Theory of Social Choice syllabus

ECN 226: Theory of Social Choice

Spring 2013

Dr. Jac Heckelman

Carswell 122

x5923

heckeljc@wfu.edu

http:\\www.wfu.edu\~heckeljc\jac.htm

Social choice theory focuses mainly on the incentives voters face under alternative voting arrangements. When individuals form groups, conflicts naturally occur, and decisions must be reached as to how these conflicts will be resolved. In a democratic environment, voting is the main avenue for deciding how to proceed. The issues may involve selecting representatives or specific proposals. But if the entire group cannot agree, how should consensus be determined?

In this course, the implications of various voting rules will be considered both in terms of individual voting incentives and aggregation to group decisions. Social choice analysis is designed to determine how well a given voting rule will lead to outcomes which best represent the desires of the group members. However, group members as voters may not reveal their true preferences if they determine that voting differently would better their chance for a more preferred outcome. Voting rules will therefore be considered for their impact on voting incentives, by making comparisons under “sincere” versus “strategic” voting.

TEXTS

Mathematics and Politics, by Alan D. Taylor and Allison M. Pacelli (2nd edition)

Analyzing Politics, by Kenneth A. Shepsle (2nd edition)

(additional readings available through Sakai)

EXAMS

Midterm 1 (20%)
Midterm 2 (20%)
Final (30%)

PAPER (20%)

Due April 22
Paired students will write a 6-10 page paper developing a new voting procedure. This can be either an existing vote procedure not discussed in class, or a newly created voting rule of the student's own design. The paper should discuss both pros and cons of the proposed rule, in terms of properties and incentives, and contrasted against one other standard rule. The conclusion should then explain favoring one of the rules over the other based on the comparisons made. Examples of voting outcomes should be used for illustrative purposes. Duplication of the same two rules for comparison by different student pairs will not be allowed. Papers will be presented in class (15 minutes each) beginning April 22. Both a hardcopy version of the paper and electronic version of the presentation (PowerPoint, pdf, etc.) are due on the 22nd for all students, regardless of which day you are presenting.

HOMEWORK AND PARTICIPATION (10%)

Students are to prepare typed answers for each set of readings questions. They are to be brought to class on the reading day and used as a guide to discussion. They may or may not be collected by random choice. If collected, they are to be turned in at the end of class. Late homeworks will not be accepted. If you are absent on the day of a scheduled reading, it is your responsibilty to ensure the homework is turned in before the end of that class - either by hard copy or email. Master sheet for all homework questions listed here. Homework questions separated by their specific readings are also posted to Sakai.

All students will be expected to stay up to date on the class readings and be prepared to discuss individual readings in class and contribute positively to the overall classroom environment. Absences on reading discussion days will incur penalties unless validly excused with official notification.

Each problem set will be reviewed in class. Everyone is expected to have completed the assignment and be prepared to present their answers in class on the due date.

Each reading day and problem set due date is listed below, but updates to the schedule may be announced as the semester progresses.

READING SCHEDULE

1. Introduction

Shepsle, ch 1

Johnson, “Constitutional Economics” {1/22}

Taylor and Pacelli, ch 1, pp 1-10

Shepsle, ch 2, 3

Dahl, “Majority Rule and the Democratic Process” {1/29}

2. Median Voter Spatial Models

Shepsle, ch 5, pp. 90-99, 110-123; ch 4 (skip pp. 67-82)

Fiorina, “Do Voters Choose Divided Government?” {2/7}

Shepsle, ch 5, pp. 99-110

Problem Set 1: Shepsle, ch 5, #1, 7, 10 {2/14}

3. Strategic Voting

Taylor and Pacelli, ch 4

Shepsle, ch 3,6

Dixit and Nalebuff, “The Strategy of Voting” {2/19}

Problem Set 2: Shepsle, ch 3, #4; ch 6, #7; game tree; Dixit and Nalebuff 7 {9/29}

EXAM 1 (sections 1-3) {2/21}

4. Alternative Voting Procedures

Shepsle, ch 7, pp 191-210

Taylor and Pacelli, ch 1, pp 10-35

Brams and Fishburn, “The Mixed Success of Approval Voting” {3/19}

Problem Set 3: Shepsle, ch 7, #1, 2; ch 2, #6 {3/21}

Mueller, “Probabilistic Majority Rule” {3/21}

Problem Set 4: Shepsle, ch 3, #2; ch 4, #4; game tree; PMR exercise (on Sakai){3/20}

5. Impossibility Theorems

Shepsle, ch 4, pp 67-82

Taylor and Pacelli, ch 7, pp 205-222

Hammond, “Rank Injustice?” {4/2}

Problem Set 5: Shepsle, ch 4, # 2, 5 {4/2}

EXAM 2 (sections 4-5) {4/4}

6. The Calculus of Voting

Shepsle, ch 9 (skip pp. 276-292)

Problem Set 6: Shepsle, ch 9, #5, 8 {4/11}

Heckelman, “Bribing Voters Without Verification” {4/16}

Guest Lecture: Sen, “Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” {4/18}

PRESENTATIONS {4/22*, 4/23, 4/25}
NOTE: special class day held on Monday, 4/22 at 3:30pm

7. Comparison of Economic vs Political Approach

Shepsle, ch 17

Guest Debate: Buchanan, “Public Choice: Politics without Romance” {4/30}

FINAL EXAM (sections 1-7) {5/4, 10am - SET IN STONE}