From: Andrew Brown (Andrew@LUBS.LEEDS.AC.UK)
Date: Fri Jan 23 2004 - 07:21:09 EST
Ian, Chris and Paul C. Some brief points. 1. Chess and AI Yes, I agree with Ian that chess programs are nothing like the sort of programs that are of real interest in AI, etc. They are an easy target and misleading as regards the true issues at stake (they rely on brute processing power not interesting stuff like neural networks etc.) 2. 'Open mindedness' and materialist dialecticts. One great presentational problem for materialist dialectics is that it is associated with Stalin and the related Marxist 'orthodoxy'. Another is that it is very different to prevalent Western philosophy. The fact is that it was developed in the 20th century in Eastern Europe and Russia yet this was precisely in defiance of the orthodox Russian philosophy. Bakhurst has documented this history. 3. Distinctions within dialectics It is important to distinguish Hegelian idealist and Marxian materialist dialectics. From my perspective the chief problem with conetemporary developments such as both critical realism and Hegel-inspired systematic dialectics is they tend to reject materialist dialectics. From my point of view one reason for this is that Western philosophy has such a grip on us that when it comes to trying to grasp someone like Ilyenkov (or, originally Engels) terribly erroneous view interpretations are given. 4. Emergence. Ian, I agree that the research you refer to helps us to grasp how thought etc. emerges. However, what seems to be lacking in the research to which you refer is a recognition that thought (intelligence, etc.) is one side of the social relations of production. To study the brain is not to study or gain insight into thought, or the social relations of production, but into some of the processes which enable thought and the social relations of production. 5. Logic: formal or dialectical, and the finite/infinite distinction It seems that we are all agreed on Godel and Chaitlin. Of course a computer can run several things at a time so is not tied to just one formal system. Nevertheless, however much info content you stuff in a computer, and whatever the additional variety brought in by consideration of initial conditions, the problem is that the universe has a lot more 'info content' stuffed into it, than any computer. There remains a fundamental distinction between the infinite universe and the finite computer. [I guess to follow through this point the mathematical distictions between different types of infinity may be needed]. There seems a good case for Hegel to say that logic must be about content, categories, not pure form. 6. Pan logicism. It is dialectical logic, a logic of categories, that is universal, not formal logic. For a materialist this is only because logic reflects matter and matter is universal. In popular terms this is an 'emergentist' universality, it is not a reductionism. Ian I would be greatful if you could give me a good reference to explain what you mean by 'computation theory' (or whatever the correct term is). It does seem, from my perspective, that you have a more reductionist notion in mind than what I take from dialectics. Notwithstanding differences of perspective, Ian, I fundamentally agree that you have made a compelling case for the importance of the research developments that you refer to. I look forward to finding out more. Andy
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