From: Jurriaan Bendien (adsl675281@TISCALI.NL)
Date: Tue Nov 28 2006 - 12:35:54 EST
Dogan, If we suppose capitalist business produces outputs only in order to sell them profitably, and no other reason, this does not necessarily mean that it is ipso facto irrational, because very clear means-ends relationships are involved. It means only that the commercial rationality governing capitalist business is limited to producing outputs for profitable sale. The argument about world hunger can and has been inverted also, by the defenders of capitalism: if we had more capitalism, there would be no hunger. In this case, the hunger exists because of obstacles to market trade, and if those were removed, there would be no hunger; the perceived irrationality here consists in the fact that obstructions to capitalism are maintained. Throughout the 20th century, millions have died from hunger every year, but it is not altogether clear to me that you can blame that simply on capitalism. But regardless of one's point of view on this, it is evident that capitalism flourished, despite these millions dying from hunger. In reality, when Marxists decry capitalism as an irrational system, what they are doing most often is that they make a moral argument about what human priorities should be (a hierarchy of values), except that they often do not make this explicit, and assume their case is self-evident. But it may not be self-evident at all. Another frequent supposition in the talk about the irrationality of capitalism is that rationality is by definition a "good" thing. Capitalism according to Marxists is a "bad" thing, and, therefore, it must be irrational. But rationality is not necessarily a "good" thing at all. Rational thought and action may be applied for good or for evil. A given means-ends relationship can be judged quite rational, even although we object to the means and/or the ends on other grounds. I would think this is precisely one of the root causes of the postmodern condition, i.e. the lack of substantive, consensual and objective criteria about what is rational or irrational. When I sit here typing a mail, it is a rational activity. But someone might argue it is irrational, because I could better spend my time on other things. This is a value judgement which may be more or less informed by knowledge about my life. I could justify my activity rationally, but that justification might not be accepted by somebody else, operating with a different means-ends relationship and value-hierarchy. Jurriaan
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