From: Howard Engelskirchen (howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM)
Date: Sun Mar 04 2007 - 23:52:39 EST
Many natural scientists and others agree that social science is different -- so different in fact that it really isn't science at all. As for your last paragraph, you appear to say that in the end it is not possible to give a definition of the real and essential character of the commodity -- that's okay, but then I assume you didn't actually mean to refer earlier to a 'real definition'. As ee cummings might have said, borrowing from one poem to deform another, "so much depends on that damned last etc." > Agreed. The real and essential character of commodity requires (amongst > much else) price, money, market, etc. This can not be seen by an appeal > alone to a particular definition (or what Marx wrote); it must be explained > in terms of grasping the inter-connection between different categories > associated with comprehending the subject matter of capitalism. The issue > thus isn't merely a definition; the issue is grasping how capitalism works. > In any event grasping how capitalism works means understanding the structures of social life that causally account for it. If we're able to identify those, then in doing so we've given a real definition of capital. A real definition does not point at words; it points at causal structures. But causal structures don't tend to end with an 'etc.' (There are fuzzy edges and things that are not one thing or the other, but all that is a different question.) Howard ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jerry Levy" <Gerald_A_Levy@MSN.COM> To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> Sent: Saturday, March 03, 2007 9:42 AM Subject: Re: [OPE-L] questions on the interpretation of labour values > > There is nothing in the analogy as so stated that does not apply to the > > distinction between the real definition of the commodity form and price. > > Drawing a sharp line between the things we study in nature and in society > > is too easy and insulates social science to its loss. > > Hi Howard: > > I think, rather, that it's too easy to draw improper analogies between > natural processes and social processes. In general, I believe that we > should train ourselves not to think of social phenomenon as if they > can be grasped with the same logic by which natural processes can > be grasped. There are several issues here. Neither capitalism nor > any other mode of production are a consequence of natural laws. > Nor can their logic be grasped by appeal to the logic of the natural > sciences. There are sometimes similarities, but great caution is needed > here otherwise we are likely to fall into the trap of bourgeois economics > of believing that capitalism or some other mode of production represents > the natural order of social life. The appeal to science also leads to > the fallacy that the same kind of (formal) logic which is used in certain > natural science disciplines can be employed to grasp the character > and dynamic tendencies of different modes of production. This > can produce mathematically more elegant and sophisticated models > (and allow one to have discussions with economists employing other > paradigms since mathematical logic -- especially when coupled with > English, the language of the leading Empire -- is the 'universal' language > of economists) but at an injustice to grasping the contradictory and > dynamic character of the subject matter of capitalism. > > > > Analogies to lessons from natural science run throughout Capital. > > > Yes, that's true. > > So do analogies to literature including mythology. > > In part this is a question of the _style of exposition_. These analogies, > like his analogies to literature are part of his writing style and often, > imo, represent simply a literary flourish. In other cases, they reflect > Marx's 19th Century understandings of science and, especially, a > Darwinian influence. The point is that there is nothing in _Capital_ > which can't be explained without reference to analogies to natural > processes or literature, is there? > > In any event, no one is going to convince me about any point > in terms of grasping the logic of capitalism by appeal to the logic > and findings of the natural sciences. Nor do I think _anyone_ should be > so convinced. Such appeals represents a kind of over-reaching and > often leads to both bad science and bad political economy. > > (NB1: this is not to say that there are _no_ connections between natural > and social processes -- obviously there are, especially when considering > ecological dimensions such as how social activity can alter natural > processes which in turn can change social life, etc. ) > > (NB2: A good example of bad political economy is the belief that > scientific theorems developed in the 20th Century can and should be > retroactively used to grasp the 19th Century thought of Marx.) > > > > You point out that I identify a social structure linked to the character > > of > > commodities. Actually my point was more precise. The concept of a > > commodity makes no sense except as the product of a particular social form > > of labor. That form of labor -- independent producers producing goods > > useless to them for private exchange -- gives us a real definition of the > > commodity form. All of it, not part of it. You suggest that prices are > > part of the real definition of commodities. What else does the definition > > include? To be clear: a nominal definition is the kind of thing we do > > with a dictionary. > > > Exactly. Those who assert that commodity relations exist in non-capitalist > modes of production apply the nominal dictionary definition of > commodity: a good which is produced with the intention of being sold. > This may help them grasp the existence of those nominal commodities in > pre-capitalist or post-capitalist social formations, and it also helps > one when you dialogue with mainstream historians and anthropologists > (since those other disciplines are likely to use the simple dictionary > definition), but it makes it more difficult for one to grasp the subject > of capitalism which can be unpacked in large part by considering the > larger meaning of the commodity-form and its relation to the value-form > and the capital-form. > > > > A real definition identifies the dispositional properties of > > a thing such that we know how it persists as what it is and how it tends > > to behave. An explanatory mechanism showing how these essential > > properties account for manifestations of behavior and other features > > is presupposed. It is not a conjunction or gathering of all important > > characteristics. > > > Agreed. The real and essential character of commodity requires (amongst > much else) price, money, market, etc. This can not be seen by an appeal > alone to a particular definition (or what Marx wrote); it must be explained > in terms of grasping the inter-connection between different categories > associated with comprehending the subject matter of capitalism. The issue > thus isn't merely a definition; the issue is grasping how capitalism works. > > > In solidarity, Jerry
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