re Rakesh's 5547 Rakesh, you have emphasized, and emphasize here, that money and money alone incarnates abstract labor: >representing an aliquot of abstractly general or social labor would >>seem to be a property of all (reproducible) commodities in the >>exchange relation. >> >>yet in fact only one commodity immediately counts--in fact it >>actually incarnates-- abstractly general or social labor. >> >>Yet how if being some aliquot of abstractly general or social labor >>is supposed to be a predicate of all commodities does the concrete >>sensate of one commodity come to be alone the form of appearance of a >>predicate? > I think the distinction made in your question is the key to the answer -- every commodity, including the money commodity, has value, but only one is set aside as the form of appearance or sign of value. The word "incarnate" can confusingly refer to the one thing or the other. It is just a word. But it cannot be indifferently understood if the explanation is scientific. That is, if every commodity is a product that has had a portion of aggregate social labor expended on it, then because all are equivalent in this respect, the natural, physical, concrete sensible properties of one can be a sign of the portion of aggregate social labor expended on another. Because it has had an equivalent portion of aggregate social labor expended on it, the coat can be a sign of the portion of aggregate social labor expended in producing x yards of linen. So and so many ounces of gold can be a sign of the portion of aggregate social labor expended in producing x yards of linen. While each commodity has an infinite list of other commodities besides a coat, or gold, which can serve as a sign of its value, this is not so helpful because no such list reaching into infinity can be compared with any other. ON the other hand, if two commodities use the same commodity as a sign of their value, then comparison is possible. As a consequence all come to express their value in the same commodity. That commodity then becomes the "visible incarnation" of the value of the others. It is not this because it is the only one that has had some proportion of society's aggregate labor time expended on it; the reverse is true. Instead, because all are alike in that respect, any could serve as a sign ofr the value of all the others, but some one must be set apart as a sign if the others are to be compared. And because the others express their value in this one commodity, then they all become themselves directly exchangeable and appear as directly social labor. "Everything has a price." We can say that gold is directly social labor since the world of commodities has made it the form of expression of the value of all commodities and it is directly exchangeable with them. We can also say that gold is general social labor since it can exchange for anything. But we cannot say that gold is a form of undifferentiated abstract labor because it is not that -- it is a specific form of concrete labor just like tailoring or weaving -- though we can say that gold is a form of appearance or manifestation of undifferentiated abstract labor. I think to say that abstract labor is real, we must specify its nature. As I argued in 5521, time spent in bending a sword into a plowshare is time really spent in activity. Insofar as it is a portion of aggregate labor time available to society, then it is a real expenditure of society's labor. There is nothing metaphorical about this that I can see. As Marx says in another context, if birds had to spend all their time looking for food, they'd have to do without nests. Anyway, when you say that >>Value is the system by which any act of labor only becomes as an >>aliquot of social or abstractly general labor time if its product can >>be ex-changed into the money (commodity) which (alone among >>commodities) itself incarnates social or abstractly general labor >>time, "incarnates," as I understand it, must be understood to refer to money as a sign. It would be incorrect for this to be understood to say that gold alone among commodities contains any portion of the aggregate labor time expended by society on its products. I want to come back to your suggestion that value only becomes such in exchange. I'm still unclear with respect to your use of "mysticism," and particularly in relation to the 3 peculiarities of the equivalent form. Of course it is the case that people grasp real economic relations in a distorted fashion, and the nature of the relations themselves can facilitate this. Nonetheless, we can fashion theoretically economic categories that accurately reflect real social structures. The inversion that characterizes concrete and abstract labor -- ie that concrete labor is a form of appearance of abstract labor (rather than abstract labor being an ideational property of concrete labor) -- expresses, as I understand it, a scientific, not a mystical, relation of those economic categories. Comradely, Howard > At 08:25 AM 5/11/01 -0700, you wrote: >re Howard's helpful 5539 > > >> >> >>My understanding is not that the inversion referred to in the passage from >>Marx gives us, insofar as it characterizes value, an illogical and absurd >>mystical interconnection. There are two possibilities here: >> >> a. the abstractly general is a property of the concrete and sensuous real >>-- an example might be whiteness as a property of horses, swans, hats, etc. > >representing an aliquot of abstractly general or social labor would >seem to be a property of all (reproducible) commodities in the >exchange relation. > >yet in fact only one commodity immediately counts--in fact it >actually incarnates-- abstractly general or social labor. > >Yet how if being some aliquot of abstractly general or social labor >is supposed to be a predicate of all commodities does the concrete >sensate of one commodity come to be alone the form of appearance of a >predicate? > > > > > >> >> b. the concrete and sensuous real is a form of appearance of the >>abstractly general. >> >>There is nothing peculiar about one thing being a form of appearance for >>another. The error is to treat sometihng that we arrive at by purely >>mental effort as if it were to generate the particulars abstracted from. > > >The problem is when the abstractly general is treated at the same >level as the concrete sensate. > >That is, the university is searched for in one of its buildings or departments. > >So while abstract or abstractly general or social labor time--and any >aliquot thereof-are real, what would be mistaken is to assume that >abstract labor could then instantiate itself in one of the concrete >forms which putatively all together compromise abstractly general >labor. > > so it is as if the university could be said to have materialized >itself in say the Hearst mining building at UC Berkeley. > >Having the property of universal exchangeability or in other words >being itself the form of appearance of social labor, money is >thereby fetishized and to that extent real wealth devalorized. > > > > >>If value is purely conceptual, then we do have an illogical mystical >>connection. But if it is sometihng real, a causal ensemble, then, if it is >>also non-empirical, we will have to study it through its form of >>appearance. > >Social or abstractly general labor time--and any aliquot thereof--is >of course real. > >Value is the system by which any act of labor only becomes as an >aliquot of social or abstractly general labor time if its product can >be ex-changed into the money (commodity) which (alone among >commodities) itself incarnates social or abstractly general labor >time. Value is thus a social relation (or system) mediated by things. > >In the system of value then social labor only becomes as such in >homogeneous, quantitative terms--each act of labor equatable and >reducible to the other by the equivalence in exchange of their >respective products. > > > > > >> That is why we have two separate questions presented. First, >>what is the nature of what we refer to, ie what kind of thing is it and >>what does it tend to do? > >Value is not a description of an independent thing; it is a system. > > > >> Second, what are the forms of its representation? >> Thus Aristotle could not make sense of value because he could conceive of >>no referent that houses or beds or money could be the form of appearance >>of. > >The mysticism is not in that each act of labor has in addition to its >concrete and qualitative aspects the abstract aspect of being >(potentially) a form of appearance of some aliquot of abstractly >general or social labor time. > >The mysticism of value is in the three peculiarities of the equivalent form. > > > > > >> An alternative error would be to treat the form of appearance as if it >>were actually, or possessed the powers of, the referent. >> >>As for the third peculiarity, while I don't think there is anything to >>suggest the text is about gold producing labor as such, I get the point -- >>it is the equivalent form that is at issue. > >yes this is what I should have said. > > >> That is, it's not that the >>inversion doesn't apply to the third peculiarity -- ie it is possible to >>think of private labor as a form of expression for social labor -- it is >>rather that Marx is saying something different: because private labor in >>the equivalent form is a form of expression for social labor it serves as a >>general claim on the labor of others, ie it becomes directly exchangeable >>with other commodities. As such, it is directly social in form. > >And it is the peculiaritity or the mysticism or the category mistake >implicit in this that we will hopefully be able to specify better. > > > >looking forward to your reply, > >Rakesh > >
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