SIAVELIS RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Legislative Candidate Selection in New Democracies (with Bonnie N. Field).
Abstract: The project focuses on national legislative candidate selection in third-wave democracies. It aims to answer three broad questions: What explains the adoption of particular candidate selection procedures in new democracies? How do distinct candidate selection procedures affect political party institutionalization, legislator behavior and the consolidation of democracy? To what degree, why and how do the candidate selection procedures adopted during the transition create path dependency?
Bonnie N. Field and Peter M. Siavelis. 2009. "The Determinants of Candidate Selection Procedures in New Democracies: Evidence from Spain (1977-1982) and Chile (1989-2005)." Estudio/Working Paper 109/2009, Máster en Democracia y Gobierno, Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain.
Bonnie N. Field and Peter M. Siavelis. 2008. "Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities: A Research Note," Party Politics, 14:5 (September): 620-39.
Also published as: "Procedimientos de seleccion de candidatos en las democracias nacientes," en Flavia Freidenberg y Manuel Alcántara Sáez (eds.), Seleccion de candidatos, politica partidista y rendimiento democrático (México, DF: Tribunal Electoral del Distrito Federal, Universidad Nacional de México e Instituto de Iberoamérica), pp. 61-84.
Bonnie N. Field and Peter Siavelis, “The Genesis of Candidate Selection Procedures in Spain (1976-1982),” paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association conference, Chicago, Ill., April 12 to 15, 2007.
Cabinet and Executive Branch Structure and the Performance of Presidentialism
Abstract: This project analyzes how presidents often build or rely upon informal networks of supporters and advisors that help them structure relations with congress, protect their image, and navigate difficult political waters by providing presidents avenues of influence and power that are informal in nature. In particular it seeks to add to a growing literature contesting the idea that presidentialism is a sub-optimal institutional arrangement for Latin America’s multiparty systems by exploring the important and undertheorized variable.
Peter Siavelis, “Cabinets, Quotas, Iron Circles and the Second Floor: Formal and Informal Organization of the Executive Branch in Chile,” presented (by a colleague as I was not able to attend the meeting) at the seminar, El presidencialismo latinoamericano y el parlamentarismo europeo "cara a cara," Zaragoza, Spain, March 17-18, 2010.
Abstract: This project challenges the commonly held notion that Chile is as European in its structure of party competition as is usually supposed, both for the pre- and post- authoritarian periods. We test levels of party system nationalization at the municipal, congressional and presidential levels before and after Chile’s dictatorship and compare them with other Latin American and European cases.
John Polga-Hecimovich, Scott Morgenstern, and Peter Siavelis, “Electoral System and Party System Nationalization in Chile: What the Voters Want and What the Voters Get,” paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association conference, Chicago, Ill, April 21-24th, 2010.
Political Coalitions and the Performance of Chilean Democracy
Abstract: This book length project explores the roots of success of post-authoritarian governments focusing on the relationship between the citizenry, parties and the structure of political coalitions, mediated by Chile’s institutional structure. It underscores both the positive and problematic elements of the interaction of Chile’s institutional framework and structure of political competition in determining the quality of Chilean democracy in terms of representation, accountability, stability and legitimacy.
“Elite-Mass Congruence, Partidocracia and the Quality of Chilean Democracy,” Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1:3 (2009): 3-31.
“Enclaves de la transición y democracia chilena,” Revista de Ciencia Política, 29:1 (2009): 3-21.