From: Rakesh Bhandari (bhandari@BERKELEY.EDU)
Date: Sat Sep 09 2006 - 13:18:33 EDT
>Jurriaan: > >Well, since you reproduced the following quote from Marx, I have >a question which you -- or someone else on the list -- might be able to >answer: > >> "The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement >> and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the >> conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a >> warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalled the rosy >> dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are >> the chief moments of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the >> commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. It >> begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant >> dimensions in England's Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the >> opium wars against China, &c. > >In what sense did it begin with the revolt of Netherlands from >Spain? > >In solidarity, Jerry The following is not a direct answer but illuminating, I think. Acemoglu et al also speak to the role of merchants in the 'transition'. Full citation below. In above passage Marx seems to be emphasizing here the role of merchant capitalists in the emergence of full scale capitalist society. I think he would have found this paper congenial. I haven't yet read Marcel van der Linden's paper on Dutch merchant capital; Jurriaan translated that paper. "3.2.2 The Dutch case Turning to the Dutch case, it would be a fair characterization to view the history of the Netherlands during the 16th and early 17th centuries as the history of the struggle between merchants, especially the wealthy and politically powerful Regents, and the Habsburg monarchy. While the monarchy tried to increase its tax revenues from the Netherlands, the merchants tried to minimize taxes and fought for security of property and for independence from Spain. An early milestone was the granting of the Grand Privilege of 1477 which gave the States General of the Burgundian Netherlands the right to gather on their own initiative and curbed the right of the ruler to raise taxes. However, by 1493 Maximilian of Habsburg reversed the privileges. After 1552, war with France increased the Habsburgs' fiscal needs and led them to impose a large tax burden on Netherlands. In 1556 when Charles V abdicated in favor of his son Philip II, the Netherlands rejected his first set of fiscal demands, only grudgingly paying up in 1558 under their own terms. Growing fiscal and religious resentment in 1572 led to a series of uprisings against the Habsburgs, mostly orchestrated by commercial interests (see Israel, 1995). De Vries and van der Woude (1997, p. 369) argue that "urban economic interests ultimately believed it advantageous to escape the Habsburg imperial framework". In the case of Amsterdam, de Vries and van der Woude (1997, p. 365) note: "the ruling faction instinctively chose the cautious path of loyalty to Catholicism and the Habsburg regime... Their opponents included most of the city's international merchants.....[I]n 1578 a new Amsterdam city council threw the city's lot in with the Prince of Orange... among the merchants returning from... exile were [those whose families] and several generations of their decendents would long dominate the city." Not only did commercial interests wish to escape the Habsburg regime, but they were becoming rich enough to turn their wishes into action. Israel (1995, pp. 241- 242) describes this as follows: "From 1590, there was a dramatic improvement in the Republic's economic circumstances. Commerce and shipping expanded enormously, as did the towns. As a result, the financial power of the states rapidly grew, and it was possible to improve the army vastly, both qualitatively, and quantitatively, within a short space of time. The army increased from 20,000 men in 1588 to 32,000 by 1595, and its artillery, methods of transportation, and training were transformed" (see also Israel, 1989, Chapter 3). By 1629, the Dutch were able to field an army of 77,000 men, 32 50% larger than the Spanish army of Flanders (Israel, 1995, p. 507). After the Dutch revolt, it was the wealthy, predominantly Protestant merchants, the Regents, that dominated the city and state politics.36 De Vries and van der Woude (1997, p. 587) in their analysis of the relationship between soico-economic position and political influence note the that the richest people consisted of those "6 to 8% of urban households with incomes in excess of 1,000 guilders per year. This was the grote burgerij from whom was drawn the political and commercial leadership of the country. Here we find, first and foremost, the merchants."37 In fact, the Dutch Revolt also served to weaken the position of Dutch nobles in the two largest states, Zeeland and Holland. Again quoting de Vries and van der Woude (1997, pp. 507-508): "Many nobles ... were ... excluded from the political system when the new Republican order triumphed... Only the Prince of Orange remained as a qualified representative of the noble order, and three attempts by other nobles (in 1615, 1616 and 1651) to be restored to their ancient rights were torpedoed by the cities in Zeeland. These cities, indeed, were the great winners of this process." Full independence for the Dutch Republic was not secure until the war against the Habsburgs was completed with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In this process, the role of merchants was central. Dutch bankers and trading companies financed the inde- pendence war and dictated policy. Adams (1994, p. 329) quotes Elias in arguing that "The leading edge of commercial expansion shifted to the colonial and rich trades, and the merchants engaged in colonial trades, proclaiming the need for the states to help merchants secure wider opportunities in the Indies, swept into power in Amsterdam in 1601". De Vries and van der Woude (1997, p. 366) note that it was "the traditional pillars of the maritime economy ... that supported and strengthened the young Republic in its hour of need." From Sloan School of Management Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Working Paper No. 4269-02 Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Working Paper No. 02-43 The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth Daron Acemoglu MIT; NBER; CEPR Simon H. Johnson MIT; NBER James A. Robinson University of California, Berkeley; CEPR This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=355880
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