From: ajit sinha (sinha_a99@YAHOO.COM)
Date: Mon Nov 17 2003 - 06:23:47 EST
--- Rakesh Bhandari <rakeshb@STANFORD.EDU> wrote: > >--- Rakesh Bhandari <rakeshb@STANFORD.EDU> wrote: > >> Ajit wrote > >> > >> > > >> >Well! If you are referring to Sraffa's book, > then, > >> of > >> >course, Sraffa is not developing any causal > theory > >> >there. The function of his book is to show that > the > >> >neoclassical supply function, which is built on > a > >> >supposed causal relation between prices and > methods > >> of > >> >production is illegitimate. > >> > >> So capital is not a factor with a price but an > index > >> of > >> a conflictual social relation? > >_____________________ > >Capital, as used by economic theory, is an > irrational > >term. One should instead say, means of production. > >Marx sometimes uses capital in the same vein as > >economic theory, since he thought he could > aggregate > >all means of production in terms of labor time. > > This would not reduce Marx's concept of capital to > the > everyday conceptions thereof as systemized in > economic > theory. > > > > > But at > >many times the term for him refers to the relation > >between the calss of capitalists and the wage > laborers > >but not as an "index of conflictual social > relations". > > No for Marx capital is inherently dynamic; it is > self expanding > value (good collection of relevant quotes in > appendix to Pack's > book on commodity theory of value). But as you say > in another post > the Sraffian framework disallows dynamics from its > problematic of value; > it thus has no room for capital in Marx's sense. ___________________ So, for you there is no capital at a given point of time for Marx? When Marx writes C, V etc in his equations they are not capital? ______________________________ > >> > But this does not mean > >> >that Sraffa is saying that there cannot be any > >> causal > >> >theory of change. > >> > >> But are you saying that or implying that below? > >> Confused here. I thought you were chiding > Michael L > >> for not having > >> a causal theory but then you seem to suggest > that > >> attribution of > >> causes is superstitious? > >_________________ > > > >How can I chid Michael L! What I was humbly > pointing > >out was that he is developing a causal explanation, > >but his explanation turns out to be circular--a no! > >no! for any causal theory. My reference to Hume and > >early Wittgenstein was only to point out that > causal > >explanations as such are neither empirical nor > >logical, they are implied by the scientific > theories. > > > Implied falsely by scientific theories? Still not > getting > your point. So science has to learn how to get by > without > causality, as traditionally understood? Is that what > you > are saying? Scientific theory can at best be based > on something > like Bayesian probability? Is that your point? __________________ No! my point is not about what science should be at all. Science believs in cause-effect relationship. This is their fundamental belief. Scientists understand what they mean when they refer to cause as they have devised certain standards that justifies something to be a cause or not (statistical probability or passing the laboratory test or what ever)but those standards themselves have no grounds independent of the context of the scientific discourse. As religious or spiritual people understand what they mean when they talk about soul and God. But neither can be established through mathematical proofs or logical propositions. ____________________________ > >> > But you should keep it in mind that > >> >Hume's empiricist philosophy rejected any > >> >philosophical basis to causality. For Hume > >> causality > >> >is nothing but a belief or habit of mind. > Hume's > >> >challenge on causation has never been answered. > All > >> >Kant could do is to make the relationship of > cause > >> and > >> >effect a priori. From a logical perspective, > >> >Wittgenstein in the Tractatus declared that > >> >'Superstition is nothing but a belief in causal > >> >nexus'. > >> > >> > >> On a more ontological level Lewontin seems > correct > >> that the states > >> and motions of living organisms are the > consequence > >> of many > >> intersecting causal pathways, thereby making it > >> unusual that normal > >> variation in any one of these pathways has a > strong > >> effect on the > >> outcome. Given the multiplicity of causal > chains, > >> all of weak > >> individual influence in their normal condition, > it > >> is difficult to > >> ascribe a cause to some effect since putative > cause > >> and its effect > >> will not likely seen to vary together. > >___________________ > >I don't think Lewontin even touches upon the nature > of > >problems both Hume and Wittgestein are dealing > with. > > OK but I am not quite sure what Wittgenstein would > say > about 'causality'. That causality cannot be made > sense > of in terms of either empiricism (Hume) or > intellectualism (Kant) > would lead him to say that neither understands > the work that causality does in this or that > language game, no? > That is, I don't think you have shown that > Wittgenstein would have > accepted Hume's analysis as destructive towards > the existence of causality. By the way, I don't know > what Wittgenstein > would have said about Nelson Goodman's restating of > the Humean problem > of induction in terms of the grue paradox or how a > Wittgensteinian > would resolve it. > But since I still don't understand the point that > you are making > in response to Michael L, I am not quite sure why > you are raising > the philosophical history of the analysis of > causation and which > philosophical position you are accepting. _____________________ This whole debate has nothing to do with Michael L. It started off because you had raised the question of no causality in Sraffa's work. As far as the later Wittgenstein is concerned, I think he will accept that cause and effect has meaning within the context of scientific discourse but it will become nonsense once you drag it out of the scientific context and use it in philosophical ar mathematical discourse. Cheers, ajit sinha > > > > >____________________________ > >> >Mathematical logic does not admit of > >> >causality. Because no causal proposition can be > >> made > >> >with certainty. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> You are not counting as a piece of mathematical > >> logic or as truly > >> causal those statistical theories of causality > as > >> developed in > >> thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, Pearsonian > >> regressions, etc? > >__________________ > > > >They are not mathematics. They use mathematics. > > OK in terms of pure mathematics there is no > causality, only > relations of entailment or logical necessity. But > are you > then saying that are no relations of causality > inside === message truncated === __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Protect your identity with Yahoo! Mail AddressGuard http://antispam.yahoo.com/whatsnewfree
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