Re: [OPE] intermission: value of knowledge

From: D. Göçmen <dogangoecmen@aol.com>
Date: Sun Nov 15 2009 - 10:28:20 EST

 In my book *The Adam Smith Problem....* (pp. 152-155) I commented on the paragraph in question as follows below.
If I am to comment of it today I would put it slighly different as Smith uses different wording when he refers to the concept of free trade (restore=past) and Oceana and Utopia (establish=future). The wording suggests that free trade is historically no longer possible whereas Utopia etc. might be established as it refers to future:

"However, unlike Hume, Smith is not questioning the possibility of
freedom of trade, Utopia or Oceana as such. He says that these are impossible
because:
...not only the prejudices of the public, but what is much more
unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly
oppose it. Were the officers of the army to oppose it with the same
zeal and unanimity any reduction in the number of forces, with which
master manufacturers set themselves against every law that is likely to
increase the number of their rivals in the home market; were the
former to animate their soldiers, in the same manner as the latter
enflame their workmen, to attack with violence and outrage the
proposers of any such regulation; to attempt to reduce the army
would be as dangerous as it has now become to attempt to diminish
in any respect the monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained
against us. This monopoly has so much increased the number of
some particular tribes of them, that, like an overgrown standing army,
they have become formidable to the government, and upon many
occasions intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who

supports every proposal for strengthening the monopoly, is sure to
acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great
popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and
wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the
contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to
thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest
rank, nor the greatest public services can protect him from the most
infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes
from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and
disappointed monopolists.67
At first sight, Smith appears to be rejecting the possibility of utopia as such.
On closer examination, however, he does in fact formulate at least two
preconditions which should be fulfilled so that utopia may become
possible. He refers to ‘public prejudices’ and ‘master manufacturers’ as
presenting fundamental obstacles to the realisation of utopia. For if public
prejudices can be overcome by enlightening them, if ‘master manufacturers’
as a social force can be overcome by other social forces with different
interests, there is no reason why utopia should be impossible. On closer
examination, therefore, the reasons which Smith gives in order to justify
why he thinks that utopia would not be possible turn themselves into
historical, social and political challenges which must be overcome if the
existing social conditions become a burden, from which the realisation of
utopia appears to be the only escape.
What is also important here is the radicalism with which Smith
formulates the second obstacle. He refers to the whole economic and
political structure of commercial society as an obstacle to the realisation of
utopia. In short, if my reading of this paragraph is correct, then we may
conclude that Smith is in fact justifying the possibility of realising utopia in
an indirect way. That is, he is formulating some preconditions which must
be fulfilled so that utopia can be realised. If Smith’s seeming-scepticism
with regard to the possibility of utopia turns out in fact to be a conditional
justification, this would, in turn, mean that Smith takes seriously at least
three types of utopia: those of free trade, Harrington and More. His
reference to three types of utopia at the same time may cause an
interpretative dilemma. For the principle of free trade and the
Harringtonian version of utopia begin with an entirely different paradigm
to that of More. In other words, if Smith is justifying the possibility of
realising utopia in an indirect, rather than a direct way, and if he is putting
before us three types of utopian society with entirely different paradigms
within the framework of which the problems of commercial society may be

solved. Which of these three types of utopia is Smith’s preferred utopia?
Any solution can only be a speculative, but I want to argue that all three
forms of utopia must be taken together and set in relation to one another.
Scholars of Smith’s work who deal with his utopia have implicitly or
explicitly concentrated mostly on his idea of freedom of trade. However,
reading Smith’s work in the light of what I suggest would mean that his
utopia consists of three complementary elements. Smith’s conception of
freedom of trade seems to refer to the equal distribution of commodities in
the market. His reference to James Harrington’s Oceana points to the equal
distribution of land. Both principles are developed on the basis of the
paradigm of distributive justice, and may be taken together. His reference
to Thomas More’s Utopia refers to the common use and administration of
all means of production and subsistence.
Thomas More and James Harrington were not the first or last figures in
the history of European utopian thought. But their utopias respectively
represent in modern times two different paradigms, which may be claimed
to separate European utopian thought generally into two great schools. The
Harringtonian version of utopia and the idea of freedom of trade are above
all concerned with the division of land and distribution of wealth among
the citizens. The Morean version of utopia, by contrast, is concerned
primarily with the socialisation of land and wealth. In other words, the
Harrington version of utopia, as well as the concept of freedom of trade,
remains within the paradigm of what is called, at least since Plato and
Aristotle, the distinction between mine and thine, and which is the sole
foundation of private property. By contrast, the Morean version of utopia
questions this paradigm essentially and wants to establish a society based on
the principles of common ownership. Philosophically speaking, Harrington
wants to establish a society on the principle of distributive justice, merit and
demerit. More, by contrast, aims at establishing a society on the principle of
mutual recognition.
How do these two types of utopia relate to Smith’s utopia? How can this
apparent interpretive dilemma be solved? I suggest differentiating within
Smith’s utopia between short-term and long-term aims. Especially, Smith’s
discussion of freedom of trade and Oceana refers to his short-term solution,
and his discussion of Utopia to his long-term solution to the problems
arising from the technical and social division of labour in commercial
society. It is said that Plato operated merely based on long-term or ideal
solutions, whereas Aristotle dealt only with short-term or immediately
possible solutions. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Smith seems to operate on
the basis of both solutions, the immediately-possible and ideal, at the same
time.

With his short-term aim, Smith wants to reform radically commercial
society without questioning its essential logic, whereas with his long term
solution he essentially wants to overcome commercial society. I am not
claiming that Smith explicitly formulates this position, but I am maintaining
that this may be a more reasonable explanation for the above-formulated
interpretative problem, if we take seriously the most fundamental
conceptions of his social and political theory such as mutual sympathy and
love, and his non-utilitarian conception of action. However, apart from all
these arguments, my reading is particularly inspired by two passages in The
Theory of Moral Sentiments.
First, when Smith comes to deal with the sense of merit and demerit in
part two of The Theory of Moral Sentiments he defines merit and demerit as
‘species’ of criteria of approbation and disapprobation distinct from
propriety and impropriety.68 The main difference between these two sets of
criteria is this: whereas the former are to be seen within the paradigm of
justice, which is according to Smith a negative virtue, the latter can hardly
be confined to the conception of justice and therefore it must be placed
within the paradigm of mutual sympathy and recognition.
Second and more importantly, Smith says: ‘Society may subsist among
different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility,
without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe
any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld
by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed
valuation.’69 But:
…where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded [not based
on the principle of utility but - DG] from love, from gratitude, from
friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy. All the
different members of it are bound together by the agreeable bands of
love and affection, and are as it were, drawn to one common centre
of mutual good offices.70
The former principles refer to the system of justice and utility, that is, to
the idea of freedom of trade and the Harringtonian version of utopia,
whereas the latter points to the system of mutual recognition and the
Morean version of utopia.
This seems to me to be the best solution to the interpretative problem in
Smith’s formulation of his utopia. If we remain within his theory of
distribution then we may be able to claim that he champions the idea of
freedom of trade and the Harringtonian version of utopia. However, this
would hardly question the very logic of quantitative exchange relations, and

consequently it would contradict Smith’s whole system of mutual sympathy.
If we leave, however, his theory of distribution and enter his theory of
production, and bear in mind what he says about the concentration of
production as a progressive outcome of the accumulation of capital, then
we may be able to suggest that he operates with the Morean version of
utopia as an essential alternative to commercial society, which may also be,
according to Smith’s own account, a satisfactory solution to the Adam
Smith Problem."

 

D.Göçmen
http://dogangocmen.wordpress.com/
http://www.dogangocmen.blogspot.com/

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: D. Göçmen <dogangoecmen@aol.com>
To: ope@lists.csuchico.edu
Sent: Sun, Nov 15, 2009 5:10 pm
Subject: Re: [OPE] intermission: value of knowledge

 Dear Paul, the paragraph I was thinking of is this (WN, IV.ii.43/p. 471):

"To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely

restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or

Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the

* publick, but what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of

many individuals, irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the army to

oppose with the same zeal and unanimity any reduction in the number of

forces, with which master manufacturers set themselves against every law

that is likely to increase the number of their rivals in the home market;

were the former to animate their soldiers, in the same manner as the latter

enflame their workmen, to attack with violence and outrage the proposers

of any such regulation; to attempt to reduce the army would be as dangerous

as it has now become to attempt to diminish in any respect the

monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained against us. This

monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of

them, that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formid-

[2oT]able to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the

legislature, s9 The member of parliament who supports every proposal for

strengthening this monopoly, is sure to acquire not only the reputation of

understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of

men whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he

opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to

be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the

highest rank, nor the greatest publick services can protect him from the

most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes

from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed

monopolists."

 

D.Göçmen

http://dogangocmen.wordpress.com/

http://www.dogangocmen.blogspot.com/

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Bullock <paulbullock@ebms-ltd.co.uk>

To: Outline on Political Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu>

Sent: Sat, Nov 14, 2009 1:36 am

Subject: Re: [OPE] intermission: value of knowledge

Dogan... have you refs to Adam Smith saying this...
ie 'illusion'?

 

Paul B.

  

----- Original Message -----

  

From:
  D. Göçmen
  

  

To: ope@lists.csuchico.edu

  

Sent: Friday, November 13, 2009 2:11
  PM

  

Subject: Re: [OPE] intermission: value of
  knowledge

  

  

  

With minor editing
  again:

"Good point, Jerry. As Marx pointed out in *Grundrisse* the idea of *free market*
  implies a market without market forces even if we leave out the state. Already
  Smith pointed out that the idea of free market and free trade is an illusion.
  More generally, Engels, in his investigation into the concept of competition,
  pointed out that the division of labout resulting in private property implies
  some kind of monopolies and therefore power relations. Remember what Marx says
  about the dision of labour and private property in Capital: the divison of
  labour does not require private property as in a factory but private property
  does always."

  

  

  

D.Göçmen

http://dogangocmen.wordpress.com/

http://www.dogangocmen.blogspot.com/

  

  

-----Original Message-----

From: Gerald Levy
  <jerry_levy@verizon.net>

To: Outline on Political Economy mailing
  list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu>

Sent: Fri, Nov 13, 2009 3:28
  pm

Subject: Re: [OPE] intermission: value of knowledge

  

>
  What is different about knowledge is that it has high returns to
  scale,

> but as Michael has pointed out, capitalism has difficulty
  with all

> industries characterised by high returns to scale. It
  is forced to

> abandon the idea of the free market and resort to
  monopoly in

> these cases, whether it be railways or software
  publishing.

 

Hi Paul C:

 

Even where there
  are more competitive markets, the "free market" doesn't exist. One can only
  conceive of the possibility of a free

market in the absence of a
  state, yet where the capital-form has

existed historically so has the
  state-form. "Free market capitalism"

is not a historical construct,
  it is an ideological one.

 

Regarding the point that labor
  has to be expended preserving

the material carriers of knowledge,
  that's true but it can also be

vanishingly small. What, for instance,
  is the labor required to preserve a Class 6 SHDC and the data which has been
  stored in it? What's even more to the point is that although there is such
  preservation labor required, it doesn't correspond to the value
  of

the knowledge.

 

In solidarity,
  Jerry

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Received on Sun Nov 15 10:30:28 2009

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