From: Paul Cockshott (wpc@DCS.GLA.AC.UK)
Date: Mon Dec 31 2007 - 18:08:19 EST
Dave Z ----------- However, there are two issues that I think lack analysis: What is the relation between the capitalism and the nation state, especially once capitalism has reached a truly global scale? From a purely abstract capitalist logic one would expect a decay of smaller nation states and the formation of larger blocs of juridical and military power, e.g. as the EU. But the reverse seems to be true. Paul C ------ What do you mean by the last sentence Dave? Dave Z ----------- Given the integration of global capitalism today I have a hard time to see that the rivalries between capitals themselves will translate into rivalries between nation states (except for the case of state-capitalist enterprises). Paul C ------- Could one not have argued the same thing in 1908? Remember that states are something quite different from capitalist firms. States are territorial organisations that appropriate a significant, often major, part of the surplus product in the teritories that they control. As such they have distinct interests as surplus appropriators. They are typically controlled by the propertied classes within that territory, but, in parliamentary states, have also to respond to the interests of other classes. They also have the power to create money, upon which power the whole process of capital accumulation ultimately depends, since capitalist wealth is denominated in the money created by these states. It is quite exceptional for a state to be controlled by and in the service of 'capital' they are typically in the service of 'national interests' and influenced primarily by firms based in their territory. In recent years the UK state has come to approximate a state in the service of 'capital in general', but that reflects the particular preponderance of finance capital within the UK economy. Few other capitalist states approach this British level of openness to foreign capital. Consider the degree wo which the US state and the US currency are dependent on German Chinese and Japanese credit. The creditor states could, with adjustment to their internal policies remove these lines of credit. Kalecki teaches us that the mass of profit in a capitalist economy is determined by the sum of capitalist consumption, net investment and the trade surplus. The trade surplus that China runs with the US constitutes a huge boost to the profits of Chinese firms, even if from the standpoint of a rational Smithean calculus, it constitutes nothing more than a huge loss, a huge subsidy to the US. From the standpoint of individual chinese firms the trade surplus is a big gain, it boosts their profits. From the standpoint of the state however, as personified by the state bank, it is of much more dubious benefit. It causes an accumulation of dollar holdings of increasingly perilous real value. One response is to set up large state venture funds so that China can convert these surpluses into equity capital, but such equity capital need not be invested in the USA. Another response could be for the state to step up internal infrastructure investment - but with 50% of Chinese gdp currently going on investment there is little room for this to go much further. Alternatively the surplus could be expended as internal state spending on either armaments or welfare as happened in for example the UK during the 50s. But if these things happen, what position does that put the USA in? Suppose that the financing available for the current US deficit of some $700 billion dried up. Will it still be able to sustain its current level of imports of manufactured goods and oil? What would be the implications for the US state if it could no longer finance anything near current levels of oil imports? The free market value of the dollar would decline much further than it has already. Costs of oil and manufactured goods in US shops would rise even more drastically. What would the implications of this be for political stability with the state? What would the implications be for the continued viability of the US armed forces if they could no longer afford the oil they currently use? These factors alone would seem to provide ample motivation for the revival of imperialism in its most classic form -- the seizure of territories rich in raw materials, first Iraq, then perhaps Iran, then Venezuela. If all these countries were under US occupation they would have to supply oil in dollars, however depreciated the dollar becomes on the world market. We should not be using the imperialism of 1908 as our model, but the imperialism of 1938. Paul Cockshott Dept of Computing Science University of Glasgow +44 141 330 3125 www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/ //Dave Z on 2007-12-30 21:33 clyder@GN.APC.ORG wrote: > Have members seen Paul Cerni's article on the political enconomy of > imperialism in the 21st century > > http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol8.1/cerni.html > > I was very impressed by it but it raises many controversial issues. >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Jan 02 2008 - 00:00:07 EST