From: Paul Cockshott (wpc@DCS.GLA.AC.UK)
Date: Wed Jan 09 2008 - 18:20:57 EST
In response to Charles Andrews' comments. Regarding the size of China's manufacturing workforce, Judith Banister's article, mentioned in my essay, explains that: "In the late 1990s through the year 2000, China saw declining numbers of manufacturing workers, caused by restructuring and the privatization of state-owned and urban collective-owned factories in the cities. Both massive layoffs of urban manufacturing workers and sharp increases in manufacturing labor productivity ensued. Since then, private-sector manufacturing has thrived in both urban and rural areas of China. The reorganized factories are more productive than state-owned and collective-owned factories and are competitive in the domestic and global economies. China’s manufacturing employment began to rise again after 2000, regaining the upward trend of the period from 1980 to 1995." That was published in 2005; it would be very useful to keep an eye on how China's industrial workforce changes and develops, on an industry basis as well as overall; and to gain a more detailed knowledge of, for example, the gender and age composition of the workforce, the size of establishments, etc. This is not something I was able to do in my essay - which was only a first and general attempt to understand contemporary imperialism, - but all the trends I identify are, of course, in need of further study and subject to change. Similarly, regarding the issue of engineering leadership, we would need a more detailed study than I was able to provide. Again, the situation is bound to differ from industry to industry, and to change rapidly over time. From China's efforts in the space race we can at least guess that the authorities there are keen to develop Chinese technological and scientific capabilities. Harry Braverman, in his book Labor and Monopoly Capitalism, argues that 'It was not until the rise of Nazism in Germany and World War II, as a result of which a great deal of scientific talent was either driven from Germany by Hitler's racial and political policies or was appropriated by the victorious allies, that the United States acquired a scientific base equal to its industrial power, which had prior to this development depended largely upon the engineering exploitation of foreign science. Thus it has been only since World War II that scientific research in the United States, heavily financed by corporations and government, and buttressed by further drafts of scientific talent from all over the world, has systematically furnished the scientific knowledge utilized in industry'. This suggests that a nation can become the dominant industrial power, win a world war, and establish itself as a global hegemon, before acquiring scientific and technological dominance. Whether China will be able to do anything of the kind remains to be seen, but it is not an impossibility. Paula From: Paul Cockshott Sent: Friday, January 04, 2008 1:28 AM To: Paula_cerni@msn.com Subject: FW: [OPE-L] Imperialism in our century Paul Cockshott Dept of Computing Science University of Glasgow +44 141 330 3125 www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/ -----Original Message----- From: OPE-L on behalf of Charlie Sent: Mon 31/12/2007 11:10 PM To: OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Imperialism in our century I recall a statistic (anecdotal quality only) to the effect that the manufacturing workforce in China peaked several years ago and was shrinking. It was not a cyclical event, instead evidence that automation was even replacing workers at low Chinese wages. Don't know if evidence confirms or denies this. In addition, a portion of the manufacturing jobs in low-wage Asian countries exist despite the possibility of automation only because the wages are so low that automation does not pay. Cerni's article conveys a sense of successive imperialist centers without overall forward motion such as the above indicates. A related consideration: Although the U.S. borrowed and stole British technology early in the 19th century, by the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 the U.S. was an engineering leader. In other words, the up and coming capitalist country was a technological leader, too. The German case was similar. China does not yet display the same lead. These points suggest that Chinese capitalism is up and coming at a time when the economic space for capitalist development is narrowing. Charles Andrews Paul Cockshott Dept of Computing Science University of Glasgow +44 141 330 3125 www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/ -----Original Message----- From: OPE-L on behalf of Charlie Sent: Mon 31/12/2007 11:10 PM To: OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Imperialism in our century I recall a statistic (anecdotal quality only) to the effect that the manufacturing workforce in China peaked several years ago and was shrinking. It was not a cyclical event, instead evidence that automation was even replacing workers at low Chinese wages. Don't know if evidence confirms or denies this. In addition, a portion of the manufacturing jobs in low-wage Asian countries exist despite the possibility of automation only because the wages are so low that automation does not pay. Cerni's article conveys a sense of successive imperialist centers without overall forward motion such as the above indicates. A related consideration: Although the U.S. borrowed and stole British technology early in the 19th century, by the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 the U.S. was an engineering leader. In other words, the up and coming capitalist country was a technological leader, too. The German case was similar. China does not yet display the same lead. These points suggest that Chinese capitalism is up and coming at a time when the economic space for capitalist development is narrowing. Charles Andrews
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