I agree with most of what I think Howard is saying here. I'm a bit strapped
for time now (only now??), but I suspect we may also overlap on our
understanding of Money, although I still characterise commodity money as an
historically important contingency, and would suggest that we cannot know
that commodity backing or state power are the only two possible bases for
Money.
comradely,
michael
> -----Original Message-----
> From: howard engelskirchen [mailto:lhengels@igc.org]
> Sent: Friday, May 11, 2001 4:52 AM
> To: michael@williamsmj.worldonline.co.uk
> Subject: Re: [OPE-L:5523] RE: William of Ockam's Razor and Political
> Economy
>
>
> Michael,
>
> Re your 5523,
>
> Although I have defended reasons as causes before elsewhere, I now agree
> with you that reasons cannot be reduced to causes. Still, cause is what
> transforms the world, pushes windmills, etc., so to say that reasons can't
> be reduced to causes doesn't mean that social science isn't about
> explaining causal mechanisms. It does suggest social causality is likely
> to be more complicated than causality in natural science precisely because
> intentionality introduces meaning and the action of signs into the mix. I
> agree with your characterization of the specific domain of social science
> as "socially structured intentional relations."
>
> I agree also with your brief description of agency and structure.
> My point
> about relations of labor, force and consciousness is that these social
> structures, which exist in and through the behaviors of agents, give
> content to social science. Specifying content narrows the range of
> contingency. Thus, as I understand it, it is not contingent that paper
> money depends on a sufficient qualitative development of state power, and
> so in this sense paper money must express, in some form, relations of
> force. Also, without a sufficient development of state power, there must
> be a money commodity -- this also is not contingent.
>
> But I will have to come back to this.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Howard
>
>
>
>
>
> At 11:16 AM 5/9/01 +0100, you wrote:
> >I do not seem to have made myself clear, so here is a quick response to
> >Howard:
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: owner-ope-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu
> >> [mailto:owner-ope-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu]On Behalf Of howard
> >> engelskirchen
> >> Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2001 4:52 AM
> >> To: ope-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu
> >> Subject: [OPE-L:5521] Re: Re: Re: William of Ockam's Razor and
> Political
> >> Economy
> >>
> >>
> >> Re Michael's 5517...
> >>
> >> One of the hares I noticed loose, Michael, was the idea of
> "living in an
> >> epoch driven by pure form."
> >>
> >> I wonder what that could mean as a matter of social science? Social
> >> science, like natural science, is about explaining causal mechanisms.
> >
> >I am distinctly dubious about the reduction of social science to causal
> >mechanisms analogous to those sought by natural science - because of the
> >quite conventional problem of intentionality. IMO, reasons, motives, etc
> >cannot be reduced to causes. (Note that I do not say that social
> events have
> >no causal conditions; just that the specific domain of social science is
> >socially structured intentional relations.)
> >
> >> If
> >> it were a matter of saying that understanding the causal mechanisms of
> >> society depended above all on something pretty much like what Aristotle
> >> meant by formal causality, that this was key, then I could follow. But
> >> this kind of causality would not be referred to as "pure form," and
> >> although Marx's analysis of capitalism is certainly the first
> example in
> >> social science demonstrating its significance, I don't know why formal
> >> cause in this sense would be specific to the capitalist mode of
> >> production.
> >
> >1. What I have in mind is the interaction between agency and structure,
> >nicely argued fairly recently by Tony Smith, such that agents
> are disposed
> >by their structural location to tend to reproduce and/or transform the
> >structures in which they are located that predispose agents ... etc..
> >
> >2. Thus I do not argue for a specific kind (formal) of causation
> peculiar to
> >capitalism, but for the nature of capitalist social structure as
> >specifically characterised by (near) contentless form - crucially the
> >Value-form whose sole (near) autonomous manifestation is in Money.
> >
> >> As a consequence, I don't know why there would be any special
> unease (for
> >> *that* reason) that would attach. But then "driven by pure form" must
> >> refer to the kind of thing usually meant by causality in the
> modern world,
> >> which is efficient cause, the wind against the windmill, the thing that
> >> pushes. In this case I wonder if this isn't a category
> mistake. That is,
> >> I don't understand how "pure form" can push a windmill.
> >
> >I don't claim it does. (see above)
> >>
> >> ...
> >>
> >> As for the "existential contingency of content," Michael, are
> >> there so many
> >> different ontological categories of content that we can speak of
> >> contingency?
> >
> >I do not understand what notion of 'contingency' depends upon
> the number of
> >ontological categories at work? Rather, it is, for example,
> 'necessary' that
> >capitalism incorporates Money (with all the hierarchy of social functions
> >outlined by Marx); but it is 'contingent' what object bears
> Money (bullion,
> >notes and coin, electronic account entries, etc.)
> >
> >> Following Marx there are relations of (1) labor, or, more
> >> broadly, behavior as the material transformation of the world,
> (2) force,
> >> and (3) consciousness or information. What else is possible for social
> >> science? Paper money has "objective social validity" because of
> >> compulsory
> >> action of the state, and credit money, which has its source in
> promise, a
> >> relation of consciousness, also depends on the state's
> compulsion ("if he
> >> do not pay, his goods will be sold by the sheriff").
> >
> >I don't think I disagree with any of this.
> >
> >> In what sense does
> >> ontological coherence here depend on contingency?
> >
> >I didn't say that. What I said was: "a pure form in itself can have no
> >ontological coherence." I thought this was a statement of the obvious: in
> >what sense can there be actual form without content? (Of course, it is
> >equally impossible to conceive content without form - except
> perhaps for god
> >pre-genesis or the big bang!)
> >
> >(I'll try to stay with this thread, but other pressures may
> force me to drop
> >out. This will imply no respect for other participants.)
> >
> >Comradely,
> >
> >michael
> >
> >
>
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