke an incident in order to justify an attack. > But, there's more than just the direct provocations and assaults > on Cuba. >The essential context in which to understand Cuba's actions is the US war >against Iraq--- both the execution of that war and the impunity of >opposition to it. The US determination to go ahead despite the historic >world-wide demonstrations against the war revealed that, whatever long-run >effect the mobilisation might have, in the immediate situation the >demonstrations could not stop an aggressor nation determined to have its >way; i.e., as long as there was business as usual, no high costs to be felt >by the aggressor, every country was on its own. Cuba was on its own. (Do >you think that the leaders, eg., in Venezuela were not making the same >observations when watching the US proceed to ignore the UN and world >opinion?) This is why the Cubans speak about a Nazi-Fascism stalking the >world. In this situation, I think Cuba opted for its own 'shock and awe' >campaign. It surfaced its undercover agents to demonstrate to the US how >skillful Cuban intelligence is. (Lest anyone not get that message, Felipe >Perez Roque underlined it at the press conference, noting 'that no one in >Cuba is a fool, that we have revealed only a small part of what we know; >... our people have learned to defend themselves.') And, Cuba took the >dramatic and painful act of executing the hijackers. As Fidel told the >foreign participants to the Marx conference at an unannounced evening >gathering (and subsequently told a Mexican journalist), the choice was >between those deaths and many more which would result from the US plan to >provoke an immigration crisis which would be used 'as a pretext for a naval >blockade, which would inevitably lead to war'. '"We know full well this >has a price, since a great number of friends - and many of our best friends >- for various reasons, whether religious, humanitarian or philosophical, >are opposed to the death penalty," Castro explained. But he insisted that >"we didn't have the right to hesitate, and we will not hesitate."' That >part was meant to send a message both to those within Cuba, thinking about >hijacking planes, etc and being let out on bail in the US, and also to >those within the US planning for Cuba to follow Iraq. The message was that >Cuba was prepared to do what is necessary to defend itself. > I think that some of those friends of Cuba who are criticising Cuba at >this moment should explain what they would do at this time--- not by >reference to what they would do in their ideal socialist society but what >they would do in Cuba's shoes in this real situation. And, if they differ >from what Cuba has done, they should explain why they think they know >better the real threat that Cuba faces than Cuba's own intelligence >network. And they should explain what they are prepared to do to help Cuba >defend itself. > in solidarity, > michael > > >--------------------- >Michael A. Lebowitz >Professor Emeritus >Economics Department >Simon Fraser University >Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6 > >Currently based in Cuba. Can be reached via: > >Michael Lebowitz >c/o MEPLA >Calle 13 No. 504 ent. D y E, Vedado, La Habana, Cuba >Codigo Postal 10 4000 >(537) 33 30 75 or 832 21 54 >telefax (at night): (537) 33 30 75
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