Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms

If lose the bridge which uses to provide shelter to me and the can of beans which uses to feed me, of course my living standards and life expectancy will tumble. This is a triviality.   The real point at stake is whether I could be sheltered and fed by other and better means. Lionel Robbins was very clear about this. Recognising the provision of useful effects on behalf of GOASPLAN, he stated that the fundamental question is not whether plantscan be built and managed with certain technical efficiency, but if using the resources of the community to build and manage factories those resources are being used more profitably than they could be used in any other way.   So again, the qualitative inputs provided by returns to management are essential to asses the opportunity costs of centrally planned socialism.   A. Agafonow ________________________________ De: Paul Cockshott <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk> Para: Outline on Political Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu> Enviado: mié,9 junio, 2010 00:49 Asunto: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms I think you are evading the point, remove GOSPLAN and output living standards and life expectancy tumbled. you can not cover up the deaths of millions of people due to poverty and then claim that there was not a massive decline in real production of use values. ________________________________________ From: ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu [ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu] On Behalf Of Alejandro Agafonow [alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es] Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2010 4:46 PM To: Outline on Political Economy mailing list Subject: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms Since the original problem was to work out the marginal return on an input, i.e., marginal returns to management, we have to face the fact that we don’t really have an homogeneous unit of account to measure this input. We are not concerned with measuring it for the sake of measurement itself. If we have to take into account the diminishing quality of marginal returns to management and this hampers measurement, that’s just too bad. Concerning your reference to GOSPLAN, I’m not sure if it is right to consider returns to management from the point of view of a “group of people responsible for controlling and organizing a company”, but from the broader point of view of the work needed to the “control and organization of something”. In this last sense, productivity was not so good in GOSPLAN as you have to take into account the hole labour force, not to speak of the artificiality of the USSR production given increasing inventories that nobody wanted. A. Agafonow ________________________________ De: Paul Cockshott <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk> Para: Outline on Political Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu> Enviado: sáb,5 junio, 2010 22:29 Asunto: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms You would not get a clear distinction between inependent and dependent variables if you want to adjust the input for quality. Your definition of quality then is related to output. But the original problem was to work out the marginal return on an input. Note too that you claims about diminishing marginal returns to management in the ussr are empirically dubious. When the top layer of management, GOSPLAN was removed in the early 90s, national output fell by some 40percent or more. Given that only a couple of thousand worked in GOSPLAN, say less than 0.01 percent of the soviet labour force, the marginal returns to management seem to have been enormously positive in practice. ________________________________________ From: ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu> [ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>] On Behalf Of Alejandro Agafonow [alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es>] Sent: Saturday, June 05, 2010 5:54 PM To: OPE List Subject: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms But my point is that evaluating managerial inputs in person hours is not a good answer because you are not measuring the falling in managerial quality as a larger degree of centralisation goes by. Likewise, as far as managerial inputs are produced inside the enterprises rather than externalising the production of every input, evaluation in money doesn’t seem the answer either. Hiring managers in a job market is not necessarily the same as buying managerial inputs. The reaction of actual capitalist enterprises is trying to stop nearby the point of constant returns opening new factories/enterprises when it is possible, whichever the way of measuring managerial inputs is. A. Agafonow ________________________________ De: Paul Cockshott <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk<mailto:wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk>> Para: Alejandro Agafonow <alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es>>; Outline on Politic al Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>> Enviado: sáb,5 junio, 2010 16:01 Asunto: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms It obviously makes a big difference whether you evaluate managerial input in person hours or in money, given the rapid growth of managers pay. I can quite believe that in money terms there may be decreasing returns to management --- original message --- From: "Alejandro Agafonow" <alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es>> Subject: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms Date: 5th June 2010 Time: 10:44:37 am Paul, I’m afraid that productivity, i.e., output in terms of goods per unit of labour, can not be arithmetically treated to determine if under conditions of productivity growing faster than logarithmically it would outmount decreasing returns to management. To be arithmetically treatable, we would have to reduce managerial inputs and goods or services per unit of labour, to a common unit of account. Then, we would be able to compare them in order to determine if under conditions of productivity growing faster than logarithmically, it would outmount decreasing returns to management indeed. The crucial point is whether we can find a unit of account for managerial inputs able to measure them according to the quality of their contribution to production? We can imagine a situation where though facing conditions of productivity growing faster than logarithmically, managerial inputs are reducing their effectiveness in running production and distorting the whole system. A. Agafonow ________________________________ De: Paul Cockshott <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk<mailto:wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk>> Para: Outline on Political Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>> Enviado: lun,5 abril, 2010 21:36 Asunto: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms Ok but are the costs of management polynomial, logarithmic or log linear in scale of production. First approximation indicates managment to be log linear in number of people employed, but if productivity of labour rises faster than logarithmically with number employed ( not a steep demand ) then there would be no decreasing returns in your sense to managerial inputs. ________________________________________ From: ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>> [ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>>] On Behalf Of Alejandro Agafonow [alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es><mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es>>] Sent: Monday, April 05, 2010 12:25 PM To: Outline on Political Economy mailing list Subject: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms Do you mean Paul backed by empirical research? The phenomenon of diminishing returns to scale in production is backed by empirical research, though diminishing returns to management may have motivated less empirical inquiry. However, to think the world as one where there are only constant or even increasing returns to scale and management is like thinking in a world without friction. A. Agafonow ________________________________ De: Paul Cockshott <wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk<mailto:wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk><mailto:wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk<mailto:wpc@dcs.gla.ac.uk>>> Para: Outline on Political Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>>> Enviado: lun,29 marzo, 2010 20:52 Asunto: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms how much of this is theory and how much is backed by quantitative research ________________________________________ From: ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>>> [ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope-bounces@lists.csuchico.edu>>>] On Behalf Of Alejandro Agafonow [alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es><mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es>><mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es><mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es<mailto:alejandro_agafonow@yahoo.es>>>] Sent: Monday, March 29, 2010 6:07 PM To: Outline on Political Economy mailing list Subject: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms Diminishing returns to management are yield rates that after a certain point fail to increase proportionately and start to decrease to additional outlays of management. Should certain degree of centralization reached this bureaucratic inefficiencies start to increase disproportionately. A. Agafonow ________________________________ De: Gerald Levy <jerry_levy@verizon.net<mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net><mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net<mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net>><mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net<mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net><mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net<mailto:jerry_levy@verizon.net>>>> Para: Outline on Political Economy mailing list <ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>>>> Enviado: jue,18 marzo, 2010 15:09 Asunto: Re: [OPE] socialist planning in capitalist firms > So, what does make conflicting interests in capitalist economies more > powerful than conflicting interests in socialist > economies that prevent the former to go further in a centrally capitalist > economy? Hi Alejandro: The profit system. Also, while there can be conflicting interests in a socialist system, there can and should be a certain level of coordination among different producers. For instance, consider how the diffusion of new technologies is often retarded by the system of proprietary rights, such as the patent system, under capitalism. This incredible inefficiency would (or, at least, should) be overcome in a socialist system where producers would share knowledge about technologies. In any event, there wouldn't be the same people vs. profit equation in which the requirements of the latter trump the former under socialism. > Nothing in my criterion. Therefore the issue of diminishing returns to > management. What do you mean by diminishing returns "to management"?  There can be - and are - bureaucratic inefficiencies wherever there are bureaucracies. A capitalist corporation is an inherently bureaucratic and hierarchical organization and there are many inefficiencies that arise from this. In  solidarity, Jerry _______________________________________________ ope mailing list ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>>><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>>>> https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/ope The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 _______________________________________________ ope mailing list ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>>> https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/ope The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 _______________________________________________ ope mailing list ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu><mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu>> https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/ope ________________________________ The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 _______________________________________________ ope mailing list ope@lists.csuchico.edu<mailto:ope@lists.csuchico.edu> https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/ope The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 _______________________________________________ ope mailing list ope@lists.csuchico.edu https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/ope

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Received on Thu Jun 10 09:32:53 2010