Re: [OPE-L] Lawrence Krader on objective and subjective value

From: ajit sinha (sinha_a99@YAHOO.COM)
Date: Mon Nov 12 2007 - 11:26:32 EST


Who are you talking to Rakesh? I have noticed that you
have not stopped commenting on what I write even once.
You think you are the smartest guy out there? So you
can simply wait for somebody to respond to what I
write to give your stupid editorializing on what I
write. I have ignoring you and have endured you for
long enough! I came back on this list on an explicit
and public acknowledgment by the moderator that you
will not be allowed to comment either directly or
indirectly on whatever I write. You have violated it
consistently since I have come back and I have endured
it silently--hoping that the list managers would tell
you quietly to desist. Be a man of honor and stick by
what you publicly promise. Ajit Sinha
--- Rakesh Bhandari <bhandari@BERKELEY.EDU> wrote:

> >Dear Ajit,
> >
> >While Marx could be construed as putting forward a
> theory that
> >explains why everyone sees things in a certain way
> while he alone
> >does not, this would be an uncharitable
> interpretation. The idea
> >seems to be more humdrum: Copernicus claimed a
> different standpoint
> >(as, incidentally, did Kant in Philosophy) for
> explaining the
> >apparent motion of the stars and planets which also
> offered an
> >account of why they seemed to move as they do to
> people who had not
> >adopted that standpoint but one that more
> immediately reflected their
> >experience. Marx might only be saying that from the
> standpoint of
> >seeing indefinitely enduring social systems as
> historically limited,
> >he can provide an account of exploitation, etc,
> that is invisible to
> >those who do not take their object of study as
> arising only in
> >specific historical circumstances and depending for
> its reproduction
> >on specific  and transient historical conditions.
>
> Ian, I think this and your other recent post on
> Cartesian
> subjectivity are very well put. Thanks. I think the
> rise of the
> workers movement did provide Marx with a standpoint
> which I think you
> are suggesting is epistemologically superior. I also
> think
> dialectical thinking even in the form of Engels'
> principles allowed
> him to theorize economic phenomena in a new
> way--value form as unity
> of opposites and price of production as a
> reconciliation of
> contradiction between law of value and law of
> profit, as two
> examples. Or quantity to quality transitions in the
> transformation
> from petty proprietor to captialist or in wage
> relatin from exchange
> to appropriation. He was alerted to how process
> could result in the
> negation of its own negation too of course. Most
> importantly though I
> think Marx's dialectics were not only logical.
> Marx's genius depended
> on the dialectical process that history had by the
> 1830s applied to
> capitalist institutions, bringing out contradictions
> which no amount
> of dialectical genius on the part of Smith or
> Ricardo could have
> disclosed.
>
> Rakesh
>
>
> >
> >More suspect, surely, would be Marx's gestures at
> some sort of
> >historical inevitability of social change
> independent of individual
> >agency,
> >Cheers,
> >Ian
> >
> >Cheers,
> >Ian
> >
> >>--- Ian Wright <wrighti@ACM.ORG> wrote:
> >>
> >>>  > Jurriaan, I think you did not understand what
> I
> >>>  was
> >>>  > trying to say. Let's say I claim that "I
> always
> >>>  lie".
> >>>  > Now if this statement is true then I have
> >>>  obviously
> >>>  > contradicted myself, because I have
> apparently
> >>>  made a
> >>>  > statement which is not a lie. And if it is
> not
> >>>  true
> >>>  > then still I have contradicted myself because
> what
> >>>  I
> >>>  > stated is not true. This is the kind of
> problem
> >>>  Marx's
> >>>  > (or at least an interpretation of) historical
> >>>  > materialism falls into. If historical
> materialism
> >>>  is
> >>>  > true then it cannot escape its own
> historicity and
> >>>  if
> >>>  > it claims to be universally true (as it does)
> then
> >>>  its
> >>>  > claim to universality stands in contradiction
> to
> >>>  its
> >>>  > own theoretical claim. One aspect of Marx's
> >>>  writing is
> >>>  > quite prophetic in nature. He seem to sit on
> a
> >>>  hill
> >>>  > top looking down at ordinary folks in the
> >>>  > valley--commenting on how little they can see
> >>>  given
> >>>  > their circumstances etc. whereas he, of
> course,
> >>>  sits
> >>>  > on a previledged position from which the
> vision is
> >>>  > much clearer and complete. Cheers, ajit sinha
> >>>
> >>>  I think you are choking on an a
> self-referential
> >>>  feature of Marx's
> >>>  Historical Materialism (HM) that he inherits
> from
> >>>  his inversion of
> >>>  Hegel. Both thinkers argue that human history
> is
> >>>  intelligible and
> >>>  law-governed. For Hegel, history is the
> >>>  self-development of Spirit,
> >>>  for Marx its the self-development of social
> labour.
> >>>  Both Spirit and
> >>>  social labour function in the role of
> invariants in
> >>>  each respective
> >>>  theory that ultimately explain social change
> through
> >>>  time. Hegel
> >>>  claims that the Spirit first becomes
> self-conscious
> >>>  of itself in
> >>>  Hegelian philosophy, whereas Marx argues that
> social
> >>>  labour first
> >>>  becomes self-conscious of its own historical
> role in
> >>>  scientific
> >>>  socialism (e.g., "philosophy must be realized
> in the
> >>>  proletariat"). So
> >>>  HM is a theory of history that explains the
> >>>  necessity of its own
> >>>  appearance at a certain stage of human
> development
> >>>  (hence the
> >>>  self-referential element). But of course it is
> not a
> >>>  finished theory
> >>>  (hence the historical contingency). Since
> science is
> >>>  cumulative the
> >>>  claims of HM are universal without entailing a
> >>>  contradiction: if it is
> >>>  a true theory of history then better and more
> >>>  complete theories in the
> >>>  future will retain its essential insights (c.f.
> >>>  Newtonian mechanics as
> >>>  a special-case of quantum mechanics at large
> >>>  scales).
> >>>
> >>>  I think your invocation of the liar paradox
> does not
> >>>  do justice to
> >>>  this theoretical complexity. It's also a
> typically
> >>>  "analytical"
> >>>  objection that ignores how self-referential
> >>>  paradoxes can get resolved
> >>>  once time is introduced. Implement the liar
> paradox
> >>>  in Prolog and
> >>>  you'll get an infinite loop not a crash.
> >>_______________________________
> >>Ian, I'm not talking about the theory of history.
> I'm
> >>talking about the critique of ideas based on the
> >>master strategy of HM. To quote Rubin via
> Jurriaan:
> >>
> >>In Das Kapital, as Isaac I. Rubin emphasized, Marx
>
=== message truncated ===


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