From: Rakesh Bhandari (bhandari@BERKELEY.EDU)
Date: Mon Nov 12 2007 - 11:42:56 EST
> Who are you talking to Rakesh? I responded to Ian, based on some ideas I had after reading Haldane's Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences. I want to read Stathis K's REvolution and Philosopy more carefully to get an idea of how importat rise of working class was to Marx's theorizing. Tony Smith wrote a great review. On Cartesian subjectivity I want to read Dallmayr's Twilight of Subjectivity and Supiot's Homo Juridicus. Of course also interested in on importance of Ilyenkov to understanding Marx's method. That predated any messages by you on the topic. Can't help overlap. We are both talking about Marx. I am surprised that you are reading my posts. Don't. I have not cited anything you have said. Nor am I interested. was impressed by Ian H' message on Cartesian subjectivity in particular. Rakesh I have noticed that you > have not stopped commenting on what I write even once. > You think you are the smartest guy out there? So you > can simply wait for somebody to respond to what I > write to give your stupid editorializing on what I > write. I have ignoring you and have endured you for > long enough! I came back on this list on an explicit > and public acknowledgment by the moderator that you > will not be allowed to comment either directly or > indirectly on whatever I write. You have violated it > consistently since I have come back and I have endured > it silently--hoping that the list managers would tell > you quietly to desist. Be a man of honor and stick by > what you publicly promise. Ajit Sinha > --- Rakesh Bhandari <bhandari@BERKELEY.EDU> wrote: > >> >Dear Ajit, >> > >> >While Marx could be construed as putting forward a >> theory that >> >explains why everyone sees things in a certain way >> while he alone >> >does not, this would be an uncharitable >> interpretation. The idea >> >seems to be more humdrum: Copernicus claimed a >> different standpoint >> >(as, incidentally, did Kant in Philosophy) for >> explaining the >> >apparent motion of the stars and planets which also >> offered an >> >account of why they seemed to move as they do to >> people who had not >> >adopted that standpoint but one that more >> immediately reflected their >> >experience. Marx might only be saying that from the >> standpoint of >> >seeing indefinitely enduring social systems as >> historically limited, >> >he can provide an account of exploitation, etc, >> that is invisible to >> >those who do not take their object of study as >> arising only in >> >specific historical circumstances and depending for >> its reproduction >> >on specific and transient historical conditions. >> >> Ian, I think this and your other recent post on >> Cartesian >> subjectivity are very well put. Thanks. I think the >> rise of the >> workers movement did provide Marx with a standpoint >> which I think you >> are suggesting is epistemologically superior. I also >> think >> dialectical thinking even in the form of Engels' >> principles allowed >> him to theorize economic phenomena in a new >> way--value form as unity >> of opposites and price of production as a >> reconciliation of >> contradiction between law of value and law of >> profit, as two >> examples. Or quantity to quality transitions in the >> transformation >> from petty proprietor to captialist or in wage >> relatin from exchange >> to appropriation. He was alerted to how process >> could result in the >> negation of its own negation too of course. Most >> importantly though I >> think Marx's dialectics were not only logical. >> Marx's genius depended >> on the dialectical process that history had by the >> 1830s applied to >> capitalist institutions, bringing out contradictions >> which no amount >> of dialectical genius on the part of Smith or >> Ricardo could have >> disclosed. >> >> Rakesh >> >> >> > >> >More suspect, surely, would be Marx's gestures at >> some sort of >> >historical inevitability of social change >> independent of individual >> >agency, >> >Cheers, >> >Ian >> > >> >Cheers, >> >Ian >> > >> >>--- Ian Wright <wrighti@ACM.ORG> wrote: >> >> >> >>> > Jurriaan, I think you did not understand what >> I >> >>> was >> >>> > trying to say. Let's say I claim that "I >> always >> >>> lie". >> >>> > Now if this statement is true then I have >> >>> obviously >> >>> > contradicted myself, because I have >> apparently >> >>> made a >> >>> > statement which is not a lie. And if it is >> not >> >>> true >> >>> > then still I have contradicted myself because >> what >> >>> I >> >>> > stated is not true. This is the kind of >> problem >> >>> Marx's >> >>> > (or at least an interpretation of) historical >> >>> > materialism falls into. If historical >> materialism >> >>> is >> >>> > true then it cannot escape its own >> historicity and >> >>> if >> >>> > it claims to be universally true (as it does) >> then >> >>> its >> >>> > claim to universality stands in contradiction >> to >> >>> its >> >>> > own theoretical claim. One aspect of Marx's >> >>> writing is >> >>> > quite prophetic in nature. He seem to sit on >> a >> >>> hill >> >>> > top looking down at ordinary folks in the >> >>> > valley--commenting on how little they can see >> >>> given >> >>> > their circumstances etc. whereas he, of >> course, >> >>> sits >> >>> > on a previledged position from which the >> vision is >> >>> > much clearer and complete. Cheers, ajit sinha >> >>> >> >>> I think you are choking on an a >> self-referential >> >>> feature of Marx's >> >>> Historical Materialism (HM) that he inherits >> from >> >>> his inversion of >> >>> Hegel. Both thinkers argue that human history >> is >> >>> intelligible and >> >>> law-governed. For Hegel, history is the >> >>> self-development of Spirit, >> >>> for Marx its the self-development of social >> labour. >> >>> Both Spirit and >> >>> social labour function in the role of >> invariants in >> >>> each respective >> >>> theory that ultimately explain social change >> through >> >>> time. Hegel >> >>> claims that the Spirit first becomes >> self-conscious >> >>> of itself in >> >>> Hegelian philosophy, whereas Marx argues that >> social >> >>> labour first >> >>> becomes self-conscious of its own historical >> role in >> >>> scientific >> >>> socialism (e.g., "philosophy must be realized >> in the >> >>> proletariat"). So >> >>> HM is a theory of history that explains the >> >>> necessity of its own >> >>> appearance at a certain stage of human >> development >> >>> (hence the >> >>> self-referential element). But of course it is >> not a >> >>> finished theory >> >>> (hence the historical contingency). Since >> science is >> >>> cumulative the >> >>> claims of HM are universal without entailing a >> >>> contradiction: if it is >> >>> a true theory of history then better and more >> >>> complete theories in the >> >>> future will retain its essential insights (c.f. >> >>> Newtonian mechanics as >> >>> a special-case of quantum mechanics at large >> >>> scales). >> >>> >> >>> I think your invocation of the liar paradox >> does not >> >>> do justice to >> >>> this theoretical complexity. It's also a >> typically >> >>> "analytical" >> >>> objection that ignores how self-referential >> >>> paradoxes can get resolved >> >>> once time is introduced. Implement the liar >> paradox >> >>> in Prolog and >> >>> you'll get an infinite loop not a crash. >> >>_______________________________ >> >>Ian, I'm not talking about the theory of history. >> I'm >> >>talking about the critique of ideas based on the >> >>master strategy of HM. To quote Rubin via >> Jurriaan: >> >> >> >>In Das Kapital, as Isaac I. Rubin emphasized, Marx >> > === message truncated === > > > __________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around > http://mail.yahoo.com >
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