From: Rakesh Bhandari (rakeshb@stanford.edu)
Date: Tue Dec 10 2002 - 12:36:11 EST
Andy B writes in 8126: > >> And even if such self >> moving active matter is already implicit in the mechanistic worldview >> since the principle of inertia clearly states that a body continues in >> its state of rest or uniform motion unless compelled to change to >> change by forces impressed upon it and thus renders self-motion or >> Leibnzian conatus rather than extension fundamental to matter--I > > understand this to be have been your main point in 8115-- > >It is true that the the law to which you refer is consonant with the >notion that matter is inherently in motion. This certainly does not >mean that extension is inessential to matter. Even considered at >its most abstract, matter must have both extension and motion. By the activity of matter do you mean the principle of inertia or something else? I am not sure whether extension has to be a property of matter. If we are to settle on a property monism for matter--though there seems no reason to-- I think activity or change would be a better candidate though it is perhaps not clear that metaphysical entities (God, ghosts, collective memory) do not "have" activity or change as a property. I think that we are agreed that even mechanical materialism does not imply that matter is inert as Engels underlined; that incorrect assumption or interpretation of mechanical materialism historically led to its rejection for idealism. > >Well, the real problem would arise if we do *not* allow that matter self-organises. > Then once again we would have to ask what is it >that organises 'matter' (where we for some reason deny 'matter' >itself any organising principle)? If it is not matter itself then how can >we avoid contradiction with the laws of physics? How can we avoid >some mystical appeal to 'God' as in Descartes? Or perhaps we >could suggest that it is Hegelian 'mind' / 'Spirit' that develops >material form? But neither of these 'options' avoids self- >contradiction I would argue. The reasonable view to take is then >that matter is self-organising. Yes but that is what is to be explained in materialist terms: how despite the tendency towards thermodynamic equilibrium does matter organize itself? I am looking for materialist explanations which allows us to go from the idea already implicit in the mechanical world view that matter moves itself to the possibility of self organizing (if not self complexifying) matter and wondering whether in making a materialist explanation of said transition the doctrine of materialism itself undergoes any substantial (dialectical?) modification. What do we mean by dialectical materialism (Levins and Lewontin), materialist dialectics (Ilynenkov), emergent materialism (Mario Bunge)? You have already marked this change by introducing concepts such as emergence and levels of organization and the equivalence of energy and matter. At the very least, materialism has to be freed from reductionism and physicalism. In Science and Society a few years back, Richard Levins compared dialectical materialism to systems analysis. Yours, Rakesh
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