Allin Cottrell wrote: > On Thu, 10 May 2001, Gerald_A_Levy wrote: > > > Re Paul C's [5533]: > > > > > Without a causal and hence predictive theory > > > of price one can have no basis for the theory > > > of relative surplus value, to take just one > > > instance from Marx's work. I could equally > > > well have said no theory of differential ground > > > rent... > > > All of the above identifies a causal theory with a predictive one. > > One can, however, have a theory in which causal relationships are > > identified but (e.g. because of the quantity of unknowns) one > > which does not claim to be predictive. > > I think this is a misunderstanding. A causal theory is capable of > generating predictions _conditional_ on knowledge of the values of the > theory's "independent variables". If these values aren't in fact > known then one can't make _actual_ predictions, but that doesn't mean > the theory is non-predictive in the sense Paul is using. > > Allin. _____________________ I think the author to whom Allin is responding is confusing prediction with forcasting. Every causal theory must predict. Prediction is an essential aspect of the structure of a causal theory. However, and this may come as a surprise to many, I think Sraffa's PCMC is a thorough critique of mechanical causality in economic theory. His arguments are like theorems of geometry, which are not causal but rather propositions of essential relations. Cheers, ajit sinha
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