I am almost certain that any criterion advanced to distinguish between competing theories will *itself* be disputed. Some of us will never be convinced by any theory that involves a fallacy of composition (thanks for explaining the origins of the debate, Rakesh). Some of us will never be convinced that language/theory/fact can be anything other than a construction/reconstruction in thought, a product of the 'thinking head' appropriating the world as best it can, but never perfectly (imho, *all* theories - not only value-form theories - are appropriations of empirical experience and existing theories, and thus imperfect understandings of reality). We could, I suppose, adopt a Lakatosian principle and ask whether the labour (embodied) theory of value engenders a progressive research paradigm, spawning new and important insights into contemporary capitalism; but who is to decide what is new, important, progressive? A knotty problem in any debate. One obvious solution, I suppose, is to choose not too choose: an undogmatic blossoming of ideas, a la Feyerabend - now there's 'something nice' to put on the banner! For myself, I much agree with the criteria put forward by Howard: >We would want to know first what >account gives a more comprehensive rendering of concrete phenomena (as I >understand it value form theory would agree with that) and then also which >theory was capable of grounding a metacritique (a) of alternate theories >and (b) of itself. The last, (b), is most often overlooked it seems. comradely, Nicky ---------------------------------- Nicola Mostyn (Taylor) Faculty of Economics Murdoch University Australia Telephone: 61-8-9385 1130
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