From: Paul Bullock (paulbullock@EBMS-LTD.CO.UK)
Date: Fri May 02 2003 - 17:48:11 EDT
Subject: US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup > US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup > By Michael Dobbs > Washington Post > December 30, 2002 > > High on the Bush administration's list of justifications for war > against Iraq are President Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons, > nuclear and biological programs, and his contacts with international > terrorists. What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these > offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as > a valued ally. > > Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad > during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense > secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special > presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi > relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to > Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an "almost > daily" basis in defiance of international conventions. > > The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before > his 1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included large-scale intelligence > sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and > facilitating Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological precursors > -- is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It > is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights > violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms > proliferators, all on the principle that the "enemy of my enemy is my > friend." > > Throughout the 1980s, Hussein's Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, > then still in the throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw > Baghdad as a bulwark against militant Shiite extremism and the fall > of pro-American states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan > -- a Middle East version of the "domino theory" in Southeast Asia. > That was enough to turn Hussein into a strategic partner and for U.S. > diplomats in Baghdad to routinely refer to Iraqi forces as "the good > guys," in contrast to the Iranians, who were depicted as "the bad > guys." > > A review of thousands of declassified government documents and > interviews with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and > logistical support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses > against the "human wave" attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The > administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the > sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian > applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological > viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague. > > Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government > officials about the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have > done more to stop the flow to Baghdad of technology for building > weapons of mass destruction. > > "It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now," says > Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of "The > Threatening Storm," which makes the case for war with Iraq. "My > fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warning at the time that Hussein was > a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the State > Department." > > "Fundamentally, the policy was justified," argues David Newton, a > former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio > station in Prague. "We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the > war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and > the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that Hussein's government would > become less repressive and more responsible." > > What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of the > 1980s, say Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the Iranian > revolution and the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait that transformed > the Iraqi dictator, almost overnight, from awkward ally into mortal > enemy. In addition, the United States itself has changed. As a result > of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, > U.S. policymakers take a much more alarmist view of the threat posed > by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. > > U.S. Shifts in Iran-Iraq War > > When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack > across the Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the > United States was a bystander. The United States did not have > diplomatic relations with either Baghdad or Tehran. U.S. officials > had almost as little sympathy for Hussein's dictatorial brand of Arab > nationalism as for the Islamic fundamentalism espoused by Iran's > Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As long as the two countries fought > their way to a stalemate, nobody in Washington was disposed to > intervene. > > By the summer of 1982, however, the strategic picture had changed > dramatically. After its initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and > Iranian troops had advanced to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq's > second largest city. U.S. intelligence information suggested the > Iranians might achieve a breakthrough on the Basra front, > destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf states, and even Saudi Arabia, thereby > threatening U.S. oil supplies. > > "You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was very > different from where we are now," said Howard Teicher, a former > National Security Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy during > the Reagan administration. "Realpolitik dictated that we act to > prevent the situation from getting worse." > > To prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied > battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis, > sometimes through third parties such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt > toward Iraq was enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 114 > of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era foreign policy > decisions that still remains classified. According to former U.S. > officials, the directive stated that the United States would do > "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from losing the > war with Iran. > > The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that > Iraqi forces were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold > back the Iranians. In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to > chemical warfare, a practice outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In > practice, U.S. condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons ranked > relatively low on the scale of administration priorities, > particularly compared with the all-important goal of preventing an > Iranian victory. > > Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan > T. Howe, told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence > reports showed that Iraqi troops were resorting to "almost daily use > of CW" against the Iranians. But the Reagan administration had > already committed itself to a large-scale diplomatic and political > overture to Baghdad, culminating in several visits by the president's > recently appointed special envoy to the Middle East, Donald H. > Rumsfeld. > > Secret talking points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to > Baghdad enshrined some of the language from NSDD 114, including the > statement that the United States would regard "any major reversal of > Iraq's fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West." When Rumsfeld > finally met with Hussein on Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi leader that > Washington was ready for a resumption of full diplomatic relations, > according to a State Department report of the conversation. Iraqi > leaders later described themselves as "extremely pleased" with the > Rumsfeld visit, which had "elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new > level." > > In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he "cautioned" > Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with > declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the > Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that > Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign > minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he > mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that > "inhibited" U.S. efforts to assist Iraq. > > Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in > its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that > Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration's > tilt toward Iraq -- he was a private citizen when he was appointed > Middle East envoy -- the documents show that his visits to Baghdad > led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. > Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, > but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following > year. > > As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed > Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, > despite heated objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher > says, it would have been "impossible to take even the modest steps we > were contemplating" to channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq -- along > with Syria, Libya and South Yemen -- was one of four original > countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979. > > Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the terrorism > list provided an incentive to Hussein to expel the Palestinian > guerrilla leader Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1983. On the other hand, > Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the > '80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine > Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad after being expelled > from Tunis for masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship > Achille Lauro, which resulted in the killing of an elderly American > tourist. > > Iraq Lobbies for Arms > > While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, Iraqi > diplomats and weapons merchants were fanning out across Western > capitals for a diplomatic charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. In > Washington, the key figure was the Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Nizar > Hamdoon, a fluent English speaker who impressed Reagan administration > officials as one of the most skillful lobbyists in town. > > "He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of the > mafia," recalled Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the > Reagan White House. "Within six months, he was hosting suave dinner > parties at his residence, which he parlayed into a formidable > lobbying effort. He was particularly effective with the American > Jewish community." > > One of Hamdoon's favorite props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf > allegedly found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was > decorated with a map of the Middle East showing a series of arrows > pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used to "parade the scarf" to > conferences and congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian > victory over Iraq would result in "Israel becoming a victim along > with the Arabs." > > According to a sworn court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the > United States "actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying > the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing military > intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring > third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq had the military > weaponry required." Teicher said in the affidavit that former CIA > director William Casey used a Chilean company, Cardoen, to supply > Iraq with cluster bombs that could be used to disrupt the Iranian > human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to discuss the affidavit. > > At the same time the Reagan administration was facilitating the > supply of weapons and military components to Baghdad, it was > attempting to cut off supplies to Iran under "Operation Staunch." > Those efforts were largely successful, despite the glaring anomaly of > the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when the White House publicly admitted > trading arms for hostages, in violation of the policy that the United > States was trying to impose on the rest of the world. > > Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not as deeply involved as > German or British companies in selling weaponry to Iraq, the Reagan > administration effectively turned a blind eye to the export of "dual > use" items such as chemical precursors and steel tubes that can have > military and civilian applications. According to several former > officials, the State and Commerce departments promoted trade in such > items as a way to boost U.S. exports and acquire political leverage > over Hussein. > > When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after > the 1991 Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile > components, and computers from American suppliers, including such > household names as Union Carbide and Honeywell, which were being used > for military purposes. > > A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens > of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-'80s under > license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of > anthrax, subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key component > of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also > approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread > suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare. > > The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was hardly a secret. In > February 1984, an Iraqi military spokesman effectively acknowledged > their use by issuing a chilling warning to Iran. "The invaders should > know that for every harmful insect, there is an insecticide capable > of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation > insecticide." > > Chemicals Kill Kurds > > In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against > Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose > alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. The > attacks, which were part of a "scorched earth" strategy to eliminate > rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and > renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department and > White House were also outraged -- but not to the point of doing > anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad. > > "The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term > political and economic objectives," Assistant Secretary of State > Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed > the chemical weapons question. "We believe that economic sanctions > will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis." > > Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein's use of chemical > weapons "against his own people" -- and particularly the March 1988 > attack on the Kurdish village of Halabjah -- to bolster their > argument that his regime presents a "grave and gathering danger" to > the United States. > > The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons against the Iranians > until the end of the Iran-Iraq war. A U.S. air force intelligence > officer, Rick Francona, reported finding widespread use of Iraqi > nerve gas when he toured the Al Faw peninsula in southern Iraq in the > summer of 1988, after its recapture by the Iraqi army. The > battlefield was littered with atropine injectors used by panicky > Iranian troops as an antidote against Iraqi nerve gas attacks. > > Far from declining, the supply of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq > actually expanded in 1988, according to a 1999 book by Francona, > "Ally to Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace." > Informed sources said much of the battlefield intelligence was > channeled to the Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad. > > Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the late > 1980s, there were still many loopholes. In December 1988, Dow > Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. > government concerns that they could be used as chemical warfare > agents. An Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum that > he could find "no reason" to stop the sale, despite evidence that the > pesticides were "highly toxic" to humans and would cause death "from > asphyxiation." > > The U.S. policy of cultivating Hussein as a moderate and reasonable > Arab leader continued right up until he invaded Kuwait in August > 1990, documents show. When the then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April > Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 25, 1990, a week before the Iraqi > attack on Kuwait, she assured him that Bush "wanted better and deeper > relations," according to an Iraqi transcript of the conversation. > "President Bush is an intelligent man," the ambassador told Hussein, > referring to the father of the current president. "He is not going to > declare an economic war against Iraq." > > "Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam," said Joe Wilson, > Glaspie's former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the last > U.S. official to meet with Hussein. "Everybody in the Arab world told > us that the best way to deal with Saddam was to develop a set of > economic and commercial relationships that would have the effect of > moderating his behavior. History will demonstrate that this was a > miscalculation." >
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