5.4.3 Minority Discounts |
How does one compute the minority
discount? The computations vary with the context.
Not having control and holding only a right to
financial returns is sometimes a significant disadvantage,
other times not.
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Example
Example of minority discount Jung
v. IRS.
Answer: |
Real estate
For real estate companies a starting point is
an analysis of of publicly traded real estate
limited partnership and investment trusts. Partnership
units, though fully marketable, typically trade
for less than pro rata net asset value -- a discount
reflecting lack of governance power.
For example, a 1993 study computed discounts
for various kinds of publicly traded limited partnerships
and found mean discounts varied according to the
type of real estate held by the firm (see table
to right). Karn, Smith & Schroeder, Discounts
for Non-Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships
(based on 146 limited partnerships). |
Type |
Mean |
All real estate |
46% |
Apartments |
48% |
Commercial |
55% |
Mini-warehouses |
25% |
Mortgage loans |
43% |
Other real estate |
50% |
Cable TV |
55% |
Leased property |
20% |
|
Company
shares
For company shares, many valuators compare the
prices paid for minority shares in takeover bids
for 100% of a target company's outstanding shares
to the pre-bid trading price (control premia).
Source: Mergerstat Review / HLHZ Control
Premium Studies (average of two studies) |
Year |
Average control
premium |
Average minority
discount |
1991 |
38.2% |
-27.6% |
1992 |
38.6% |
-27.9% |
1993 |
35.8% |
-26.4% |
1994 |
35.3% |
-26.1% |
1995 |
30.6% |
-23.4% |
1996 |
% |
|
1997 |
% |
|
1998 |
% |
|
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"The Short and Puzzling Life of the 'Implicit Minority Discount'
in Delaware Appraisal Law"
University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics
Research Paper No. 07-01
Author: LAWRENCE A. HAMERMESH
Widener University School of Law
Email: lahamermesh@widener.edu
Auth-Page: http://ssrn.com/author=156312
Contact: MICHAEL L. WACHTER
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Email: mwachter@law.upenn.edu
Auth-Page: http://ssrn.com/author=44770
Full Text: http://ssrn.com/abstract=961022
ABSTRACT: The "implicit minority discount", or IMD, is a fairly new concept in Delaware appraisal law. A review of the case law discussing the concept, however, reveals that it has emerged haphazardly and has not been fully tested against principles that are generally accepted in the financial community. While control share blocks are valued at a premium because of the particular rights and opportunities associated with control, these are elements of value that cannot fairly be viewed as belonging either to the corporation or its shareholders. In corporations with widely dispersed share holdings, the firm is subject to agency costs that must be taken into consideration in determining going concern value. A control block-oriented valuation that fails to deduct such costs does not represent the going concern value of the firm. As a matter of generally accepted financial theory, on the other hand, share prices in liquid and informed markets do generally represent that going concern value, with attendant agency costs factored or priced in. There is no evidence that such prices systematically and continuously err on the low side, requiring upward adjustment based on an "implicit minority discount".
Given the lack of serious support for the IMD in finance literature, this Article suggests that the Delaware courts may be relying on the IMD as a means to avoid imposing upon squeezed-out minority shareholders the costs of fiduciary misconduct by the controller. Where either past or estimated future earnings or cash flows are found to be depressed as a result of fiduciary misconduct, however, or where such earnings or cash flows fail to include elements of value that belong to the corporation being valued, the appropriate way to address the corresponding reduction in the determination of "fair value" is by adjusting those subject company earnings or cash flows upward.
This approach to the problem of controller opportunism is more direct, more comprehensive in its application, and more in keeping with prevailing financial principles, than the implicit minority discount that the Delaware courts have applied in the limited context of comparable company analysis. The Delaware courts can therefore comfortably dispense with resort to the financially unsupported concept that liquid and informed share markets systematically understate going concern value. |
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Closed-end
investments
Minority discounts also arise in closed-end mutual
funds. These funds, which give investors an interest
in a fixed set of financial assets, historically
trade below NAV (net asset value).
Why is this? There are many theories:
- Closed-end funds are mostly held by individual
investors, who have a sense of powerlessness
-- a so-called "small investor sentiment."
J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, "Closed-end
fund discounts" Journal of Portfolio
Management (Winter 1992)
- Closed-end fund investors have limited control
over fund managers, and they take into account
the risk of future management and fee changes.
- Closed-end funds holding a large block of
assets are illiquid, and investors discount
for this reason.
- Investors must pay capital gains taxes if
the fund liquidates its assets (such as stock),
and investors discount for this possible tax
liability. John Gasiorowski, Business Valuation
Review (June 1993).
Whether these discounts can be used by analogy
in valuing other closed-end type investments is
in the air. The IRS, for example, takes the position
that built-in capital gains are too speculative
as a basis for discounting investment interests.
TAM 9150001. Yet courts are split on whether built-in
capital gains are relevant to valuations. Compare
Gallun, 33 TCM 1316 (1974), Piper,
72 TC 1062 (1979), Andrews, 79 TC 938
(1982) with Clark, 75-1
USTC 13,076 (EDNC 1975). |
[include chart]
Closed-end large cap funds have discounts
ranging from 18% to 26% (1982-1993) and closed-end
small-cap funds have discounts ranging from
7% to 29% (1986-1993).
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Swing
blocks
Sometimes a minority interest may have a strategic
position - such as a 2% shareholder in a closely-held
firm with two 49% shareholders. THe IRS has take
the position that when a minority interest in
a family business can have governance power this
power should be taken into account. For example,
if a parent gifts three 30% interests to each
child, the IRS has said that each child received
a "swing block" since each could join
another to form a 60% control block. TAM 9436005.
Perhaps this ruling undermines the IRS position
allowing minority discounts and abandoning tits
previous "attribution" approach? . [Banister
- Exhibit 13]
Minority discounts are an important element in
estate planning, where taxpayers desire to pass
low-valued property to family members and avoid
gift and estate taxes. Revenue Ruling 93-12. IRS
"swing block" position. |
[include
chart]
"IF YOU CAN'T COME
THROUGH THE FAMILY ATTRIBUTION..."
FAIR VALUE FALL/WINTER 1996 |
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