Re: [OPE] Models and Marx

From: howard engelskirchen <he31@verizon.net>
Date: Sat Feb 12 2011 - 11:25:16 EST

> Hence we can also say that the theory of phlogiston modeled the causal
> mechanisms involved in combustion but did so poorly based on the
> criteria by which we judge or rank competing theories: empirical
> accuracy, logical consistency, generality and simplicity.

Hi Dave,

What causal mechanisms involved in combustion did the theory of phlogiston
pick out or refer to?

There's a difficulty here. Phlogiston is a substance given off in
combustion. There is nothing in nature that corresponds to this. You don't
call my model of fairies in the garden 'poor'.

howard

----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Zachariah" <dave.zachariah@gmail.com>
To: "Outline on Political Economy mailing list" <ope@lists.csuchico.edu>
Sent: Saturday, February 12, 2011 7:28 AM
Subject: Re: [OPE] Models and Marx

> On 2011-02-11 00:40, Paul Cockshott wrote:
>> The difference between the theory and the model is that the theory
>> needs to be materialised and activated as a physical model before
>> any predictions emerge.
>>
>> A theory is more abstract than a model, it tells you how to go about
>> constructing a model, but until you have built the model and activated
>> it you get no predictions out. This was harder to see in the past since
>> the computations required to model the mechanics of the solar system
>> according to Newtons laws were done by people using papers and pencils
>> so the model in the sense of the computing system that produced the
>> results, was distributed over the notebooks, the clerks who did the
>> menial
>> calculations and the directors like Laplace who developed the high level
>> equations.
>>
>> A model now can be physically localised in an appropriately configured
>> universal computer - and we at times abstract from the computer itself
>> and say that the software package, independent of the hardware, is
>> the model. But such a model is still something concrete, with a material
>> existence and more importantly, a specific parametrisation.
>>
>> The general theory of celestial mechanics is not a model, but part of
>> the means of production of models. The theory can be used to produce
>> a multiplicity of models -- of different planetary systems, of galactic
>> dynamics,
>> etc.
>>
>> A model may be built in accordance with a theory, and if the theory
>> allows a large
>> number of models to be built, all of which models turn out to have a good
>> predictive
>> ability we say that the theory is a law.
>
> Paul, I agree with what you wrote, especially about the 'materiality' of
> predictors. The meaning of words like 'theory' and 'model' are in this
> context of course somewhat elusive. By 'model' above you mean a concrete
> empirical predictor. In my original post I meant to say that theories
> 'model' (as a verb) causal mechanisms and can be used to produce a > Hence
> we can also say that the theory of phlogiston modeled the causal
> mechanisms involved in combustion but did so poorly based on the
> criteria by which we judge or rank competing theories: empirical
> accuracy, logical consistency, generality and simplicity.

> specific models (as instances) of physical systems where those
> mechanisms are active. E.g. Newton's laws model certain causal
> mechanisms of the universe and can be used to generate a predictive
> model of the trajectory of celestial bodies.
>
>
> //Dave Z
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Received on Sat Feb 12 11:26:26 2011

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