From: Ian Wright (iwright@GMAIL.COM)
Date: Thu May 27 2004 - 15:20:18 EDT
Hi Ajit I wrote this before Rakesh's comments on your paper. I agree with his point (2). I read your paper because I am interested in understanding opposed philosophical positions. I have an observation on the difference between Marxist and analytic philosophy, as represented by Gramsci and Wittgenstein in your paper. My summary point is that analytic philosophy represents one moment of the general methodology of science, and that it is a mistake to elevate this one moment to a general methodological approach because it is inherently limited. This is perhaps one deep reason why Sraffa's work is a great critique but has been difficult to generalise to dynamic situations. All the rest of this simply expands this point. ... You note the difference between Gramsci's and Wittgenstein's attitude toward commonsense theories. Gramsci thought that commonsense theories should be rationally critiqued and replaced, in order to raise the scientific understanding of the masses, whereas Wittgenstein thought that commonsense theories should be analysed in order to uncover their hidden assumptions and avoid philosophical confusion. Gramsci had a transformative attitude whereas Wittgenstein had an empirical attidude toward ideology. I guess this must be connected to the fact that Gramsci was practically involved with a revolutionary party that aimed to transform social reality, whereas Wittgenstein had an aristocractic disdain for politics, notwithstanding the difficulties his family encountered with the Nazis. Let me give another example of this empirical attitude toward ideology that is characteristic of analytic philosophy. I hope you can see some strong parallels in this example. Gilbert Ryle, an influential analytic philosopher, wrote "The Concept of Mind" in 1949, which I think is required reading for anyone interested in the philosophy of mind. It's an example of both the power and limitations of the analytic approach to scientific questions, in this case the understanding of the human mind. What Ryle demonstrates is that our everyday, commonsense ways of talking about the mind -- what is often termed "folk psychology" -- contain hidden assumptions about how the mind is constituted. By analysing folk psychology he demonstrates how misuse of our everyday theory can yield philosophical confusions. For example, he thinks that such misuse can lead to mind-body dualism, and I agree with him here. However, Ryle does not consider that commonsense theories of mind may be factually incorrect and should be replaced with better theories. He takes the existing commonsense theory as given and then generates new knowledge about that theory via analysis. For example, he does not mention mechanisms that support mental phenomena. Instead, he considers mental terms, for example describing someone as "happy", as referring to a large set of counterfactual statements, rather than to an occurrent state of a mechanism or mechanisms in the brain. In that sense, his theory of the mind is static and without mechanism. But if only this approach is taken then scientific progress is not made. For example, there was a time when people thought that emotions occurred in the heart. We now know that the heart pumps blood, although it may pump faster during emotional episodes. Presumably if Ryle had written before William Harvey's discoveries he would have applied his analytic talents to uncovering the hidden assumptions of the theory that the heart is the seat of the emotions. That may have uncovered implicit contradictions and confusions in the theory. But it would not have generated a better theory. For that required getting down and dirty with reality -- in this case cutting people open -- rather than conceptual analysis. A pure analytic approach to commonsense theories is therefore limited because it tends to be an empiricism of concepts -- which can be very useful and illuminating -- but in order to produce new and better theories of reality a full scientitic methodology is required, one that includes transformative practice. I think a great weakness of analytic philosophy in general, and Wittgenstein's philosophy in particular, is that it tends to be only an empiricism of commonsense theories. From a philosophy of mind perspective, it has been the practical work undertaken in computer science, AI, and cognitive science that has furthered our understanding of language and how it can be used. This work is primarily concerned with theories of mechanism and building and testing mechanisms. Some researchers do find Wittgenstein's ideas in this area helpful, although not many I think. Overall, I think you are right to suggest that there are deep philosophical connections between Wittgenstein's and Sraffa's work. For example, as should be expected with an analytic approach, Sraffa's analysis did reveal conceptual confusions in existing "commonsense" theories, for example the capital controversies, but the analytic approach is not a methodology designed to generate new knowledge of causal mechanisms that operate through time and explain the succession of events. It is more a conceptual analysis of existing theories. This can very much contribute to scientific progress, but it needs to be understood as part of a more encompassing methodology. I do not know your take on the strengths and weaknesses of analytic philosophy, but it appears that you may be making a virtue out of its limitations. For example, the denial of a dynamic theory of prices seems to be an unnecessarily ascetic attitude toward reality, perhaps motivated by an undue devotion to analytics. My apologies if this is a mis-characterisation -- but I do recall earlier exchanges in which you described a dynamic theory of value as "bunk". ATB, -Ian. On Thu, 27 May 2004 10:12:51 -0400, OPE-L Administrator <ope-admin@ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu> wrote: > > Ajit's paper > > "A Comment on Sen's 'Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci" > > is attached. It is a MS Word document which is 15 pages long. > > In solidarity, Jerry > > >
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