On Thu, 10 May 2001, you wrote: > > re Howard's 5531 > > > > > > > > >With respect to absraction, you are right that "fruit" exists only in and > >through the mental act of abstracting from oranges, apples, mangoes, etc. > >-- it is not a real abstraction. The concept of fruit as used by biologists is a real abstraction. It is an abstraction based upon the existence of a conserved genetic structure that generates fruits. Note that in biological terms apples are not fruit, as they arise by a genetically different mechanism than oranges or mangoes and other drupes. > The concept "fruit," Arthur reminds, does > >not generate apples and pears. When encoded in DNA it does! >But that is not to say such things are not > >possible with a little different mix, so to speak. Suppose I take oranges > >and mangos and apples and bananas and treat them as compost. Now I am > >uninterested in the particulars of specific fruits and instead think only > >in terms of so and so many pounds of vegetal matter. Moroever compost does > >generate soil, and quite a miracle it is, too. Abstract labor is like that. > > It would be a category mistake though to treat vegetal matter as if > it were a subject and not a predicate, that is if the vegetal matter > was then understood to have expressed itself in say mangos. > > Yet the money commodity is handled as if abstract labor has > incarnated itself therein. > > The three-fold peculiarity of money then is that it is the immediate > incarnation of value; the concrete labor expended in the production > thereof becomes the form of appearance of abstract human labor; and > private labor has turned here into its opposite, to labor in > immediately social form. > > Marx's point is that such money fetishism is logically absurd, an > example of a category mistake, an expression of a mystical connection. > > > > > > > > > > >Or another example. Relative to the universal equivalent, Marx wrote in > >the first edition, "It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, > >rabbits and all other actual animals, which form grouped together the > >various kinds, species, sub-species, families, etc. of the animal kingdom, > >there existed also in addition *the animal,* the individual incarnation of > >the entire animal kingdom." But this example is more likely to mislead > >than to inform and he dropped it. > > But it shows that Marx beat Ryle to the punch by a hundred years. > > > > > Anyway, there is a better example, > >though for value generally rather than for the universal equivalent: > >Mammals are warm-blooded. It doesn't matter if it's a lion or a tiger or a > >bear, it's warm blooded. Now if you're a tick, you hang on a branch and > >drop whenever any warm-blooded thing passes by. It makes no difference > >what kind of warm-blooded thing and you couldn't tell the difference > >anyway. So, acting as humans, there are concretely different and > >incommensurable lions and tigers and bears, but if you relate to the world > >as a tick, as a parasite and a bloodsucker, there are only uniform, > >homogeneous, warm-blooded bodies. > > Yes. > > > > Unlike the concept "fruit," this is a > >real, not a mental abstraction. > > Yet it would be absurd if we then turned around and said that the > real abstraction of uniform, homogeneous warm bloodied bodies > incarnated itself in pandas. And ticks will henceforth only land on > them. > > > > Abstract labor is not just a way of > >conceptualizing things, that, unlijke it, are real particulars. Abstract > >labor is real in the ordinary sense of the word, though, because its > >content is expended energy in time, it is non-empirical, just as the work > >of wind against rock leaves only a sign of what happened. > > > But I am not saying that abstract labor is not real at this level of > abstraction. > > As I understand Marx, he is saying that an act of labor has two > aspects--one concrete (tailoring, weaving, etc); another abstract > (i.e., some aliquot of social labor time). A commodity's qualities or > use value derive from the concrete labor embodied therein; the > magnitude of a commodity which however is quantitatively represented > in the exchange relation is determined by the abstract labor embodied > therein. > > Abstract labor is indeed real in this sense, yet while being a > representation of some aliquot of abstractly general labor is > potentially a property of each concrete commodity; abstractly general > labor itself becomes the subject and takes a form of appearance in > the money commodity. > > It is this absurdity or mystical connection or category mistake to > which Marx is trying to call attention in the following quote: > > > > > > > >Your quote from Marx about the inversion by which the sensuously concrete > >counts as the form of appearance of the abstractly general is fascinating: > > > >> "This inversion (Verkehrung) by which the sensibly-concrete counts only as > >>the form of appearance of the abstractly general and, not on the contrary, > >>the abstractly general as property of the concrete, characterizes the > >>expression of value. At the same time, it makes understanding it difficult. > >>If I say: Roman Law and German Law are both laws, that is obvious. But if I > >>say Law (Das Recht), this abstraction (Abstraktum) realises itself in > >Roman >Law or in German Law, in these concrete laws, the interconnection > >becomes >mystical." > > > >This is exactly the point! But notice that it does *not* lead to the > >conclusion that seems to be generally drawn -- that while the methodology > >works for the value form, if it were applied to the study of law it would > >generate mysticism. > > But Marx's point is that such logic does not work for the value form; > the value is illogical and absurd. > > > > > On the contrary, the same methodology *must* be > >applied to the study of law: I certainly can say that the senuously > >concrete behavior of others not interfering with my possession of a > >commodity is the form of appearance of my right to it, and this is not > >mysticism. But of course I do get mysticism if I take a mental abstraction > >and then say it actualizes itself in particular instances, and this is as > >true of economics as it is of law: e.g., if I said, "production in general > >actualizes itself in interest, wages and rent," or some such thing. > > And the latter is what Marx says has to be happening for us to handle > money the way we do (or the we have to given the nature of our social > relations). > > > > > >The other thing about the quote is that this is exactly what accounts for > >the peculiarities of the equivalent form . . . or almost does. The first > >peculiarity is that use value becomes the phenomenal form of its opposite, > >value. So far so good. The second peculiarity is that concrete labor > >becomes the form under which abstract labor manifests itself -- again, the > >sensibly concrete can be considered the form of appearance of the > >abstractly general. But then what of the third peculiarity? Instead of > >saying *private labor becomes the form of expression of social labor,* the > >text reads that "the labour of private individuals takes the form of its > >opposite, labour directly social in its form." > > > >What accounts for this peculiarity of the third peculiarity? > > > >In other words, the third peculiarity does not show the inversion we might > >have expected. > > > >To emphasize the point: we expect to hear (and often do hear in fact) > >someting like, "commodity producing labor is not directly social labor but > >only becomes so in exchange." But Marx says something different here: the > >text reads, "the labour of private individuals takes the form of its > >opposite, labour directly social in its form." > > But isn't Marx here referring to the labor of private individuals > engaged in gold production? Why is this labor immediately social, > that is, its product can be directly exchanged for any other > commodity? > > > > > > >My own guess is that the answer goes some way to respond to the general > >climate of dissatisfaction with Chapter One. Labor, whether generalized > >commodity production or not, if it is independent (private) and useless to > >its producer, and if it is at all regular and repeated in this form, is > >labor that is labor for others. Thus the structures of production, even > >though characterized by private labor, are social in form. As such they > >generate exchange, not the other way around. > > > >But I'd be interested in others' takes on the peculiarity of the third > >peculiarity. (And why does the example of Aristotle render intelligible > >peculiarity #3 (and #2), but not peculiarity #1?!) > > > >Comradely, > > > >Howard > ---------------------------------------- Content-Type: text/html; name="unnamed" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: ---------------------------------------- -- Paul Cockshott, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland 0141 330 3125 mobile:07946 476966 paul@cockshott.com http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/people/personal/wpc/ http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/index.html
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