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2. HOW NOT TO READ _CAPITAL_, OR ANYTHING ELSE
Some things Fred writes simply overlook the evidence in front of him.
For instance, he asserts baldly that "Constant capital can indeed *exist
prior* to production, but the precise magnitude of this constant capital
*can change*, if there is a change in the value of the means of
production" (Moseley, 2000, section 2.3, near top). He writes this as if
I had not presented a great deal of textual evidence -- some of which he
even quotes -- in which Marx does address the issue of magnitude, and in
which he says that the *precise magnitude* of the value transferred is
determined by the pre-production cost of the means of production. [4]
I could continue with a laundry list of other problems with his
arguments, but I want to concentrate instead on two really fundamental
weaknesses, weaknesses in Fred's *method* of reading the textual
evidence. The first is that HE BRINGS FAR TOO FEW CONCEPTUAL
DISTINCTIONS TO THE TEXTS. He refers repeatedly to the "determination of
constant capital." This is a catch-all concept that suppresses many
necessary distinctions. For instance, it suppresses the distinctions
between the determination of the sum of value advanced for the
acquisition of means of production, the sum of value transferred from
used-up means of production to the product, and the value of the means of
production themselves.
Fred does make a distinction between the "stock of constant capital" and
the "flow of constant capital." But there are several problems with this
distinction. First, these concepts are ill-defined or, more precisely,
left undefined (this allows him to avoid recognizing that he is using the
same concept to refer to different things). Second, they are *not* Marx'
s own concepts. Fred imposes them on the texts, thereby distorting the
meaning of the texts. Most importantly, just like "determination of
constant capital," the stock/flow distinction conflates value and
use-value aspects of determination. For instance, the "flow of constant
capital" presumably covers both the sum of value transferred from used-up
means of production and the value of these used-up means of production,
which are two quite distinct things.
Because he works with too few concepts, Fred fails to distinguish between
several different issues. They all pertain to the "determination of
constant capital," so he lumps them all together. Yet they are distinct
issues. Quite a high percentage of the "evidence" in his paper is thus
simply irrelevant. It has nothing to do with the issue -- the sole
issue -- I discussed in my paper, namely whether, in Marx's theory, "the
value transferred from inputs depends on their post-production
replacement cost" (Kliman, 1999a, section 3). Fred chastizes me for not
mentioning a passage in the _Poverty of Philosophy_ and for "miss[ing]"
many in the _Grundrisse_ and the Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 (Moseley
2000, section 2.3, beginning and end). But it was for a good reason
that I didn't discuss these passages. They do not pertain to the
determination of the sum of value transferred.
More importantly, because Fred works with too few concepts, he ends up
juggling their distinct meanings, mixing and matching them. He thereby
makes passages appear to refer to one thing when they in fact refer to
another. For instance, passages which indicate that the value of means
of production can change after they enter production (big surprise) get
distorted into ones which supposedly say that the sum of value they
transfer depends on their post-production replacement cost. The passages
do, after all, pertain to a change in the "flow of constant capital," a
catch-all term that Fred uses to cover both ideas. Likewise, passages
which indicate that moral depreciation of fixed capital occurs (another
big surprise), because they pertain to a change in the "stock of constant
capital," get distorted into ones that supposedly say that the sum of
constant capital that was advanced can be different from itself (that
*would* be a big surprise). Fred (Moseley, 2000, end of introductory
section) even challenges me to present a passage "in which Marx
explicitly said that" the sum of constant capital that was advanced is
not different from itself! Of course, Fred uses different terms here,
his catch-all terms which obscure the fact that he is challenging me to
produce a passage in which Marx wastes his time to tell us that something
was what it was. (For the record: the value of means of production can
change after they are acquired but, by definition, the sum of value that
was advanced for them cannot.)
The other really fundamental weakness is that Fred fails to understand
that THE PARTICULAR CASE IS SUBSUMED UNDER, INCLUDED WITHIN, THE GENERAL
CASE, unless the contrary is explicitly stipulated. He reasons as if the
particular is *not* subsumed under the general unless one explicitly
stipulates that it is. Thus he wrongly concludes that general statements
concerning the determination of value, statements that pertain to the
general case, do not apply in the particular case in which technology is
changing.
On this illogical basis, he airily dismisses a whole slew of evidence I
present in my paper, in which Marx writes that the sum of value
transferred is determined by inputs' current costs when they enter
production. This evidence, coming from a wide variety of texts, is
unambiguous: there is NOT A SINGLE CASE in which Marx restricts the
applicability of these statements by stipulating that they fail to apply
when technology is changing. They are, in other words, general
statements, statements which thereby cover the particular case of
changing technology within themselves.
Yet Fred tries to deny that Marx's statements are unambiguous (Moseley,
2000, section 2.3, middle). Inverting the relationship between the
general and the particular, he contends that the statements do not apply
in the particular case in which technology is changing because Marx did
not state explicitly that they do apply in this case.
I am sorry, that is simply not how the explication and definition of
concepts works. At the start of _Capital_, Marx (1977:128) writes that
the common property of commodities is that they are products of abstract
labor. He does not state explicitly that this applies when technology is
changing. Does his statement thereby fail to cover this special case?
On the next page, he writes that the exclusive determinant of the value
of any article is the labor-time socially necessary for its production.
Again, he does not state explicitly that this claim applies when
technology is changing, so does the claim fail to apply when it does? I
could of course produce tens of thousands of similar examples, from
almost every paragraph Marx ever wrote, but I really think these two have
been sufficient to make the point: the particular case of changing
technology is included under general statements unless otherwise
indicated.
But Fred doesn't only say that Marx's general statements fail to cover
the particular case. He compounds the error by asserting that, since the
passages in question are not "in the context of a discussion of the
determination of constant capital IN THE CASE OF A CHANGE IN THE VALUE OF
THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION [, . i]mplicitly, all these passages are under
the assumption that the value of the means of production does not change"
(Moseley, 2000, section 2.3, middle). How does he think he knows this?
He provides not a bit of evidence to substantiate this bald assertion of
what Marx "implicitly" assumed. He just pulls it out of thin air.
Perhaps, however, Fred thinks it is a logical deduction. If that is the
case, let me simply point out how illogical it is. With equal
justification -- i.e., none -- he could assert that, since the passages
in question are not "in the context of a discussion of the determination
of constant capital IN THE CASE IN WHICH CAPITALISTS INVEST SOME OF THEIR
PROFITS [, . i]mplicitly, all these passages are under the assumption
that the capitalists invest none of their profits"! The applicability of
the statements is "therefore" restricted to the case in which capitalists
invest none of their profits! The structure of the two arguments is
exactly the same.
The really sad thing is that such logical howlers are not Fred's
invention. They have become mainstays of simultaneist discourse. What
is at work is the modern version of the myth that Marx assumed in
_Capital_ I that organic compositions of capital are equal. After all,
since in passage after passage in which he considered the determination
of value in Volume I, Marx did not do so "in the context of a discussion
of the determination of value IN THE CASE IN WHICH ORGANIC COMPOSITIONS
VARY ACROSS INDUSTRIES [, . i]mplicitly, all these passages are under the
assumption that organic compositions are equal." This is indeed the
"justification" that was used to perpetuate the myth of equal capital
compositions, and the same kind of "justification" is regularly used by
proponents of simultaneism to dismiss scads of textual evidence that
contradicts their interpretation.
And this brings us to the real point: the illogic is not innocent.
Anyone can make a mistake, but when the employment of an illogical
argument becomes regular, accepted practice, it is no accident. Illogic
is employed because it *must* be employed in order to avoid admitting
that one's interpretation is incorrect. The actual chain of reasoning
goes like this:
1. My interpretation contradicts Marx's actual statements except in the
case in which technology is not changing (organic compositions are
equal).
2. A correct interpretation of a statement cannot contradict the
statement.
3. My interpretation is correct.
Ergo, 4. My interpretation does not contradict Marx's statements.
Ergo, 5. Marx assumed that technology is not changing (organic
compositions are equal).
6. But he said nothing of the sort.
Ergo, 7. He assumed it without saying it; he *implicitly* assumed
that technology is not changing (organic compositions are equal).
The source of the erroneous conclusion is clear. The third premise, the
dogmatic assertion that one's interpretation is correct, is false. The
sound chain of reasoning in this case is:
1. My interpretation contradicts Marx's actual statements except in the
case in which technology is not changing (organic compositions are
equal).
2. A correct interpretation of a statement cannot contradict the
statement.
Ergo, 3'. My interpretation is incorrect unless Marx assumed technology
is not changing (organic compositions are equal).
6. But he said nothing of the sort.
Ergo, 7'. My interpretation is incorrect.
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