From: Howard Engelskirchen (howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM)
Date: Mon Jun 21 2004 - 11:50:57 EDT
Hi Paul Z, Thanks for your post of 6/17. In order to minimize further misunderstanding, before replying, let me see if I understand your post: 1. You are wondering whether I've understood you at all from the beginning. You argue that when Marx said that exchange value is a form of manifestation of value, this left open the possibility that exchange value could be a form of manifestation of other social relations or forms of production or exchange - "Marx did not say "ALL . . . " 2. So, this is the point of Marx's analysis that I should have understood had been opened: the question in dispute is whether exchange value or value are categories that apply outside the capitalist mode of production. But in resolving this question it cannot be assumed that exchange value is a form of value exclusively; it might be a form that characterizes other forms of economic life in other historical periods. Can I understand this as applying to the categories 'money' and 'commodities ' as well? That is, are money and commodities like exchange value - they could appear in earlier modes of production but that would not necessarily mean that they were social forms characterized by value. Is that the argument? 3. You feel that in responding to this thread I have more or less mindlessly relied on the authority of Marx by saying that Marx established the proposition that exchange value is a form of manifestation of value. Also I argued that I am correct about the real world existence of value outside the capitalist mode of production because Marx said so and the reason I know Marx said so is because I cite myself as authority. Furthermore, reliance on authority of this sort (both Marx and me) to settle differences is, in your view, unworthy of the quality of discussion that should be taking place on the OPEL list. As far as you are concerned my contribution is not up to snuff. 4. In fact, for you this sort of reliance on authority resurrects memories of the Stalinist 30s when people were silenced for not toeing an orthodox line. Were you to acquiesce in such a claim of authority you would have to apologize for not holding views identical to mine. 5. Finally, you argue that when I say "the concepts of 'value' or the 'social relation of value' or the 'social substance of value' are theoretical objects, and then go on to say that "the social relation of value is a real object; the social substance of value is a real object," I am in effect trying to have my cake and eat it too because I use value as both a real and a theoretical object. Have I understood your post? Have I got it all? Please correct or modify as necessary. Howard ----- Original Message ----- From: "Paul Zarembka" <zarembka@BUFFALO.EDU> To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 1:16 PM Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Money, mind and the ontological status of value > Howard Engelskirchen <howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM> said, on 06/17/04: > > >To work within the framework of a coherent theory in science and to > >appropriate its method and results to use is not "falling back on > >authority." Marx's argument that exchange value is a form of > >manifestation of value is made in Chapter 1. I make use of it. What part > >of that analysis do you want to open? > > Howard, Sorry, but have you understood any of what I've been asking? To say that "exchange value is a form of manifestation of value" would never immediately claim that ALL exchange value is a form of manifestation of value. Marx did not say "ALL ..." It may or may not be delimited to the object of *Capital*, namely the capitalist mode of production. That's the issue. I have been posing the question of its applicability outside that mode of production (why do you still need to ask what I "want to open"?). As far as I am concerned, to suggest that Marx or Marxism "establishes" (citing yourself) that you are correct is unworthy of the level of discussion this list should be engaged in, as it is simply relying on 'authority'. > > > >> Try to look at it from my point of view for a moment: what could I > >possibly do with such an assertion? Apologize? > >_______________________ > > >I don't have any idea what 'apologize' refers to or for what, and I am > >definitely puzzled by your point of view. > > Asserting that you are correct because Marxist theory "establishes" it, leaves me no option but to apologize for the error of my ways. (I'm being to feel a whiff of the 1930s.) > > > >> You did not understand my posting. I wrote, "if you accept the > >distinction [between the real object and the theoretical object], you need > >to offer a way to make it 'work' in practice." Specifically, you have > >been swimming around the issue of whether value is a real object or a > >theoretical object. At one point you said it was a real object, then you > >backed off a bit. But no closure came in that discussion. So, I now ask > >in your > > >> if EV, then V > >> EV exists > >> Therefore V > >> > >> is V a real object or a theoretical object? (It is clear that EV is > >considered real because you wrote EV "exists"; you aren't as clear about > >V.) > > >_______________________ > > >The argument is meant to establish that value existed as a real object in > >the ancient world. > > >The concepts of 'value' or the 'social relation of value' or the 'social > >substance of value' are theoretical objects. The concept of a 'real > >object' is a theoretical object. > > >The social relation of value is a real object; the social substance of > >value is a real object. > > >With respect, your impression that I am confused about the distinction > >between real and theoretical objects is wrong. > > In your reply, value is both a real object and a theoretical object. You are having your cake and eating it, too. > > Paul
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