Colonial Attitudes in Israel (LE > MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE) > > Le Monde diplomatique > > > ----------------------------------------------------- > > July 2002 > > COLONIAL ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL > > Camp David's thwarted peace > > _______________________________________________________ > > President Bush has urged the Palestinians to > replace Yasser > Arafat as a condition of US support for their > statehood. > This call underscores the failure of the Oslo > accords. As > Israel tightens its hold on the West Bank and > Gaza, peace > has never seemed more distant. Yet two years ago > Israelis > and Palestinians seemed close to agreement: the > Camp David > summit in July 2000 could have been considered > as one > further step in the long negotiations between > the Israelis > and Palestinians. Instead it was dismissed as > a total > failure, with Arafat responsible for that > failure. > > by > ALAIN GRESH > > _______________________________________________________ > > When, a few decades from now, historians return > to the > Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the 1990s they > will > undoubtedly agree on at least one point. The > Camp David > summit - a two-week conclave (11 to 25 July > 2000) to > which President Bill Clinton invited the > Israeli prime > minister, Ehud Barak, and the president of the > Palestinian Authority (PA), Yasser Arafat - > marked the > start of the Middle East's long descent into > the inferno. > As historians decipher the reports on the > summit > published by the international media, they will > probably > warn their students that there would be little > truth in > history if it was based exclusively on > information from > the press. > > For months there was a one-sided version of the > summit: > Arafat had rejected Barak's "generous offer" > and refused > the creation of a Palestinian state on 95%, > even 97%, of > the West Bank and the whole of the Gaza Strip, > with its > capital in East Jerusalem. His obstinate > demands for > millions of Palestinian refugees to be given > the right to > return to Israel had wrecked all hope of a > historic peace > treaty between Israelis and Palestinians. > > One of the prime merits of the book by Charles > Enderlin, > Le Rêve Brisé (1), is that it firmly > contradicts this > version of events. Enderlin has been the > Jerusalem > correspondent for the France 2 television > channel for > more than 20 years. As the peace negotiations > continued, > he filmed the main protagonists, on the > understanding > that material would not be released before the > end of > 2001. He had access to many of their personal > notes, > which he has put into perspective, drawing on > his > exceptional knowledge of the area and its > history. The > result, which is corroborated by other accounts > (2), > throws new light on the failure of the Oslo > process. > > At the end of May 1999 Ehud Barak and the > Labour party > defeated Binyamin Netanyahu's right-wing > coalition, > ending its three years in power. Just after the > elections, Saeb Erekat, one of the leading > Palestinian > negotiators, warned his new Israeli > counterparts that > there was very little room for manoeuvre. > Palestinians > had lost all hope of peace. Over the last few > years they > had been stifled and humiliated. > > Admittedly the Palestinians had been able to > elect the > PA, and the Israeli army had evacuated the main > West Bank > towns, with the notable exception of Hebron. > But living > conditions had constantly deteriorated. Travel > inside the > territories was increasingly difficult, with > new > checkpoints and humiliating searches - worse > than before > the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords. The > standard of > living plummeted and the settlements continued > their > inexorable advance, with more Arab land being > confiscated > every day. Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, > held since > 1993, remained behind bars. May 1999 was > supposed to mark > the end of the period of transition to > autonomy, with the > setting up of a Palestinian state. But the > timeframe had > slipped and none of the major issues still > outstanding - > borders, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, > security and > water - had been addressed. > > The Palestinian leadership therefore welcomed > Barak's > election victory, even if there was some > anxiety about > this relative newcomer to politics. As chief of > staff, > Barak had opposed the original 1993 Oslo > accords and two > years later, as minister of the interior, he > had voted > against the agreement known as Oslo II > (September 1995), > which provided for the withdrawal of the > Israeli army > from the main Palestinian towns. Once in power > he lost > the Palestinians' trust within just a few > months. > > Barak took the immediate start of negotiations > on the > final status of the West Bank and Gaza as an > excuse for > delaying the implementation of the commitments > made by > his predecessor and the hand-over of new > territory to the > PA. His decision to comply - only partially - > came too > late. Moreover he failed to honour his own > promises to > evacuate villages in the outskirts of Jerusalem > - Abu > Dis, al-Azzaria and Sawahra - even though the > Israeli > government and parliament had voted for this > concession. > > 'Dear brothers' > > For reasons that had nothing to do with > tactics, Barak > was clearly attached to the settlements. One of > the first > things he did, after the election, was to visit > the > extremist settlers of Ofra and Beit El, > addressing them > as his "dear brothers" (3). On 31 March 2000 he > spoke to > the settlers in Hebron, a group of fanatics > implanted in > the centre of the Arab town who terrorised its > population. He affirmed the right of Jews to > live in > Hebron in safety, protected from any attacks. > Under the > Barak government building in the settlements > continued at > a faster pace than under Netanyahu. > > Worse still, Barak neglected the Palestinian > issue for > months and gave priority to negotiations with > Syria. He > later attempted to justify this approach: "I > always > supported Syria first reaching peace with Syria > would > greatly limit the Palestinians' ability to > widen the > conflict. On the other hand, solving the > Palestinian > problem will not diminish Syria's ability to > existentially threaten Israel" (4). He > appointed Oded > Eran to lead negotiations with the > Palestinians. But he > did not listen when Eran told him that the > Palestinian > problem was central to the Israeli-Arab > conflict and no > solution to the conflict with Syria would be > found nor > any agreement reached until it was settled. > > Once more Barak would take no advice and again > he failed. > Enderlin's account provides details of Barak's > personal > responsibility in this fiasco. Dennis Ross, the > US Middle > East coordinator, who can hardly be suspected > of pro-Arab > sympathies, once complained that whereas the > Syrians had > made progress on all fronts, Barak had made > none. > > By the time talks with the Palestinians resumed > in spring > 2000, Barak had wasted almost a year. His > government > majority had disintegrated and the suspicion of > the > Palestinians - both the PA and public opinion - > had > increased. Barak decided to force the issue and > organise > a summit meeting to settle all outstanding > issues. Was > his offer sincere, or did he aim to trap the > PA, making > it responsible for failure? The Palestinian > leadership > had serious misgivings. It explained that > preparatory > talks were needed to ensure that a meeting > between Barak > and Arafat was truly productive, warning that a > hastily > organised summit could lead to disaster. The > warning went > unheeded. > > Barak convinced Clinton, nearing the end of his > term as > president, that he could crown his career with > a > spectacular success. The two men met for the > first time > on 15 July 1999 and, according to Enderlin, it > was love > at first sight. Clinton could not conceal his > admiration > for Barak, going so far as to say that he was > "eager as a > kid with a new toy". Their affinity influenced > the course > of events at Camp David. Despite his efforts, > Clinton > always felt closer to Barak. It required little > effort on > his part to understand, accept and defend > Israeli > positions. > > In his book Enderlin devotes a long chapter to > the Camp > David meeting. He describes the life of the > summit, its > participants, the discussions within each of > the three > delegations. But should it really count as a > summit? > Barak refused to negotiate directly with > Arafat, whom he > never met alone. Two years later he tried to > justify this > attitude: "Did Nixon meet Ho Chi Minh or Giap > [before > reaching the Vietnam peace deal]? Or did De > Gaulle ever > speak to [Algerian leader] Ben Bella?" (5). But > neither > Nixon nor De Gaulle had demanded a summit > meeting with > their adversaries. Barak's obvious disdain for > Arafat > merely fuelled Palestinian suspicions. > > Enderlin's account confirms that Arafat was > never offered > a Palestinian state controlling more than 91% > of the West > Bank. Nor was his full authority over the Arab > districts > of Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif (the > precinct on > which al-Aqsa mosque is built) recognised. > Contrary to > claims by several Jewish organisations, the > Palestinian > negotiators never demanded the return of 3m > refugees to > Israel. The figures mentioned during the talks > varied > from a few hundred to several thousand > Palestinians, whom > Israel would allow to return. > > Arafat had already made clear to Clinton at a > meeting in > Washington on 15 June 2000 that he recognised > the > existence of UN Resolution 194 (of 11 December > 1948, on > refugees' right to return to their homes) but > said that a > balance had to be struck between Israel's > demographic > concerns and Palestinian demands. According to > Robert > Malley and Hussein Agha, the refugee problem > "was barely > discussed between the two sides" (6) at the > summit. At > the subsequent press conference, Barak > attributed its > failure to disagreement on Jerusalem, before > changing > tack and highlighting the refugee problem. > > So Camp David ended without agreement. This was > not the > end of the world. Progress had been achieved > and taboos > shattered. For the first time the Israelis had > considered > sharing Jerusalem in some way. The Palestinians > had > accepted that certain territories on the West > Bank or in > East Jerusalem, where there were large > concentrations of > settlers, could be annexed by Israel. > > But instead of building on these advances, > Barak put all > the blame for the summit's failure on Arafat. > Above all > he resuscitated an old right-wing slogan that > he had no > valid opposite number on the Palestinian side. > The claim > was taken up by journalists and the media, and > gained > credence. Barak then threw all his energy into > revealing > what he called "the true face of Arafat". He > stopped > negotiating for a solution, preferring to > demonstrate > there was no solution. > > But negotiations did continue, particularly at > Taba, > Egypt, in January 2001. They brought the > positions of the > two parties closer on most of the issues under > discussion, particularly territory and sharing > of > sovereignty in East Jerusalem. Arab quarters > would be > integrated in the Palestinian state and Israel > would > annex Jewish neighbourhoods. The Israeli > delegates even > made novel proposals on the refugee question > (7). But it > seems unlikely that these offers reflected > Barak's own > position, for he never endorsed them. > > 'The true face of Arafat' > > Menahem Klein, an advisor to the former Israeli > foreign > minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, recently confirmed > this view. > According to Klein, Barak told him that he had > sent a > delegation to Taba solely to reveal "the true > face of > Arafat" and not to conclude an agreement (8). > Barak > succeeded in convincing Israeli public opinion > that it > was a case of "us or them", dealing a fatal > blow to the > peace camp. The Israeli peace campaigner, Uri > Avnery, > rightly called Barak "a peace criminal". > > The aim is not to exonerate the Palestinian > leaders of > all blame, and Enderlin is careful to avoid > this mistake. > Arafat was often indecisive, incapable of > taking drastic > measures. He totally underestimated the risk of > the right > winning the elections in February 2001 and > invested quite > unjustified trust in the Bush administration. > Above all > he could not understand the undercurrents of > Israeli > opinion and failed to draw up a clear > programme, > particularly after the second intifada started. > > Enderlin rejects outright the idea that the > Palestinian > leadership planned the uprising. Georges > Malbrunot, a > fellow journalist, seconds this view in a > well-researched > book on the intifada (9). According to him, on > 31 July > 2000, well before the start of the uprising, > Erakat told > all the Israeli heads of security that Camp > David had > failed, but its achievements had to be > protected. > Negotiations were continuing and there was a > real chance > of success. He added that in the coming weeks > they would > have to prevent any friction that might trigger > violent > confrontation. > > But it was already too late. The PA was faced > with the > revolt of the Palestinian rank and file who > demanded an > immediate end to 35 years of occupation. It is > perhaps > worth remembering that several weeks later the > intifada > became a military operation, in response to > Israeli army > reprisals. Malbrunot recalls the scale of > repression: > "Israeli soldiers killed 204 Palestinians > between 28 > September and 2 December, including 73 youths > aged less > than 17 and 24 members of the security forces. > The > Palestinian leaders all agreed that they could > not afford > to lose 10 children a day and that the human > cost was too > high. They must find another strategy" (10). > > By now the Oslo accords were defunct. The > causes of their > demise and the personal responsibility of the > various > players have been the subject of endless > debate. Above > all, the peace was lost because the occupying > power - the > Israeli government and a large part of public > opinion - > was incapable of treating the Palestinians as > equals. The > Israelis always put their own rights before > Palestinian > rights to dignity, freedom, security and > independence. If > progress is to be made in the future they will > have to > break with this colonialist attitude, now > defended by > Barak. > > In a recent interview Barak supported Sharon's > strategy > of terror and in particular this April's > Operation > Defensive Wall, but claims he would have acted > "more > forcefully and with greater speed, and > simultaneously > against all cities" (11). Barak shows his true > colours in > his references to the Arabs. "They are products > of a > culture in which to tell a lie ... creates no > dissonance. > They don't suffer from the problem of telling > lies that > exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is > seen as an > irrelevant category." > > This simplistic view, levelling accusations at > an entire > culture, is reminiscent of the racist > obsessions of the > French authorities in Algeria, advocated by > Camille > Brunel, a French colonialist writing at the > beginning of > the 20th century. He wrote: "A French officer > pardoned an > Arab rebel who had deserved death a hundred > times. The > Arab said: 'I am in debt to you. To show my > gratitude, I > shall give you a piece of advice that you must > never > forget as it will always be useful when dealing > with my > people. Never trust an Arab, not even me'" > (12). > > ____________________________________________________ > > (1) Charles Enderlin, Le rêve brisé. Histoire > de l'échec > du processus de paix au Proche-Orient. > 1995-2002, Fayard, > Paris, 2002, 366 pages. Unless otherwise > indicated all > quotes are taken from the book. > > (2) See, in particular, Robert Malley and > Hussein Agha, > New York Review of Books, 9 August 2001. Amnon > Kapeliouk > was one of the first writers to contradict the > dominant > line on Camp David. See "Camp David dialogues" > and > "Conducting catastrophe", Le Monde diplomatique > English > edition, respectively September 2000 and > February 2002. > > (3) Michel Warschawski, Sur la frontière, > Stock, Paris, > 2002. > > (4) New York Review of Books, 13 June 2002. > > (5) Ibid. > > (6) Ibid, quoting from Robert Malley, who took > part in > the summit as one of Clinton's presidential > advisors. > > (7) See "The Middle East: how the peace was > lost" and > "The Middle East: how the war cannot be won", > Le Monde > diplomatique English edition, September 2001. > > (8) Ha'aretz, Tel Aviv, 2 May 2002. > > (9) Georges Malbrunot, Des pierres aux fusils. > Les > secrets de l'Intifada, Flammarion, Paris, 2002. > > (10) Ibid. > > (11) New York Review of Books, 13 June 2002. > > (12) Quoted by Alain Ruscio, Le Credo de > l'homme blanc, > Complexe, Bruxelles. > > > > > Translated by > Harry Forster > > > > ____________________________________________________ > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © 1997-2002 Le Monde > diplomatique > > <http://MondeDiplo.com/2002/07/02peace> > > > Document: Labor Camps in Palestine (1948) > http://al-awda.org/labor_camps.htm > West Bank and Gaza Emergency Relief Fund: > http://al-awda.org/wb_fund.htm > Write your representative today!: > http://congress.cfl-online.org >
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