




Brand drug without generic competition



Brand drug without generic competition




Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c



Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c

If Monopoly produces at the OLD $MR=MC$ point,
Monopoly produces Q_{monop} and charges P_c



Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c

P,
Costs

If Monopoly produces at the OLD
MR=MC point, Q_{monop} and charges P_c

P_{monop}

Additional Consumer Surplus

Reduced Monopoly Profit

Uh, oh. But what about these guys?
Willingness-to-pay > $P_c \rightarrow$ Shortage!

P_c


MC

D


MR

Q_{monop}

Q




Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c




If Monopoly produces at the OLD
 $MR=MC$ point, Q_{monop} and charges P_c

Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c



There's actually a NEW MR curve to equate $MR=MC$. What is MR for $Q < Q(P_c)$?


Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c



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
Constant! You get P_c for every Q you produce, since every buyer's willingness-to-pay is $> P_c$

Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c



Option 1: The Monopoly could keep producing Q_{monop} , and use non-price methods to allocate the shortage.


Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c



Option 1: The Monopoly could keep producing Q_{monop} , and use non-price methods to allocate the shortage.

Option 2: Or, they could try and grab some more profit.

Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c




Essentially, the New MR is constant, then resumes back to the same slope as before, but with a break.

The properties of increasing price, decreasing demand only start applying after the $Q(P_c)$ point. And at that point, we know that $MR < MC$.


Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c

Essentially, the New MR is constant, then
resumes back to the same slope with a break.

New MR = MC point is at $Q(P_c)$, and price
charged is P_c .



Brand drug without generic competition:
Introduce a binding price ceiling, P_c



New $MR = MC$ is $Q(P_c)$, and price charged is P_c .

Monopoly gains some profit from Option 1, but less than Profit compared with no P_c (since that was profit-max).

Consumers gain surplus compared with Option 1 and no P_c .

There is still deadweight loss, but less than before P_c .