From: Howard Engelskirchen (howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM)
Date: Mon Jun 07 2004 - 03:15:01 EDT
Hi Paul,
Apologies for not being clear on the status of the constellation of
theoretical concepts that make up the background of marxist theory other
than value. I too hurriedly assumed it would be understood that I was
making the same argument with respect to all of them -- as I understand it,
'mode of production,' 'labor power,' 'value,' etc. all are theoretical
concepts that refer to real objects. This is a matter of the reference of
scientific terms.
You seem to argue that it would be incorrect for theoretical objects to
refer to reality and suggest it would be a problem if [quoting Paul] "every
word could be both a theoretical concept, or refer to reality . . . ." But
I think that is just what the reference of scientific terms does -- we use
theoretical categories to pick out features of the world, real objects or
properties, that we turn our attention to. Because that is how we use such
categories, your suggestion that we use special words to designate "real
objects" won't work because those special words we use will also be
theoretical concepts used to refer, theoretical objects, and so, to avoid
the confusion we've just tried to escape, we will have to use some other
special words, some extra-special words, to refer to the real object we're
still trying to reach, and so on in an infinite regress.
The point of theory, and of fashioning theoretical categories, is reference.
Suppose we want to show that when heated in a flame salts of sodium will
turn the flame yellow. 'Salts of sodium' is a chemical term embedded in a
fairly extensive background of theory that allows us to pick out a substance
that will in fact behave the way our theory led us to expect. As terms of
scientific reference, economic categories are no different. They allow us
to pick out properties of things of nature and society and to establish the
right sort of understanding of how such objects in the world tend to behave.
This was the really important force of an observation made by Ian some posts
back -- he pointed out that when we got it right about reference it was
because our usage had been caused by the actual behaviors of real objects.
That is, the features of the world to which we refer can actually be thought
of as regulating our use of the terms we fashion. When we've got it right,
they will behave the way we expect. We use the word 'cold' to refer to ice
because of what it does to our hand when we pick it up, and we call water
H20 because if we conduct the right sort of experiments we can actually find
two atoms of hydrogen, etc.
Howard
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Zarembka" <zarembka@BUFFALO.EDU>
To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, June 06, 2004 9:42 AM
Subject: Re: [OPE-L] (OPE-L) the specific social relations [of production]
associated with value
> Howard,
>
> You wrote:
>
> > > I think we have identified two fundamental differences: first, you
> > > think value is a theoretical object but not a real one and I do think
it
> > > is a real object. Obviously this makes all the difference. A
theoretical
> > > object does not cause things. We have to explain changes in nature
and
> > > society on the basis of real objects.
>
> I replied:
>
> > Is the corpus of Marx's work a theory or reality? Are mode of
> > production, labor power, constant capital, variable capital, surplus
> > value, production of absolute surplus value, production of relative
> > surplus value, etc., real objects or theoretical objects? Marx
explicitly
> > refers to his "definition of constant capital" (Vol. I, p. 202, Lawrence
&
> > Wishart ed.), which sounds theoretical to me. Also, Marx had simply
> > referred to 'labor' in earlier work before he introduced 'labor power',
> > which seems like his producing a concept.
>
>
> Now (reproducted below), you avoid the question of what is the
difference, if any, between, on the one hand, value and, on the other hand,
mode of production, labor power, constant capital, variable capital, surplus
value, production of absolute surplus value, production of relative surplus
value, etc., regarding their being real objects or theoretical objects.
>
> The closest you come is to discuss only 'value', avoid mode of
production, labor power, etc., and simply say: "We can speak of 'value' as a
theoretical object or we can speak of the social relation to which the
concept of value refers. Usually we want to talk about the world, so unless
we make a special point of indicating that we are talking about the concept,
we probably mean to refer to the social thing that causes things to happen
in the world, that is, to that to which the concept refers."
>
> You seem, without your saying so, to have shifted your position and
partially accepted my position ("'value' as a theoretical object"), but only
partially. Thus, 'value' refers to either/both a theoretical object and a
real object. Before, you had said value "is a real object".
>
> No wonder Costas is tired of trying to interpret Marx's words, viz, if
every word could be both a theoretical concept, or refer to reality, or both
at the same time, or not both. Yes, all of us slip in our use of language
("the way we use language often invites confusion of the real and
theoretical object" -- Howard). And Marx as a human being is undertaking an
immense theoretical revolution which invites such problems. But we are 136
years after 1867. I say we should insist that 'value' and all these other
concepts are theoretical and discipline ourselves to use a different word
when the object is a real object. (For example, I wonder if you were to
substitute 'social relations' or 'social relations of production' every time
you were referring to 'value' as a real object we won't make some progress
in understanding each other.)
>
> Paul Z.
>
> *************************************************************************
> Vol.21-Neoliberalism in Crisis, Accumulation, and Rosa Luxemburg's Legacy
> RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, Zarembka/Soederberg, eds, Elsevier Science
> ********************** http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/PZarembka
>
>
> Howard Engelskirchen <howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM> said, on 06/06/04:
>
> >The quote you have referred to from Poverty of Philosophy I think is very
> >helpful on this: "economic categories are only the theoretical
expressions,
> >the abstractions of the social relations of production."
>
> >Marx there connects theoretical objects and real objects -- the economic
> >categories are theoretical, the social relations of production are real.
> >In theoretical activity we use thought categories to refer to real
> >things. Only by getting our references more or less right can we hope for
> >any success in our explanatory and practical activity.
>
> >The way we use language often invites confusion of the real and
> >theoretical object. In science, for example, when somebody says
something
> >about a scientific "law," they can mean either the verbal formulation
> >given to a natural process, or they can refer to a mechanism of nature
> >itself. The "law" of gravity could mean either someone's conceptual
> >formulation of how gravity works or it could refer to the physical force
> >acting on any object that has mass. 'Value' is the same. We can speak
of
> >'value' as a theoretical object or we can speak of the social relation to
> >which the concept of value refers. Usually we want to talk about the
> >world, so unless we make a special point of indicating that we are
talking
> >about the concept, we probably mean to refer to the social thing that
> >causes things to happen in the world, that is, to that to which the
> >concept refers.
>
> >Marx and Ricardo both used the word 'value'. The question is whether
when
> >they did they referred to the same real object. My guess is that they
> >did, although Marx's theoretical category more accurately corresponds to
> >the social relation that exists, just as "ZnCl2" more accurately refers
to
> >zinc chloride than did the alchemist concept of 'butter of zinc.' But
> >both theoretical labels refer to the same real object in nature. On the
> >other hand the concept of 'value' manipulated logically by Professor
> >Wagner's "association of concepts" method, the object of Marx's scorn in
> >Notes on Wagner, seems not to have referred to the same real object and
in
> >fact, like phlogiston, probably referred to nothing at all. Marx
> >criticized Wagner, remember, for taking the word 'value', then splitting
> >it up conceptually into use value and exchange value and then pretending
> >to manipulate the concepts dialectically.
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