Hello Jerry, > > ii) Instead of 'aspect', why not say (as Hegel does) that a 'thing' has > properties? Isn't the value-form a property of value? In the general case properties of things can indeed be rendered as apsects of those things. I think the term 'aspect' is broader than 'property' though. 'Aspect' emphasises partiality, but does not commit one to any conception of what we have abstracted from, of what the aspect is an aspect of. 'Property' emphasises the *thing* that has the property. The trouble with value is that, as Murray puts it, value is not a thing on the ordinary conception of things. It does not behove to a logic of Being, rather to a logic of reflection. So I am a little uneasy about calling the value-form a property of value, since it tends to make value sound like an ordinary thing like any other. 'Aspect' makes no such commitment. > > iii) By your reading, what is the 'thing-in-itself' re value? Note that, > as Hegel wrote elsewhere (_Hegel's Logic_, p. 72), "there is nothing > that we can know so easily" as the thing-in-itself. He wrote that the > thing-in-itself "expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that > consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific > thoughts of it. It is easy to see what is left -- utter abstraction, total > emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world' -- the negative of > every image, feeling, and definite thought" (Ibid). Congealed abstract labour. But I don't think the interpretation of your citation from Hegel above is unproblematic, far from it. The notion of 'thing-in-itself' as an *utter abstraction* is one that I think that Hegel ultimately rejects. The fact that it is appropriate to value tells us about the peculiarity of value, therefore. Thanks, Andy > > In solidarity, Jerry > > > >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sun Jul 15 2001 - 10:56:29 EDT