From: Costas Lapavitsas (cl5@SOAS.AC.UK)
Date: Tue Jun 22 2004 - 12:05:49 EDT
Howard, It did, but it was not as bad as the version here. Costas At 11:43 22/06/2004 -0400, you wrote: >Hi Costas, > >Did my post to you come through with the symbols breaking up the text as it >does in your copy below? If I know I can try to correct that. > >Thanks, > >Howard > > >----- Original Message ----- >From: "Costas Lapavitsas" <cl5@SOAS.AC.UK> >To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> >Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 11:05 AM >Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Money, mind and the ontological status of value and >abstract labor > > >Dear Howard, > >I don't really have much else to add to my previous posts, except perhaps >three brief points. > >1.The example you give of 'funny walking' actually conveys quite clearly >what I mean by transhistorical and metaphysical. You are abstracting from >the particularities of each form of such walking, hoping to arrive at a >material substratum, a kind of 'funny walking in general'. This, by >analogy, you also do for labour. I don't think that this is Marx's >materialist method. Rather, it seems to me that Marx focuses on labour >under capitalist conditions, extracts the theoretical content of abstract >labour, and then often uses it to understand other forms historical forms >of labour. He terminology is not always consistent when he does the last. > >2.On exchange value, I did refer to 'mock commodities' rather than >commodities. But the point remains important: the form of value becomes >attached to things or processes or even qualities that have nothing to do >with the substance of value. The form of value is exchange value and, when >more developed, price. > >3.On value, and this is also in reply to Paul C, it seems to me that it is >vital to claim that value is actually produced, under capitalist >conditions. Value is more than a statistical centre of gravity for price. >If value is not produced, then surplus value is also not produced and the >theory of exploitation goes out of the window. I don't think that this is a >path that Marxist economics could or should take. > >Costas > > > > >At 11:56 21/06/2004 -0400, you wrote: > >Hi Costas, > > > > > > > >Your post is very interesting and raises a couple of fundamental issues. > >Let me start with a couple where I hope we can agree. > > > > > > > >1. transhistorical. How are you using that word? I offered a > >clarification on this before. Are we in agreement with the clarification >or > >not? I suggested that I used the word ?~transhistorical?T to refer to > >things > >common across all history and that therefore I did not consider value > >transhistorical even though I did think it was present in many > >pre-capitalist economic formations. We can use the word differently; > >nothing turns on this. Just so we are not misunderstanding one another. > >You suggest that I want to establish the reality of value >transhistorically. > >According to the meaning offered above, I do not. If you want to use > >?~transhistorical?T to refer to something present in more than one > >historical > >period, but not necessarily all, please let me know. > > > > > > > >2. You refer to a ?oconstant elision between what you [Howard] >think > >and what you think Marx thinks.? As I explained to Paul Z at the very > >beginning of our exchange, I am interested in interpreting Marx. I am not > >offering my own theories of history or economics. However, the only access > >I have to Marx?Ts thought is through what I think he thinks, and we are >all > >faced, in evaluating others?T interpretations, with distinguishing what is > >authentic from what is illicit. You seem to be complaining that >substantial > >parts of my interpretation of what Marx thinks are incorrect, introduce > >things not in Marx, etc. Then this is just error, and I welcome your > >corrections. I will work on being clear. > > > > > > > >3. I think there probably is a metaphysical point on which we > >differ ?" metaphysical in the sense of ontological. Did you ever see the > >Monty Python sketch about the Ministry of Funny Walking? Imagine John > >Cleese seriously applying himself to the social forms of funny walking. > >People have walked throughout history. When, by means of abstraction, I > >refer to the material substratum of that activity without reference to the > >diversity of its forms (e.g. I abstract from gender differences in the way > >we walk) that doesn?Tt mean the referent of my reference is not real. >Marx > >does that all the time. In the chapter on the Trinity Formula he complains > >that coupling capital with land and labor makes the error of mixing a >social > >object that is the product of history with material objects that are the > >substratum of all history. Paul Cockshott?Ts translation of > >?oindifferent to > >form? into the positive capacity for redeployment to different social >tasks > >seems to me very good. There is no production in general, Marx writes in > >the introduction to the Grundrisse, but there are elements common to all > >production, and it is not a false abstraction to refer to them as such. > > > > > > > >Think of what makes forms of law different from forms of production. We > >confront the same problem of abstracting in ?odepth? to reach an object >not > >presented phenomenally the way we want to consider it. I take it that for > >Marx, legal relations are relations of force. Like social labor, relations > >of force never occur in history except in particular social forms, but if I > >abstract to the thing of which they are relations ?" ie I make force >rather > >than say labor the object of my study -- that doesn?Tt mean that I refer >to > >something that isn?Tt real. > > > > > > > >4. I understand your point about exchange value not being produced. > >Exchange value is a form of manifestation, so to justify the use of > >?~produced?T I think we?Td have to get into a causal theory of > >reference, and > >this was not your meaning or mine (just now). > > > > > > > >But in your response on the point you seem to treat anything in the market > >with a price as exchange value. Is that so? Virgin land, honor, etc., all > >have exchange value if they are offered for sale at a price. Is that your > >meaning? Doesn?Tt Marx distinguish between price as the money name for a > >weight of gold and exchange value? In other words, once exchange is > >established, gold can be exchanged for things without value or exchange > >value, say, a promise, which clearly does not embody objectified labor. >But > >these things will have a price. > > > > > > > >Perhaps others on the list might have an idea how we would evaluate >recovery > >for ?opain and suffering? or ?oemotional distress? in a lawsuit? Do > >these > >things have value? Or exchange value? Are they forms of social labor to > >which large skill multipliers are attached? My instinct has been to treat > >them like ?~honor?T and to say they have a price but not value. Does > >that seem > >correct? > > > > > > > >5. I?Tll take up the point about abstract labor in a separate >post. > > > > > > > >Thanks, > > > > > > > >Howard > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >----- Original Message ----- > >From: "Costas Lapavitsas" <Cl5@SOAS.AC.UK> > >To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> > >Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 4:37 PM > >Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Money, mind and the ontological status of value and > >abstract labor > > > > > >Howard, > > > >To avoid shadow boxing let me state what agree on. I have no disagreement > >with value (abstract labour) being a real social substance, as well as > >object of theoretical analysis. Nor do I have any difficulties with value > >and capital being distinct social 'objects'. My bone is with your attempt >to > >establish the 'reality' of value transhistorically. > > > >I noted a logical contradiction in your use of 'labour indifferent to >form'. > >Your clarification is not persuasive. You agree that capitalist production > >makes labour 'indifferent to form' but then attempt to generalise this > >across history and establish it as common feature of all labour. It is > >difficult to know exactly what your argument is because there is constant > >elision between what you think and what you think Marx thinks, which Paul > >has also noted. > > > > From what I can gather, the approach you adopt is a kind of metaphysics. >You > >state that there is 'labour indifferent to form', which then takes a >variety > >of social forms across history. This is hardly compatible with your own > >insistence on the 'reality' of the concept of abstract labour. If it is > >'real', it must have been made so by social processes, as happens under > >capitalist conditions. If it arises purely because the thinker has > >abstracted from the particularities of many social forms of labour, it is > >not real. On the contrary, it is transcendental and metaphysical. > > > >But you contradict yourself further in your attempt to clarify. In > >attempting to show that abstract labour can exist without the form of wage > >labour you argue that "Any production that is production for exchange value > >is labor indifferent to form. This is where I was unclear." However, in >your > >original message you argued that "Labor abstract in the sense that it is > >indifferent to the utility of the product which it produces, commodity > >producing labour, equal and homogeneous labour, is not at all necessarily > >indifferent to the form of labour - Marx gives the example of guilds and > >crafts which remained immersed in the particularity of labour". It seems to > >me that you can't have both arguments. I suggest that the latter is >correct, > >but this makes your clarifying argument logically problematic. > > > >Incidentally, in your last message you state that exchange value is > >produced. This is clearly incorrect. Exchange value is an aspect of > >commodities, an exchange property, and belongs to them whether they have > >been produced (for instance, cars), not produced (for instance, land or > >financial assets), or even if they are mock-commodities (for instance, a > >favour, a bribe). What is produced is value (abstract labour) and only >under > >capitalist conditions. > > > >To return to the point at issue, though, I have full sympathy with the > >attempt to show that value is a real social substance. The point is that > >this must necessarily be shown by elaborating the social conditions under > >which labour takes place. These are capitalist conditions. Otherwise > >abstract labour would simply be an ideal abstraction, which, incidentally, > >neoclassicals could fairly easily shoot down. Establishing abstract labour > >under capitalist conditions does not stop it from giving us insight into > >non-capitalist forms of labour or commodities in non-capitalist modes of > >production. But that is not the same as seeking a transhistorical >definition > >of abstract labour. Slaves, to conclude, most definitely do not represent > >crystallisations of abstract labour. > > > >Costas > > > >-----Original Message----- > >From: Howard Engelskirchen <howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM> > >To: OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU > >Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 03:52:50 -0400 > >Subject: Re: Money, mind and the ontological status of value and abstract > >labor > > > >Hi Costas, > > > >Thanks for the opportunity to clarify. > > > >I do not mean to say that wage labor goes into the making of a slave in the > >ancient world. > > > >The problem is interpreting 'indifference to form.' I think I was not as > >clear as I could have been. There are different ways of understanding > >"indifference to form." The significant thing about capitalist conditions > >is that they strip labor to pure subjectivity, labor is denuded of all > >objectivity, and as a result it becomes possible to think of labor as > >"indifferent to form." But because something becomes thinkable under > >capitalist conditions does not mean that historically it only existed under > >capitalist conditions. This is the 'man is the key to the anatomy of the > >ape' problem again. We may recognize something in the ape because of and > >once we have recognized it in a man. > > > >So can we identify 'indifference of form' independent of capitalist > >conditions now that we are alerted to the significance of the concept? > > > >Think of Aristotle's idea, taken over by Hegel, that "all matter is > >indifferent to form." Find an example of that. You can't, because any > >matter that actually exists is "en-formed." Nonetheless, in order to get > >clear on the significance of form we can start with a conception of matter > >that abstracts from form. This is the substratum that is then formed. > > > >My understanding is that Marx treats the activity of labor in this fashion. > >He considers all labor throughout history, labor transhistorically, as > >indifferent to form, and then traces the evolution of social production in > >terms of the different social forms taken by labor. He is able to focus > >attention on distinct forms of social labor by abstracting from the labor >to > >which it gives form. What he abstracts from, something accessible only > >conceptually, is un-en-formed labor, labor indifferent to form. > > > >One of the social forms of enforming labor that occurs historically is > >exchange. Exchange can attach to different dominant modes of production. > >It does not itself become the dominant form of a mode of production except > >as generalized commodity production, that is, where labor power is bought > >and sold as a commodity. But there can be the production of exchange value > >without the buying and selling of labor power as a commodity, that is, > >without wage labor. > > > >Any production that is production for exchange value is labor actually > >indifferent to form. This is where I was unclear. But there are still two > >such social forms. In the one case the indifference of labor to form is > >caused by exchange itself; it is exchange which renders labor >commensurable. > >If I produce on my own small plot use values for the subsistence of my > >family, but then have a surplus which I take to market, then to the extent > >of the surplus I am indifferent to the particularity of the labor whose > >product I offer to sell. It exists for me only as a means to money -- I am > >indifferent to my own labor and look upon it only as a means to a claim on > >someone else's labor. In exchange the labor I used equated with all other > >labor in the market. Nothing depends on whether anyone produced anything >by > >means of wage labor. > > > >Capital is different. the indifference of labor to form in the case of > >capital is not generated by exchange but by the fact that labor is denuded > >of all objectivity. > > > >So that's the difference I'm shooting for. Chances are more clarification > >would help, but that's a start. Perhaps the following is a barrier to > >interpreting what I've argued -- do you view value and capital as distinct > >social objects? I do. I think often there is a tendency to view value as > >just capital that is not quite ripe yet -- sort of like a green apple -- a > >necessary analytical stage in order to present the concept of capital > >clearly, but not a distinct social relation. > > > >Howard > > > > > >----- Original Message ----- > >From: "Costas Lapavitsas" <Cl5@SOAS.AC.UK> > >To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> > >Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2004 3:17 PM > >Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Money, mind and the ontological status of value and > >abstract labor > > > > > >I cannot respond to Howard's message for a couple of days. But before > >replying, I would like some clarification. I have isolated two paragraphs, > >which seem to me important: > > > >"Labor abstract in the sense that it is indifferent to the utility of the > >product which it produces, commodity producing labor, equal and homogeneous > >labor, is not at all necessarily indifferent to the form of labor -- Marx > >gives the example of guilds and crafts which remained immersed in the > >particularity of labor. Indifference to the utility of the product, the > >thing that causes(!) recourse to exchange, does not at all imply or > >presuppose indifference to the particularity of labor. The conditions for > >capitalist production do. Labor as pure subjectivity, as the use value of > >capital, labor indifferent to form, presupposes production for exchange > >value, not for use." > > > >and > > > >"So, yes, slaves embodied abstract labor in the same way money or other > >commodities did -- by the social substance formed of the union of labor > >indifferent to form and the social form of the commodity." > > > >I read the first as saying that only labour undertaken under capitalist > >conditions (wage labour?) is indifferent to form. > >I read the second as saying that slaves embodied abstract labour as social > >substance formed by the union of labour indifferent to form and the social > >form of the commodity. > > > >Is there something wrong with my reading, or are you suggesting that there > >was (is?) some sort of capitalist labour going into making someone a slave? > > > >Costas
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