On 2010-08-12 15:12, Paul Cockshott wrote:
> What is the difference between a structural and an institutional mechanism?
>
>    
In this case it was a distinction between how deep the mechanisms that 
results in the state's class bias is embedded in the social system. In 
other words, if you remove the institutional mechanism, the structural 
one remains. Perhaps the analogy of local versus global attractors of a 
system is apt.
The personal mechanism that generates the class bias simply means that 
the actual people who run the state apparatuses, and the government in 
particular, are drawn from the class itself either by formally excluding 
others or by elections. While this obviously operated in, say, early 
20th century Western Europe and still does so today, e.g. USA with Bush 
II among other places, with the implementation of universal suffrage 
this mechanism is far too contingent and haphazard to explain the 
globally correlated trajectories of capitalist states.
The institutional mechanisms biases the state managers, independently of 
their original class positions, towards the interests of the class in 
the selection process, e.g. the need for campaign money from donors of 
the propertied classes.
These two sets have been taken as sufficient to explain the class bias, 
and may indeed have been so. But they are not necessary or ultimate and 
accepting them as sufficient explanations of 'the class character of the 
state' has lead to an inadequate theorization of the state in capitalism 
for two reasons.
Firstly, it doesn't take into account the separation of the political 
and economic spheres that is *unique* to capitalism. The state is 
thought to act on behalf, or even at the behest, of the capitalist class 
in a direct sense. But if the state acts in the *general interest* of 
this class, as Marx thought, then this direct mediation would quickly 
ruin such strategic goals due to the intrinsic competition between 
members of that class. This implicit idea of 'acting at the behest', I 
believe, also underpins the orthodox theory of the role of the state in 
imperialism.
Secondly, the rise of workers' parties from Austria to Brazil showed how 
contingent the two mechanisms were, and that they could indeed be 
overridden or offset. Contrary to the axiomatic notion of state as an 
'instrument' or possession of the ruling class as a whole. Thus workers' 
parties in government were anomalies that could only be explained by 
adding epicycles in which they were thought to be 'bought off', and 
their failure to transform the system was taken as evidence of this.
The structural mechanism then is independent of the ones above and 
biases the state managers to be concerned about the development of the 
entire capitalist sector, independently of their specific goals or class 
positions. This operates through the state's basic mode of reproduction, 
taxation, which it derives primarily from incomes in the capitalist 
sector. Hence the need to maintain a healthy sector and business 
confidence. Any failure to do so risks weakening the tax base and the 
destructive effects of a declining sector, such as rising unemployment 
or lower wages, may turn sections of the population against the current 
managers of the state.
Thus the ultimate, rather than proximate, cause of the failure of the 
reformist workers' parties lies in their lack of strategic and 
organizational capacities to overcome or circumvent the operation of 
this structural mechanism.
//Dave Z
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Received on Thu Aug 12 19:07:28 2010
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