From: ajit sinha (sinha_a99@YAHOO.COM)
Date: Sat Nov 15 2003 - 01:09:25 EST
--- Howard Engelskirchen <howarde@TWCNY.RR.COM> wrote: > The idea that Hume's position on causation has never > been satisfactorily, > challenged leaves out of account the last 30 or 40 > years of the philosophy > of science. ____________________ What science does or how it should be done can never solve a philosophical or logical problems. Science is neither philosophy nor mathematics. I think most of your objections are taken care of, may be not completely satisfactoily, in my answers to other messages. Cheers, ajit sinha About midcentury realist challenges to > logical empiricism began > to take hold for the good and substantial reason > that the propositions on > offer, including Hume's approach to causation, > didn't correspond to what > scientists actually do. Nancy Cartwright, for > example, in "The Reality of > Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws," argues that > although philosophers > have believed in laws and denied causes, explanatory > practice in physics is > just the opposite -- we argue from effect to cause > against a background of > our best available knowledge to find concrete causal > processes. The > inference is not to the best explanation but to the > most probable cause. > Bhaskar's powerful critique of Hume in A Realist > Theory of Science (1975) > was mentioned in a previous post. Bhaskar argues > that the Humean concept of > cause can't make sense of experimental activity -- > the sequences of events > Hume's account presupposes are mostly produced in > the closed system of a > laboratory, and the Humean can't give an account of > what explanations hold > outside the experimental laboratory where such > regularities rarely occur. > Moreover, reflection on experiment shows that it is > not about sequences of > events at all. Those are produced by the activity > of the experimenter -- ie > the experimenter puts litmus paper in acid and turns > the paper red -- but > the experimenter doesn't produce the causal process > that caused the > transformation. In other words in the Humean > account causal processes are > confused with and collapsed into the sequences of > events that permit us to > identify them. > > Harre and Madden in Causal Powers (1975) also > provide an important critique > of Hume. They show that Hume's argument depends on > conflating logical > necessity -- something true in all possible worlds > -- with natural > necessity -- a relation that holds between a > generative structure and its > effects that can only be discovered a posteriori. > The fact that it is > logically possible for nature to change its course > and for a stick of > dynamite to turn into a stone doesn't say anything > to the point about > whether, given dynamite of the proper composition > and structure, a stick of > dynamite will explode when detonated. It is self > contradictory to say that > the nature of dynamite is such that it both does and > does not explain its > power to explode. > > There's methodological significance here, as Harre > and Madden emphasize by > recounting the story of Moliere's imaginary invalid: > opium puts people to > sleep because it has a "virtus dormitiva." Put a > Humean on the case: > > "Following Hume's account of the empirical meaning > of a causal statement, > the man who wanted to know more about the action of > powerful particulars, > say soporifics, could proceed only by collecting > more cases of similar > phenomena until he had enough to convince himself of > the lawfulness of the > statement of concomitance -- for example, had formed > the psychological habit > of expecting drowsiness to follow ingestion of > opium." > > It's been done in social science. > > On the other hand, given a robust realist account of > causation a scientist > "will not collect further statistics but begin[] an > exhaustive chemical > anlaysis of the potent entity, trying to find out > what sort of stuff it is, > i.e. what its nature is. Then he tries to follow it > through the body after > ingestion and tries to ascertain how it acts upon > the central nervous > system, the higher centers, and so on. He > undertakes quite a different sort > of investigation from the strict Humean. He does > what scientists actually > do." (Causal Powers 91). > > In other words, looking for a "virtus dormitiva" is > better science, and, by > the way, which approach did Marx follow? > > Richard Boyd is another contemporary philosopher of > science who provides a > sustained and satisfying critique of Hume based on > the practices of science: > "There is indeed considerable evidence that almost > all the significant > features of the methodology of recent science rest > ultimately upon knowledge > of unobservable causal powers and mechanisms (cites > omitted), and thus that > the empiricist reservations about experimental > knowledge of unobservable > causal powers and mechanisms are profoundly > mistaken." The basic idea is > that scientists actually do posit causal structures > and processes and then, > relying on the best background theories available to > them, design > experiments and explanations. The success of the > endeavor is good evidence > for the structures and processes proposed, whether > unobservable or not. > ((Boyd, "Observations, Explanatory Power, and > Simplicity: Toward a > Non-Humean Account.") > > The Boyd and Cartwright articles can be found in > Philosophy of Science > (1991) edited by Boyd, Gasper and Trout. > > Value is an unobservable causal structure, and Marx, > economics or social > science more generally without cause makes less > sense of the world than we > can afford. So getting past Hume's legacy is > important for us. > > Howard > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Rakesh Bhandari" <rakeshb@STANFORD.EDU> > To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> > Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 1:15 PM > Subject: Re: [OPE-L] Hume (just citations) > > > > Interesting discussion underway. > > > > On a Marxist theory of causality, see Anjan > Chakrabarti and Stephen > Cullenberg > > Transition and Development in India, pp. 31ff > > > > On Althusser's distinction between transitive and > expressive causality, > see > > Robert Paul Resch Althusser and the Renewal of > Marxist Social Theory. > > > > Rakesh __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Protect your identity with Yahoo! Mail AddressGuard http://antispam.yahoo.com/whatsnewfree
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