Both Nicky and Chris have quoted the following passage (from Section 4 of
Chapter 1 of Volume 1 of Capital) to support the value-form interpretation
of Marx's theory:
> >"Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however
> >incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms.
> >Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however
> >incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms.
> >But it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that
> >particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why
> >the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of
> >the value of the product"
I love this passage. Paul Mattick, Jr. first pointed it out to me years
ago. I don't see how this passage supports the value-form interpretation
of Marx's theory, according to which there is a "second thread" in Marx's
theory in which the content of value (labor) is NOT determined
independently of the form of value (exchange-value, etc.), but rather the
reverse: the content of value is determined by the form of value in some
way. In other words, the content is "form-determined".
However, it seems to me that Marx is saying the OPPOSITE in this
passage. Marx's question is "why this content has assumed this particular
form." The content to which Marx refers is labor, and the form to which
Marx refers is exchange-value (money or prices). Thus, Marx is saying in
this passage that the content of labor assumes the particular form of
exchange-value, or is expressed in the particular form of
exchange-value. Marx's logic in this sentence runs from content
(labor) to form (exchange-value). The starting-point is the content
(labor), which is distinguishable from the form (exchange-value) and which
assumes a particular form, or is expressed in a particular form. This
passage certainly does not seem to say that the content (labor) is
determined by the form (exchange-value).
Marx's answer to his question is that labor assumes the form of
exchange-value because this is necessary in order to regulate
commodity-producing labor as a social system. Marx's starting point is
commodity-producing labor (the content of value) and from that
starting-point the necessity of exchange-value (the form of value) is
derived.
Marx's critique of political economy in this passage is not that it failed
to recognize that the content of labor is form-determined. Rather, Marx's
critique is that they failed to ask why the content of labor assumes the
particular form of exchange-value. Political economy just took the
relation between labor and exchange-value for granted, because they
considered capitalism to be the natural form of social production.
So would Nicky or Chris or someone please explain how this passage is
supposed to support the VF interpretation of Marx's theory?
The meaning of this passage can be further clarified by reviewing Marx's
development of the relation between the content and the form of value in
his theory in the previous three sections of Chapter 1.
Section 1 derives the content (or "substance") of value - abstract labor -
as the common substance of commodities that determines their
exchange-values. The title of Section 1 is: "The Two Factors of the
Commodity: Use-Value and Value (SUBSTANCE of Value, Magnitude of
Value)." (p. 125; emphasis added).
After his derivation of abstract labor, Marx remarked: "The progress of
our investigation will lead us back to exchange-value as the necessary
mode of expression, or FORM of appearance, of value. For the present,
however, we must first consider the nature of value INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS
FORM of appearance." (p 128; emphasis added). In the rest of Section 1
and in Section 2, Marx described in greater detail the characteristics of
abstract labor, independently of its form of appearance as exchange-value.
At the end of Section 1, there is the following very important
methodological remark:
"Now we know the SUBSTANCE of value. It is LABOR. The FORM, which stamps
VALUE as EXCHANGE-VALUE, remains to be analyzed. But before this we need
to develop the characteristics we have already found somewhat more
fully." (p. 131; emphasis in the original).
Marx then went on in Section 2 to discuss further the characteristics of
commodity-producing labor, independently of its form of appearance as
exchange-value or exchange-value.
The all-important Section 3 ("The Value-Form, or Exchange-Value") then
derives money as the NECESSARY FORM OF APPEARANCE of the content of value
(abstract labor). Form is derived from content. The characteristics of
abstract labor (homogeneous, a definite quantity, comparable with all
other kinds of labor) determine the necessary characteristics of
money. The simple form of value is "insufficient" (p. 154) and the
extended form of value has its "defects" (pp. 156-7), because these forms
of value do not adequately express the characteristics of abstract labor,
the content of value.
Patrick Murray has emphasized that Marx's derivation of the necessity of
the form of appearance of value as money from the content of value
(abstract labor) is similar to Hegel's "essence logic" - essence must
appear as something other than itself.
The value-form interpretation of the quoted passage from Section 4 would
have us believe that Marx is suggesting in this passage the opposite
relation between content and form than he has carefully developed in the
previous three sections. Instead of content determining form as in the
previous three sections, somehow it is now suggested that from determines
content. This does not make sense. I don't think Marx was confused or
ambivalent about such a fundamental point as the relation between form and
content in his theory.
Chris went on to say in his latest post:
> To begin with I use an analogy which has
> defects but will get us to first base.
> Let us say we try to explain weight and notice twice as much of X weighs
> twice as much. Ah! Weight is inherent to things! Wrong. What is inherent
> is mass. But mass has no inherent tendency to turn into weight. A free
> floating mass has no weight. The form of gravity imposes weight on it when
> the mass is placed in a gravitational field. Notice it is the field itself
> that establishes the relevant quantitative determination. Gravity does not
> give more weight to things with more sides, it gives more weight to things
> with more mass. Once the field is in place it appears ilusorily that weight
> is inherent.
> By analogy it is the value form of the exchange field that imposes value
> on commodities (labour in no way "causes" this to happen), picks out labour
> (as the equivalent to mass ; hence Andy it is less than half a truth to say
> labour time causes value.), and that commensurates labours by duration
> rather than by energy expended, or unpleasantness,or social status of
> occupations, or whatever.
But this analogy doesn't work. According to Marx's theory, THERE IS AN
INHERENT TENDENCY for commodity-producing labor to be expressed as
money. Commodity-producing labor MUST be expressed as money, because that
is the only way this labor can be regulated and coordinated as a social
system. This is what Marx meant by the "NECESSITY of money", or money as
the NECESSARY form of appearance" of abstract labor. This is what Section
3 of Chapter 1 is all about. Exchange does not "pick out" labor as the
factor to commensurate; rather commodity-producing labor "picks
out" exchange as its mode of regulation (actually, exchange is the only
possible mode of regulation of commodity-producing labor). Marx's
starting point is commodity-producing labor and the necessity of some mode
of regulation, which can only be through the exchange of commodities.
Finally, Rubin is often mentioned as an early forerunner of the VF
interpretation of Marx's theory (including Chris in his latest post). But
I don't see how Rubin supports the VF interpretation. Would someone also
please explain this to me - specifically how does Rubin support the VF
interpretation?
For example, on the specific issue discussed above of the relation between
form and content in Marx's theory, Rubin clearly argues that content
determines form. Chapter 14 of Rubin's book is entitled: "Content and
Form of Value". In this chapter we find the following very interesting
passage:
"One cannot forget that, on the question of the relation between content
and form, Marx took the standpoint of Hegel, and not of Kant. Kant
treated form as something external in relation to the content, and as
something which adheres to the content from the outside. From the
standpoint of Hegel's philosophy, the content is not in itself something
to which form adheres from the outside. Rather, through its own
development, the CONTENT ITSELF GIVES BIRTH TO THE FORM which was already
latent in the content. FORM NECESSARILY GROWS OUT OF THE CONTENT
ITSELF. This is a basic premise of Hegel's and Marx's philosophy, a
premise which is opposed to Kant's methodology. From this point of view,
THE FORM OF VALUE NECESSARILY GROWS OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF
VALUE." (p. 117; emphasis)
Thus it seems clear to me that Rubin interpreted the relation between form
and content in Marx's theory as I have described above, i.e. that content
determines form. So would someone please explain why Rubin supports the
value-form interpretation of Marx's theory, according to which form
determines content.
Thanks very much again for this very interesting discussion.
Comradely,
Fred
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