Re: [OPE] questions re transition

From: Paul <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk>
Date: Wed Jun 03 2009 - 18:05:22 EDT

howard engelskirchen wrote:
> Hi Paul,
>
> We communicate across a political gulf, of course. It's interesting that
> the atmosphere clouds re the status of relations of production.
>
> 1. You write:
>
>
>> But none of the above actually says anything about the productive
>> forces, nor about the development of labour productivity. It is all, and
>> rather vaguely at that, about social relations.
>>
>
> This was after I referred to the concept of intersectionality and its
> significance. What in the world is vague about paying attention first to
> those persons at the intersection of multiple oppressions? Couple this with
> the example I gave on municipal budgeting that I suggested generalized --
> democracy means not only people engaged but people trained so that their
> interventions can be effective.
These are good suggestions but they relate to political power, ensuring
that as
the Gang of 4 put it : all round dictatorship is exercised.
> So the most oppressed get mobilized
> productively. To ignore that this concerns forces of production and the
> development of labor productivity is to miss something important in Marx, I
> think.
>
Well there is no doubt that the great broadening of technical education
that occured in Russia under Stalin was a development of that societies
capacity to produce, and in general anything that broadens the pool from
which labour can be drawn does this. But it is not clear that this is a
specifically socialist shaping of the productive forces.
> 2. You write:
>
>
>> Well I am all for democracy, and my advocacy of it is as radical any that
>> Bettleheim essayed, but I suspect that there is in your text an element of
>> wishful thinking. One must ask whether a democratic shaping of the
>> productive forces, would, of itself, yield a configuration of productive
>> forces and relations more or less amenable to capitalist restoration.
>>
>
> Now I haven't said anything about a democratic shaping of the productive
> forces "of itself." Electrification matters. Beyond that forms of
> democracy, anarchist, liberal, etc., can certainly lead to capitalist
> restoration or perpetuation. But otherwise I don't understand the "whether"
> here. Capitalism brings into existence the collective worker operating
> forces of production that are socialized. The transition to socialism is
> about turning those collective workers into associated workers. Because the
> forces of production are socialized, this is entirely a question of
> democracy. We don't need a whetherman to tell that, do we?
>
In that case you seem to be resiling from your original position that it
was necessary for socialism to shape the productive forces in a new way.
Now you are saying that the productive forces are already socialised by
capitalism -- which was of course Kautsky's position.
> Related to this. You have repeated that nothing is said, and nothing is
> said vaguely at that, about changes in the nature of the productive forces.
> First, I think Bettelheim's book "Cultural Revolution and Industrial
> Organization in China" is the place where he tries to look at some
> significant examples of this. Neighborhood factories suggested a change.
> Small industrial enterprises in the countryside were significant not only in
> changing productive forces there, but also for beginning to break down the
> millennia old contradiction between town and country. Etc. Joan Robinson
> has an interesting little book on economic management that looks at such
> stuff.
Ok you mean these things. Well I would agree that in the context of a
China just comming out of a feudal economy these constituted a definite
shaping to the forces of production that was different from what
capitalism would have achieved.
It is harder when one comes to look at already highly advanced economies
though. What would be the corresponding shaping of the productive forces
in the DDR?
> Simply delinking from the global operation of the law of value,
> Samir Amin has suggested, changes the nature of the development of the
> productive forces. So the chalkboard is not blank. But let's imagine an
> entrepreneur in the earliest centuries of capitalism imagining assembly line
> production. The image he would have formed would have been, we could say,
> vague.
If you read the last volume of the Cambridge History of Technology, you
will see that two of the first integrated factories at the very dawn of
the 19th century : a flour mill and a factory makeing blocks and tackle
for ships rigging, already had the key features of the automated
assembly line. It was there also in the Arkwright's first mills. So I
dont accept your basic point there.
> He could not have imagined the forces of production themselves
> transformed by collective labor. I think we are similarly situated. We can
> only dimly imagine how the forces of production will be transformed by
> democratically associated labor.
>
If we were really in that position, then we would have only faith to go on!
Hardly a basis for scientific socialism.
> 3. You write:
>
>
>> This reduces political economy to judgements about power politics and
>> downgrades actual economic relations. He misjudges derivatives over states
>> with actual states. Thus because according to the then fashionable Chinese
>> line, Kruschov was allegedly moving towards capitalism at the political
>> level, the mode of production is characterised as capitalist. . . .
>>
>
>
>> Why is there no real engagement in Bettleheim with the ideas put forward
>> by different soviet writers of the 50s and 60s on the organisation of the
>> socialist economy?
>>
>
> Is there a reason "Le problem des prix dans les pays socialistes d'Europe:
> Quelques reflections a propos d'un debat recent" doesn't count? This
> appeared in La Pensee in 1967 and was included in "La transition vers
> l'economie socialiste" with a pretty extensive bibliography. I don't know
> of an English translation, and if there is none, it's a shame.
I have a copy of the Maspero edition of that, I will go check it.
> The article
> sets up the effort of Calcul Economique in a way not necessarily picked up
> by reading Calcul E. Anyway, B finds the debate from the 50s and 60s
> unsatisfactory and sterile -- he includes an interesting discussion of the
> concept of socially necessary labor time and the way it was used. His
> argument is that the problematic is empiricist and to make headway must be
> shifted to a different terrain. To argue that B reduces political economy
> to power politics (in the ordinary sense of the term; ie not class struggle
> as the politics meant), misses altogether his effort to fashion a different
> problematic, one which draws carefully on the methodology of Marx's analysis
> of value as a causal structure -- B gives an example of the center of
> gravity of a system which does not manifest itself except through its
> effects. The dominance of the political is required because the economic
> form of real appropriation you start with is characterized by capitalist
> relations. They must be transformed and this does not happen spontaneously;
> it must be organized. How people in power move politically is certainly
> relevant to what kinds of relations are being consolidated, class struggle
> is relevant, but you can't reduce the transformation or reconsolidation of
> an structure of social reproduction to the power politics of persons. This
> seems like reading B's emphasis on the political empirically.
>
> By the way, do you find that Kruschov's initiatives, or those that followed
> in the USSR, reflected democratic transformations of underlying economic
> structures? My impression is that one man management, enterprise autonomy
> and control by the ruble were strengthened.
Yes, but there was also a reduction in differentials, a reduction in
coercive labour discipline, greater freedom of labour to move about the
country, encouragement of polytechnic education. The mix was contradictory.
> Experiments with dismissing
> workers were initiated and shortly after K workers lost employment
> guarantees. Party membership changed dramatically; did this reflect a
> greater control or monitoring by working people?
I am not sure about under Mr K, but under Breshnev I think that this
could be argued to be the case, see Marie Levignes review of the
Breshnev constitution.
> Did the international
> socialist division of labor promote democratic relations among nations of
> the east?
>
The basic problems were twofold

1. A failure to extend the USSR to include China and the countries of
eatern europe after 1948. There was no a priori reason why the USSR had
to coincide with the former empire of the Tsars. If the planned economy
had been integrated right accross eurasia, it would probably still
survive now. The downfall of communism can be traced back to the split
between China and comecon in the early 60s.

2. Such an extension of the USSR would only have been possible on the
basis of a radically democratic and anti-nationalist new constitution.
The Leninist political model, of rule by communist parties, made that
sort of anti-nationalist constitution impossible. On the one hand the
CPSU would not have tolerated any voting system that would effectively
have transfered power to the CPC, nor would the CPC have agreed to be
2nd fiddle to the CPSU hence the nationalist course. The fact that the
CPC contained a powerful national bourgeois element also did not help.
Only random selection of citizens of the whole eastern block to form a
united supreme soviet could have avoided this.

More generally the problem with the eastern block was that its
productive forces still tended to be too constrained within national
bounderies. It failed to gain the effective level of
internationalisation achieved by western multi-national companies.
> Finally on your interesting propositions regarding statistical mechanics --
> the Method of Political Economy is relevant here. The mathematics will be
> as good as the concepts you use to pick out the objects modeled.
> 'Population', Marx argued, was at first "an empty word." You had to start
> with the "simplest determination", a Kerngestalt, of a social formation. In
> order that societies is not an empty word, you need to know boundaries, for
> example. National? Maybe. Anyway, the theoretical work transition
> studies requires has to be done before you crank it up.
>
> Wishfully yours,
>
> howard
>
>
>
>
>
> howard engelskirchen
> he31@verizon.net
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Paul Cockshott" <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk>
> To: "Outline on Political Economy mailing list" <ope@lists.csuchico.edu>
> Sent: Monday, June 01, 2009 5:33 AM
> Subject: Re: [OPE] questions re transition
>
>
>
>> howard engelskirchen wrote:
>>
>>> This is a theoretical point Bettelheim insisted on: the development of
>>> the forces of production is shaped by the relations of production. That
>>> is the significance of the domination of the relations of production over
>>> the forces of production -- we would want some evidence not just of
>>> material development of the forces of production but of transformed
>>> social relations shaping material development. So at least that question
>>> has been well asked -- to take Bettelheim seriously we have to explore in
>>> what way socialist relations would alter the nature of the productive
>>> forces.
>>>
>>>
>> Verily, but the posing is not the answer thereof.
>>
>>> Most fundamentally, we'd want evidence that the development of the forces
>>> of production reflected a dynamic not of the accumulation of dead labor
>>> but instead of the enhancement of living labor. And on that point one
>>> decisive kind of reshaping that has to occur is to work out ways
>>> associated labor can develop the productive forces democratically.
>>>
>> Well I am all for democracy, and my advocacy of it is as radical any that
>> Bettleheim essayed, but I suspect that there is in your text an element of
>> wishful thinking. One must ask whether a democratic shaping of the
>> productive forces, would, of itself, yield a configuration of productive
>> forces and relations more or less amenable to capitalist restoration.
>>
>>> There's no precedent for this. That is, the most important productive
>>> force is living labor itself, and I'd want to look to advances in forms
>>> of organization as well as to the material transformation of things.
>>> We'd expect the discovery and transformation of forms of organization to
>>> lead to the transformation of material things. But forms of collective
>>> managment of production, forms that draw on and develop from each
>>> according to ability, are significant in their own right. Kimberle
>>> Crenshaw's attention to intersectionality argues listen first to those at
>>> the intersection of multiple oppressions. As we find forms of
>>> organization to do so we will have developed the forces of production of
>>> living labor. That would be a measure.
>>>
>>>
>> But none of the above actually says anything about the productive forces,
>> nor about the development of labour productivity. It is all, and rather
>> vaguely at that, about social relations.
>>
>>> I'm uncomfortable, though, with your treatment of the transition as a mix
>>> of ensembles. I would want to speak of an articulated mix of structures
>>> or relations: you suggest a mix of societies. Probably I misunderstand,
>>> but what on earth could that mean?
>>>
>> The difference is that I am using the language of statistical mechanics.
>> One has to think of all of the countries in the world with a statistical
>> distribution of socialism and capitalism over them and a set of transition
>> probabilities -- how likely on a per annum basis are revolutions and
>> counter revolutions.
>> Further, one has to view this in terms of a distribution over a state
>> space, analogous to the phase space of Boltzman, but with axes given by
>> the political structure, the relations of production and forces of
>> production in each social formation. These axes for each social formation
>> correspond to Boltzman's x, x', y, y', z, z' for each atom. I have
>> identified 3 axes for each social formation but one could go to greater
>> detail. Thus when talking about transitions between socialism and
>> capitalism one is talking not about microstates defined on the 3 axes, but
>> between two macro states defined by some sort of plane or hyperplane. Each
>> of these macrostates that we call socialism or capitalism is compatible
>> with a large number, or ensemble, of microstates: different configurations
>> of the political superstructure, different degrees of industrialisation,
>> different mixes of state and collective or private property. Any actual
>> transition between socialism and capitalism or vice versa is actually a
>> transition between two of these microstates : eg Czechoslovakia in 1948
>> with a particular degree of industrialisation, particular degree of prior
>> seizure of the estates of emigrants and rebels etc, to Czechoslovakia in
>> 1950 with state ownership, dictatorship of the proletariat led by the CP
>> etc. There is no general transition process. Thus any statistical
>> probabilities we have for transitions between social systems is
>> a sum over the ensemble of transitions between microstates.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Perhaps you're saying the same thing, but wouldn't it be clearer to say,
>>> as Bettelheim does, that immediately after the revolution there is
>>> socialist political authority, but that the structure of real
>>> appropriation remains capitalist? Thus socialist political and juridical
>>> powers must be used to transform capitalist relations of appropriation.
>>> Where socialist political power loses its connect with the working
>>> population and a minority makes decisions that reproduce the separation
>>> of productive entities from one another and the separation of laboring
>>> producers from the conditions of production, then, even though private
>>> property in a juridical sense no longer exists, nonetheless social
>>> reproduction is dominantly capitalist.
>>>
>>> Formally socialist but really capitalist. This will lead to interests
>>> and irationalities (output measured in tons? make heavier chandeliers)
>>> that may favor and eventually lead to overwhelming pressure (by the
>>> minority) and sufficient acquiescence to restore traditional ownership
>>> forms. But in the end the ownership form is secondary (though changes in
>>> forms of capitalist ownership also can have significant and destructive
>>> effects, as we witness) -- the main thing is that a minority in power,
>>> economically and politically, functions in structures of real
>>> appropriation that reproduce capital as a social relation.
>>>
>>>
>> I definitely disagree here. This reduces political economy to judgements
>> about power politics and downgrades actual economic relations. He
>> misjudges derivatives over states with actual states. Thus because
>> according to the then fashionable Chinese line, Kruschov was allegedly
>> moving towards capitalism at the political level, the mode of production
>> is characterised as capitalist. This form of argument mistakes a
>> prevailing wind for a completed sea voyage.
>> It makes the huge transformation that occured in 88->92 incomprehensible,
>> as the Soviet economy was, according to B, already a capitalist one.
>>
>>> The key then is to know what capital is and what its transformation would
>>> look like. Marx refers to capital's "Kerngestalt" -- structural
>>> kernal -- and Bettelheim identifes this as the double separation. I
>>> understand this as a causal structure -- real and relational, but
>>> underlying and not empirical.
>>>
>> Yes, but how do you overcome it?
>> Why is there no real engagement in Bettleheim with the ideas put forward
>> by different soviet writers of the 50s and 60s on the organisation of the
>> socialist economy?
>>
>>> So like a chemist manipulating elements to reshape a molecule we look
>>> for its transformation and that is the way we measure the success or not
>>> of societies in transition. That brings us to the questions you raised
>>> in your earlier post. I'll take those up in another email.
>>>
>>> howard
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> howard engelskirchen
>>> he31@verizon.net
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: "Paul" <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk>
>>> To: "Outline on Political Economy mailing list" <ope@lists.csuchico.edu>
>>> Sent: Sunday, May 31, 2009 6:27 PM
>>> Subject: Re: [OPE] question re published letters Engels
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>> But, the question that you ask is a good one. Both Khruschev and Lenin
>>>>> (but not so much Mao - at least from the Great Leap Forward and after)
>>>>> shared the belief that socialist relations of production would arise as
>>>>> a
>>>>> consequence of increasing forces of production, but there is obviously
>>>>> no
>>>>> necessary reason why this must be the case.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Bolsheviks, especially in the early period, tended to somewhat
>>>>> uncritically glorify
>>>>> the empowering possibilities of advances in technology and
>>>>> industrialization.
>>>>> This romanticisation of industrialization could also be seen in the
>>>>> constructivist
>>>>> art of the period.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Yes but if we take Bettleheim seriously we have to ask in what way
>>>> would socialist relations of production alter the nature of the
>>>> productive forces.
>>>>
>>>> If we model the transition between modes of production as a Markov
>>>> process then in any given year there is a certain transition
>>>> probablility P(c->s) for a society going from capitalism to socialism,
>>>> there is also a transition probability for a society going from
>>>> socialism back to capitalism P(s->c).
>>>>
>>>> If each probability is non zero we will end up with a population of
>>>> societies that is a stochastic mix or capitalist and socialist states.
>>>> Such a transition system has an equilibrium mix and does not show
>>>> secular evolution.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If we just characterise societies as socialist or capitalist in terms of
>>>> social relations then the above argument is actually an argument about
>>>> transtions between ensembles not individual states. One ensemble we
>>>> characterise as capitalism and
>>>> the other socialism. Within each ensemble or macrostate, there is a
>>>> plethora of microstates characterised by different combinations of
>>>> forces of production with the broadly socialist or broadly capitalist
>>>> relations of production, and also by a plethora of variations of
>>>> property and authority relations within the broadly capitalist or
>>>> broadly socialist categories.
>>>>
>>>> To show a secular evolution of modes of production such that mode of
>>>> production A is superior to B ( say A= capitalism
>>>> B= feudalism ) then we have to have the property that the reverse
>>>> transtion P(a->b) falls over time. In the capitalist case this was
>>>> because capitalist agriculture and capitalist industry developed new
>>>> forces of production whose operation under the old feudal relations of
>>>> production was improbable. Thus the longer capitalism existed, the less
>>>> likely a feudal restoration became.
>>>>
>>>> The question one has to ask is whether we can say the same thing about
>>>> socialism. Is it the case that the longer a socialist society exits, the
>>>> more it develops new modes of material production that would be hard to
>>>> operate under capitalist relations of production?
>>>>
>>>> And if that is the case, does the existence of these new modes and
>>>> techniques of material production reduce the probability of capitalist
>>>> restorations?
>>>>
>>>> It seems to me that these are quite open questions. On the one hand the
>>>> USSR clearly developed organisations and structures of production that
>>>> were crucially dependent on the all union planned economy. When that was
>>>> removed after the Yeltsin coup there was a wholesale collapse of
>>>> production and a huge increase in mortality rates.
>>>> So the USSR developed forces of production whose continued operation was
>>>> not compatible with capitalism, but the mere existence of these forces
>>>> of production does not itself seem to have been sufficient to reduce the
>>>> transition flux P(s->c)
>>>> towards zero.
>>>>
>>>>
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