From: Dave Zachariah (davez@KTH.SE)
Date: Wed Jan 02 2008 - 06:15:30 EST
Here: http://www.lausti.com/articles/gulf/oil.html I found it while searching for information about Matzpen. > Where has Machover argued this? > > > Paul Cockshott > Dept of Computing Science > University of Glasgow > +44 141 330 3125 > www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: OPE-L on behalf of Dave Zachariah > Sent: Tue 01/01/2008 10:10 PM > To: OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU > Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Imperialism in our century. > > Thanks a lot for your informative reply Paul. > > Paul C > ------ > What do you mean by the last sentence Dave? > > Dave Z > ----------- > What I meant to say was that the last one hundred years have been a > period of proliferation of nation states, quite the contrary to what one > would expect from an abstract capitalist logic of expansion alone. > > Paul C > ------- > Remember that states are something quite different from capitalist firms. > States are territorial organisations that appropriate a significant, often > major, part of the surplus product in the teritories that they control. > As such they have distinct interests as surplus appropriators. > > Dave Z > ----------- > I fully agree with you here. What I was aiming at was to what extent is > there a "class character of the state" and to what extent are > inter-state rivalries driven by rivalries between capitals today? > > As for the class character of the state I think of it primarily from a > juridical point of view: the state is "capitalist" if it is assigned to > protect capitalist private property. Then it is a matter of degree of > the influence capitalist interests can have over the state. If those who > run the state apparatus come from the propertied classes or at least are > steeped in its ideology there may be a direct influence. If not, there > is always indirect influence that stems from the fact that the bulk of > taxable incomes are generated in capitalist firms. > > If we take the major inter-state conflicts since the collapse of the > Soviet bloc, I can't see that they were the result of competition > between capitals. They are primarily driven by territorial interests but > under the influence of certain capitalist interests. Moshé Machover has > argued that the US involvement in conflicts in the Middle East has been > driven by short-term capitalist interests and long-term territorial > interests. > > 1. The short-term. To raise the price of oil and to win favourable arms > contracts with the state. (This of course benefits a section of > capitalist firms at the expense of the others.) > > 2. The medium-term. Control over international oil trade to make sure > that it continues to be traded in dollars rather than euros. > > 3. The long-term. Control the Middle East's oil reserves, and therefore > those rival states whose economies depend on it. > > > > > > on 2008-01-01 00:08 Paul Cockshott wrote: >> >> Dave Z >> ----------- >> However, there are two issues that I think lack analysis: >> >> What is the relation between the capitalism and the nation state, >> especially once capitalism has reached a truly global scale? From a >> purely abstract capitalist logic one would expect a decay of smaller >> nation states and the formation of larger blocs of juridical and >> military power, e.g. as the EU. But the reverse seems to be true. >> >> Paul C >> ------ >> What do you mean by the last sentence Dave? >> >> >> Dave Z >> ----------- >> Given >> the integration of global capitalism today I have a hard time to see >> that the rivalries between capitals themselves will translate into >> rivalries between nation states (except for the case of state-capitalist >> enterprises). >> >> Paul C >> ------- >> >> Could one not have argued the same thing in 1908? >> >> >> Remember that states are something quite different from capitalist >> firms. >> States are territorial organisations that appropriate a significant, >> often >> major, part of the surplus product in the teritories that they control. >> As such they have distinct interests as surplus appropriators. They are >> typically controlled by the propertied classes within that territory, >> but, >> in parliamentary states, have also to respond to the interests of other >> classes. They also have the power to create money, upon which power the >> whole process of capital accumulation ultimately depends, since >> capitalist >> wealth is denominated in the money created by these states. >> >> It is quite exceptional for a state to be controlled by and in the >> service >> of 'capital' they are typically in the service of 'national interests' >> and >> influenced primarily by firms based in their territory. In recent >> years the >> UK state has come to approximate a state in the service of 'capital in >> general', >> but that reflects the particular preponderance of finance capital >> within the >> UK economy. Few other capitalist states approach this British level of >> openness to >> foreign capital. >> >> Consider the degree wo which the US state and the US currency are >> dependent on German >> Chinese and Japanese credit. The creditor states could, with >> adjustment to their >> internal policies remove these lines of credit. >> >> Kalecki teaches us that the mass of profit in a capitalist economy is >> determined >> by the sum of capitalist consumption, net investment and the trade >> surplus. >> The trade surplus that China runs with the US constitutes a huge boost >> to >> the profits of Chinese firms, even if from the standpoint of a rational >> Smithean calculus, it constitutes nothing more than a huge loss, a >> huge subsidy >> to the US. From the standpoint of individual chinese firms the trade >> surplus >> is a big gain, it boosts their profits. From the standpoint of the >> state however, >> as personified by the state bank, it is of much more dubious benefit. >> It causes >> an accumulation of dollar holdings of increasingly perilous real value. >> >> One response is to set up large state venture funds so that China can >> convert these >> surpluses into equity capital, but such equity capital need not be >> invested in the USA. >> Another response could be for the state to step up internal >> infrastructure investment - >> but with 50% of Chinese gdp currently going on investment there is >> little room for this to go much further. >> Alternatively the surplus could be expended as internal state spending >> on either armaments or >> welfare as happened in for example the UK during the 50s. >> >> But if these things happen, what position does that put the USA in? >> Suppose that the financing available for the current US deficit of >> some $700 billion >> dried up. >> Will it still be able to sustain its current level of imports of >> manufactured >> goods and oil? >> What would be the implications for the US state if it could no longer >> finance >> anything near current levels of oil imports? >> >> The free market value of the dollar would decline much further than it >> has already. >> Costs of oil and manufactured goods in US shops would rise even more >> drastically. >> What would the implications of this be for political stability with >> the state? >> What would the implications be for the continued viability of the US >> armed forces >> if they could no longer afford the oil they currently use? >> >> These factors alone would seem to provide ample motivation for the >> revival of >> imperialism in its most classic form -- the seizure of territories >> rich in raw >> materials, first Iraq, then perhaps Iran, then Venezuela. If all these >> countries >> were under US occupation they would have to supply oil in dollars, >> however depreciated >> the dollar becomes on the world market. >> >> >> We should not be using the imperialism of 1908 as our model, but the >> imperialism of >> 1938. >> >> >> Paul Cockshott >> Dept of Computing Science >> University of Glasgow >> +44 141 330 3125 >> www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/ >> >
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