Zulick Home | COM340 | COM225/754 | COM300 | COM341 | COM301 | COM302 |All Primary Texts | All References
Garrison, Reply to Birney | Garrison, Peace Declaration | AASS Declaration | AASS Constitution | Related Sources

Debate from the Liberator, 31 May 1839.
Remarks of James Birney reprinted from the Emancipator.

 

Important Documents

 

Editors’ Introduction

We invite the attention not only of the readers of the Liberator, but of abolitionists generally, and the conductors of the anti-slavery press in particular, to the following documents.  The question whether abolitionists, as such, are under obligation to go to the polls, and whether non-resistants are consistent members of the American Anti-Slavery Society, is one which has recently excited a very deep interest.  The argument of Mr. Birney on the one side, and the reply of Mr. Garrison on the other, will enable every one to judge where lies the truth.

 
 

From the Emancipator

 

 
View
Of the Constitution of the American A. S. Society as Connected with the ‘No-Government’ Question.
 

1
Preamble

Association for accomplishing objects to which the consent of the majority is necessary, is called for, only on the ground, that the sentiment of the majority, as to the particular object, differs from that of the minority who associate.  The originators of the American Anti-Slavery Society believed, that slavery ought immediately to be abandoned.  The majority did not.  The minority believed that, to associate was the best way in which they could act on the majority—so that they should be […] to adopt and carry out their views. […]

 

2.1
Principles of the Consitution of the AASS

1. The admission, [that each State, in which Slavery exists] has, by the constitution of the U.S. the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its abolition in said State.

 

2.2

2. To convince our fellow citizens, by arguments addressed to their understandings and consciences, that slaveholding is a heinous crime in the sight of God, and, that the duty, safety, and best interests of all concerned, require its immediate abandonment, without expatriation.

 

2.3

3. In a constitutional way to influence Congress to put an end to the domestic slave trade—and

 

2.4

4. To abolish slavery in all those portions of our common country which come under its control—especially in the District of Columbia; and lastly,

 

2.5

5. To prevent the extension of slavery to any State that might hereafter be admitted to the Union.

 

3
Question of Membership

By the 4th article of the Constitution, any person may become a member who consents to the principles of the constitution—who contributes to the funds of the Society, and is not a slaveholder.

 

4

The first question which presents itself is—what are ‘the principles’ of the constitution?  The answer is—they are embodied in the object and means above enumerated.

 

5
Interpretation of principles enumerated in the AASS consitution

The next question is—what is it to ‘consent’—or, rather, not to consent to these principles?  If any one maintain, that the abolition of slavery in the United States ought not to be entire—or that arguments, of whatever value, ought not to be addressed to understandings and consciences of our fellow citizens, to prove that slaveholding is a heinous crime—or, that the immediate abandonment of slavery is not the duty of the slaveholder, nor promotive of the best interests of all concerned—or that it ought not to take place without expatriation—or, if he maintain that, any and every effort in a constitutional way ought not to be made to influence Congress to put an end to the domestic slave trade—to abolish slavery in all those portions of our common country which come under its control, especially in the District of Columbia—or, to prevent the extension of it to any State which may, hereafter, be admitted to the Union:—such an one (even admitting his object to be better, and his means more effective that any which have been adopted by the American Society) cannot be said to ‘consent’ to the principles of the Constitution.

 

6
Addresses question of moral vs. political action

All the action required by the constitution is moral.  Arguments addressed to the understandings and consciences of members of Congress are as much moral, as when addressed to our fellow-citizens generally.  But the framers of the constitution were not content it would seem, to leave a particular species of this action undistinguished in the mass—to be apprehended or not (as it might happen) under the general expressions, ‘aim to convince’—‘arguments addressed to the understanding,’ &c. &c.  So important did they deem it, and so anxious were they to remove all doubt of what they intended, that they separated it from the mass, by declaring, ‘the society will also endeavor, in a constitutional way, to influence Congress to put an end to the domestic slave trade,’ &c.

 

7

It is not unworthy of remark, that whilst our fellow citizens, generally, were to be ‘addressed’—Congress were to be influenced.  Not that members of Congress were not included in the words ‘all our fellow citizens,’ to whom arguments were to be ‘addressed;’ but, because certain of our fellow citizens were members of Congress, and possessed, in virtue thereof, extraordinary power, with them the society were to use additional means.  They were ‘also to endeavor, in a constitutional way, to influence Congress,’ &c., that is, by such considerations as are usually found to have a peculiar influence on men enjoying peculiar stations at the will of the people.  They were to be asked to do, what, in their public character, they were authorized to do—what it was right for them to do; if their action was not responsive to our petitions, they were to be influenced by the fear of incurring the displeasure of their constituents; consequently, of being removed from their places, that others might occupy them;—the only ‘constitutional way’ of doing which was, by the use of the Elective Franchise.

 

8

This action on Congress has been called, by way of distinction, ‘political.’  For several years after the organization of the American Society, our numbers were too few to attempt it.  It was therefore, generally, deprecated as inexpedient.  Notwithstanding, however, on one occasion, if no more, the very next year after the institution of the Society, when the moral propriety of abolitionists carrying out their principles at the ballot box was denied by some, it was strenuously upheld by the editor of the Liberator, who had aided in forming the constitution—he himself setting the example of voting for a professed abolitionist, and encouraging others to do the same,—taking the ground, that, although the votes of all the abolitionists in Boston (where the election referred to took place) would not have been sufficient to elect the anti-slavery candidate on that occasion, the course recommended would, if persisted in, facilitate his election at some future period.  (See Liberator, Dec. 1834)

 

9

The constitutions of none of the State societies (and they are all auxiliaries to the American) contain any thing repugnant to political action.  That of the Massachusetts society declares in Art. 2 ‘The objects of the society shall be, to endeavor, by all means, sanctioned by law, humanity and religion,’ &c.

 

10

The Declaration of Sentiments, published simultaneously with the constitution by those who had subscribed the latter, contains the following passage.

 

11

‘We also maintain, that there are at the present time, the highest obligations resting upon the people of the free States, to remove slavery by moral and political action, as prescribed in the Constitution of the U.S.’

 

12

After mentioning the pledge of the free States to put down servile insurrection—the danger, expense, and political inequalities produced by slavery, it proceeds to the conclusion that, ‘it must be broken up.’  How it was to be broken up, except by means of the Elective Franchise, does not appear.  The Declaration of Sentiments, although possessing no obligatory force, is the highest evidence that can be had, apart from the constitution, of what was intended by the body of the abolitionists in that instrument.

 

13.1

Opposition to political action as a development after the fact

It is not recollected, that any amount of opposition worthy to be mentioned was made to political action as inculcated (according to the foregoing interpretation) in the constitution—in the Declaration of Sentiments—in the State Societies’ constitutions—and in the Editorials of the Liberator—till after political action was, in consequence of the increase of our numbers, decided upon.  Within the last twelve or eighteen months, it is believed—after efforts, some successful, some not, had been begun to affect the elections—and whilst the most indefatigable, exertions were being made by many of our influential, intelligent and liberal friends to convince the great body of the abolitionists of the necessity—the indispensable necessity—of breaking away from their old ‘parties,’ and uniting together in the use of the elective franchise for the advancement of the cause of human freedom in which we were engaged;—at this very time, and mainly, too, in that part of the country where political action had been most successful, and whence, from its promise of soon being wholly triumphant, great encouragement was derived by abolitionists every where, a Sect has arisen in our midst, whose members regard it as a religious obligation, in no case, to exercise the elective franchise.  This persuasion is part and parcel of the tenet which it is believed they have embraced,—that as Christians have the precepts of the Gospel to direct, and the Spirit of God to guide them, all Human Governments, as necessarily including the idea of force to secure obedience, are not only superfluous, but unlawful encroachments on the Divine government, as ascertained from the sources above mentioned.

 

13.3

pacifism as anarchy

Therefore, they refuse to do any thing voluntarily, by which they would be considered as acknowledging the lawful existence of human governments.  Denying to Civil governments the right to use force, they easily deduce, that family governments have no such right.  Thus they would withhold from parents any power to personal chastisement or restraint for the correction of their children.  They carry out to the full extent the ‘non-resistance’ theory.  To the first ruffian who would demand our purse, or oust us from our houses, they are to be unconditionally surrendered, unless moral suasion be found sufficient to induce him to decline from his purpose.  Our wives, our daughters, our sisters--our mothers we are to see set upon by the most brutal, without any effort on our part, except argument to defend them—and even they, themselves, are forbidden to use in defense of their purity such powers as God has endowed them with for its protection, if resistance should be attended with injury or destruction to the assailant.  In short, the ‘No-Government’ doctrines, as they are believed now to be embraced, seem to strike at the root of the social structure; and tend—so far as I am able to judge of their tendency,—to throw society into entire confusion, and to renew, under the sanction of religion, scenes of anarchy and license that have generally heretofore been the offspring of the rankest infidelity and irreligion.

 

14

It is but justice to say—judging from the moral deportment of the adherents of the ‘No-Government’ scheme—that so far from admitting, what I have supposed to be, its legitimate consequences, they would wholly deny and repudiate them.

 

15

Refutations

These Sectaries have not as yet separated themselves from the American society.  Far from it.  They insist that their views are altogether harmonious with what is required for membership by the constitution.  So confident do they seem in this, that they say, any interpretation of that instrument which would prove them unqualified for membership—and, therefore, throw on them the duty of retiring from the society—ought not to be tolerated as sound for a moment; they assert that such an interpretation of the constitution cannot be maintained by the American society without dashing the whole anti-slavery organization into fragments, and that it is not warranted by any thing in the letter or spirit of the constitution.

 

16

As this seems to be mere assertion—no fact being stated which can be denied, and no argument advanced in support of it which can be combated—it admits of no other answer than this;—that, respect for the American society induces the belief that it will construe the constitution according to the generally received principles of construction, and not obediently to the mandate or the menace of any particular portion of its members.

 

17

Again—it is said there is nothing in the history of the abolition reformation to warrant my interpretation of the constitution.  The proof adduced is—that many good men have united with the American society or its auxiliaries, and remain members, who are, in principle, opposed to using the elective franchise on any occasion.  The conclusion from these premises to which the new constructionists come, is that the constitution is consistent with this state of things.  But, if it prove any thing logically, it is, that if Sectaries be not expelled from an institution, and are content themselves to remain in it, therefore the rules of the institution consist with their heresy: which is absurd.

 

18
Qualifications for membership must be scrutinized voluntarily

A simple statement, however, will correct whatever wrong impression may have been made on the minds of the candid as to this part of the subject: The American society have no Board of Inspection appointed to scrutinize the qualification of persons proposing themselves for membership.  They publish their constitution—submit it to all—leaving it to the integrity of every one to decide for himself, whether he possesses the qualifications it requires or not.

 

19

Self-respect ought to persuade those who disagree to withdraw

Neither have they committed to any portion of their body the power of expelling such as enter the Society without the proper qualifications, or who disqualify themselves after entering.  As no benefit of a selfish character is known to follow, on uniting with the Society, it is presumed that every one honestly considers himself qualified for membership at the time of uniting.  If, after uniting, he should find that he had become disqualified, as several have, by materially changing their opinions, the same integrity and self-respect which would have restrained him under such circumstances from joining the Society, ought, it is thought, to persuade him to retire from it.

 

20.1

Not illiberal

But the No-Government men exclaim against this suggestion, as illiberal and bigoted.  But where is the illiberality of attributing to men opinions which they cherish—acts which they are doing—and if those be found inconsistent with the terms of a particular association, of saying so?  Is any one harmed by it, if he be not thereby prevented from acting according to his own views, and associating with others who agree with him?  Would a Christian think himself illiberally dealt by, if, on making application to be admitted to membership in a particular church, he should frankly make known his religious views, and be as frankly told by the proper authorities that they differed essentially from those which that church had considered and settled as right for itself—as the most proper for carrying forward the cause of Christianity—that, therefore, he was unqualified to be connected with it;—but, that, there were other churches with which his opinions coincided, who would be glad to receive him—or, if there were none such, that still he was at full liberty to be come the founder of a new religious order—or if this was not to his taste, that he might worship alone, with none to molest, or make him afraid?  Would such an one have any ground of complaint?  Surely, none.

 

20.7

changes should be instituted in a constitutional

manner

Nor does this view at all conflict with the right possessed by every one, already a member of a religious or other association, to attempt so to change its movements as to make it more effective for the object proposed.  But as associations generally make provision for such changes, they ought to be attempted according to the prescribed form (where they are sufficient for the purpose) and not by straining or distorting the principles of the organization, so as to make them cover cases to which all concerned know, they were never intended to apply.  If this be the right course of procedure in such circumstances, and my interpretation of the constitution be correct, it would seem to be the most honorable, amiable, and respectful course for the No-Government men to move directly for an alteration of the constitution.  To this, I think, no one would take exception.

 

21.1

the differences are large enough to warrant this

But to this it may be replied—where is the necessity of a change of the constitution, when both the No-Government men and the Government men can act under it according to the dictates of their consciences respectively?  But is this really so?  Is the difference between those who seek to abolish any and every government of human institution, and those who prefer any government to a state of things in which every one may do what seemeth good in his own eyes—is the difference between them, I say, so small, that they can act harmoniously under the same organization?  When in obedience to the principles of the society, I go to the polls, and there call on my neighbors to unite with me in electing to Congress, men who are in favor of Human Rights, I am met by a No-Government abolitionist inculcating on them the doctrine, that Congress have no rightful authority to act at all in the premises—how can we proceed together?  When I am animating my fellow citizens to aid me in infusing into the government salutary influences which shall put an end to all oppression—my No-Government brother cries out at the top of his lungs, all governments are of the Devil (!) where is our harmony?  Our efficiency?

 

21.7

our purposes are opposed

We are in the condition of two physicians called in to the same patient—one of whom should be intent on applying the proper remedies for expelling the disease from the body and thus restoring and purifying its functions; the other, equally intent on utterly destroying body, members, functions and all.  Could they be agreed, and could they walk together?  It seems to me not.  And simply because their aim, their objects are radically and essentially different.  So with the No-Government and the Pro-Government abolitionists.  One party is for sustaining and purifying governments, and bringing them to a perfect conformity with the principles of the Divine government—the other for destroying all government.

 

22

But, although the No-Government abolitionists refuse themselves to vote, they do not object to petitioning Congress.’—True—and so far so good.  If this seem an absurdity to others, it may not to them.  They may have some method of accommodating their principles to such a proceeding, of which others are ignorant.  And even if there be a substantial inconsistency in refusing, from religious considerations, to have any hand in electing members of Congress—and afterward, when they are elected by others, using them as members of Congress, and only as such, it is nothing more than what often happens to good men who embrace absurd dogmas to which their practical humanity and common sense cannot be brought entirely to submit.

 

23

members of the society are bound to vote

But, do they not also inculcate on all such as believe they can conscientiously use the elective franchise, to vote for the slave?’  It is said they do.  And yet it is also said to be a difficult thing, of late, to secure the passage of resolutions embodying even this diluted principle, in the abolition meetings where the No-Government men have the ascendancy of numbers.  But admitting that they do ask those who can conscientiously vote, to vote for the slave, it does not touch the question whether they as members of the Society are not themselves bound to vote.  If it be the duty of one, it is the duty of all.  Beside what influence can he who refusing, on religious grounds, himself to vote […not as philosophically…] to direct their ‘fallen’ brethren how best they might make their sinful movements declare the glory of God and advance the cause of universal benevolence.

 

24

But would you trample on the conscientious scruples of the No-Government abolitionists, by requiring them to vote?'’ By no means.  There is no power to do so—nor would I if I could.  But Right is to be respected as well as conscience—consciences are to be moulded by right, and not right by the consciences of men.  If the Constitution of the American Society requires of those who subscribe to it, to use the elective franchise, for the abolition of slavery, and men join the Society knowing this, they are justly bound to vote.  From this no man’s conscience can except him any more than it can exempt him from the obligation of paying an amount of money which he owes his neighbor for value received.  If a rule established by an association having the right to establish it, may be nullified by one man’s conscience, so it may by another.  Thus it ceases to be a rule altogether.  If this may be done with regard to one rule, so it may with regard to another.  Then we have a society without any rule for its government.  In this way the society itself is nullified.

 

25

But there is no need of violating any one’s conscientious scruples.  If the No-Government men do verily believe that there rests on them the religious duty of directing their efforts to the annihilation (peaceable, of course.) of all existing Governments, and that the abolition of slavery, by the use of the elective franchise, is inconsistent with it, they are certainly bound by their own rule as honest men to renounce the latter.  But in doing so, they should remember, that they have ceased to ‘consent’ to one of the ‘principles’ of the Constitution, and are virtually no longer entitled to member ship.  In such a case it would seem that the duty of withdrawing from the Society was altogether plain.  Justice to those with whom they associated, and to the slave, requires it;—self-respect requires it—the No-Government enterprise, which they have nearest at heart, requires it.  For what can be more unjust to those who originally associated for the reasonable and single purpose of abolishing slavery, than the attempt to compel them into a crusade for abolishing Government?  What more unjust to the suffering slave, than the attempt to tie on to his magnificent cause a project that is hopeless, because cast out by common sense of the nations of the world?  What more prejudicial to the scheme of annihilating human governments, than to remain associated with those who are striving to purify, invigorate and immortalize their own?

 

26

For my part I can see no good reason why the No-Government party should wish to remain in the Anti-Slavery Association, seeing it must be productive of endless dissentions;--especially, when, by withdrawing and forming on a platform of their own, they could conduct their enterprise vigorously and harmoniously, and permit the abolitionists, who are the advocates of the elective franchise, to do the same with theirs.

 

27

no personal ill will

I am prompted to publish the foregoing remarks by no personal ill-will to any of those who are counted as teachers or disciples of the No-Government doctrines.  I have no ground for ill will.  On the contrary, I know of nothing which would authorize me to say, speaking of them in the mass, that they intend any thing but good; whilst for several of them I cherish particular sentiments of regard.  But it is high time that something was done to bring this subject directly before the great body of the abolitionists, in order that they may relieve their cause from an incubus that has so mightily oppressed it in some parts of the country during the last year.  It is in vain to think of succeeding in emancipation without the co-operation of the great mass of the intelligent mind of the nation.  This can be attracted, only by the reasonableness, the religion, of our enterprise.  To multiply causes of repulsion is but to drive it from us, and ensure our own defeat—to consign the slave to perdurable chains—our country to imperishable disgrace.

 
 

James G. Birney

 

28

Epilogue

*The ‘No-Government’ theory is but a new growth of one of the fungi which sprung up in the early period of the Reformation when the minds of men were heated by the new ideas presented to them. It soon led to the most horrible excesses.  Against it Luther spoke and wrote and even invoked the civil authority;--but all availed nothing.  It ran its career through such scenes of lust and blood that humanity could not but rejoice at its extinction.