I appreciated Paul Zarembka's response in OPE-L 4912. I agree
with him that Jerry "claimed too much" in OPE-L 4911, and that I
was not engaged in a "diatribe" against Fred.
I also appreciated Jerry's tennis analogy:
"If this were a tennis match would we therefore say 'game, set and
match to
Fred'? This is not an unreasonable conclusion, after all, since
Andrew
has -- in effect -- resigned from the tournament."
The reason Jerry wants to declare "game, set and match to Fred" is
that I didn't return Fred's serve (i.e., provide an alternative
interpretation of the textual evidence). But, Jerry, only one way
of winning a point in tennis involves returning the serve. There
are other ways. If the server foot-faulted on his second serve,
you automatically win the point. You do not have to return
service. There is no purpose in doing so, since you've already
won.
Fred foot-faulted on his second serve. I automatically won the
point. I do not have to return service. There is no purpose in
doing so, since I've already won.
Tennis is a game. Games have rules. Play must proceed according
to the rules of the game. If it doesn't, it is not tennis; it is
just hitting the ball back and forth across the net.
To pursue your analogy a bit further, scholarly discourse is
likewise a game. It has its own rules. Dialogue must proceed
according to the rules of the game. If it doesn't, it is not
scholarly discourse; it is just lobbing opinions back and forth
across the Net. That is why the battles of quotations of the sort
into which you want me to descend never get anywhere, never
resolve anything. They proceed without regard to rules and
without agreed-upon methods of scoring.
I am perfectly capable of returning Fred's serve (providing an
alternative interpretation of his quotations). But I want to play
tennis, not just hit the ball back and forth across the net. For
us to play tennis, we must agree on the rules and the methods of
scoring before play commences.
So I have asked Fred about his rules of the game. Under what
conditions would he be willing to concede that he has lost the
match? He has replied that he would concede this if his return of
my shot was no good (new evidence contradicts this
interpretation).
What is no good is this answer. In order to determine whether his
return is good or not, he must provide some *genuine* rules. He
must tell us under what conditions would he be willing to concede
that his return was in fact no good. In the absence of such
rules, he can always win the point by scoring his foot-faults,
shots beyond the baseline, shots into the net, etc. as "good."
Unfortunately, he has not told us under what conditions would he
be willing to concede that his return was no good.
Let me make clear that I have indeed dealt with Fred's evidence.
I haven't provided an alternative interpretation, but I have dealt
with his evidence. I wrote, twice, that he "invented" the second
profit rate. In other words, he has no direct textual evidence
for it. Where does Marx refer to two different profit rates?
Nowhere.
Fred's conclusion that there is a second profit rate is therefore
NOT a direct inference from evidence. It is rather a deduction
based on the following *premises*:
1. If Marx was referring to the same profit rate in Ch. 6 and
Part II, and if Marx didn't contradict himself, then Fred's
interpretation of the Part II evidence is wrong.
2. Marx didn't contradict himself.
3. Fred's interpretation of the Part II evidence is not wrong.
Ergo,
4. Marx was not referring to the same profit rate in Ch. 6 and
Part II.
Because, precisely because, his conclusion is a deductive one, one
based on premises rather than evidence, the way I challenged his
conclusion was appropriate. I couldn't challenge his evidence
because he doesn't have any. He has a deduction. So I challenged
his third premise, the dogmatic presupposition that his
interpretation of the Part II evidence is not wrong. Throw out
that presupposition and the "second profit rate" argument falls to
the ground.
Andrew ("Drewk") Kliman
Dept. of Social Sciences
Pace University
Pleasantville, NY 10570 USA
phone: (914) 773-3968
fax: (914) 773-3951
Home: 60 W. 76th St. #4E
New York, NY 10023 USA
"The practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the
critique that measures the individual existence by the essence,
the particular reality by the Idea."
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Mar 01 2001 - 14:01:38 EST