Traffic Check-Points for General Crime
Fighting
City of Indianapolis v. James Edmond
121 S.Ct. 447 (2000)
O'Connor, J.
In Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), we held that brief,
suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of
combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants were
constitutional. We now consider the constitutionality of a highway
checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and
interdiction of illegal narcotics.
In August 1998, the city of
Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints on Indianapolis roads
in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The city conducted six such
roadblocks between August and November that year, stopping 1,161
vehicles and arresting 104 motorists. Fifty-five arrests were for
drug-related crimes, while 49 were for offenses unrelated to drugs. The
overall "hit rate" of the program was thus approximately nine percent.
The parties stipulated to the
facts concerning the operation of the checkpoints by the Indianapolis
Police Department (IPD) for purposes of the preliminary injunction
proceedings instituted below. At each checkpoint location, the police
stop a predetermined number of vehicles. Approximately 30 officers are
stationed at the checkpoint. Pursuant to written directives issued by
the chief of police, at least one officer approaches the vehicle,
advises the driver that he or she is being stopped briefly at a drug
checkpoint, and asks the driver to produce a license and registration.
The officer also looks for signs of impairment and conducts an open-view
examination of the vehicle from the outside. A narcotics-detection dog
walks around the outside of each stopped vehicle.
The directives instruct the
officers that they may conduct a search only by consent or based on the
appropriate quantum of particularized suspicion. The officers must
conduct each stop in the same manner until particularized suspicion
develops, and the officers have no discretion to stop any vehicle out of
sequence. The city agreed in the stipulation to operate the checkpoints
in such a way as to ensure that the total duration of each stop, absent
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, would be five minutes or less.
The affidavit of Indianapolis
Police Sergeant Marshall DePew provides further insight concerning the
operation of the checkpoints. According to Sergeant DePew, checkpoint
locations are selected weeks in advance based on such considerations as
area crime statistics and traffic flow. The checkpoints are generally
operated during daylight hours and are identified with lighted signs
reading, "NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT ___ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE
PREPARED TO STOP." Once a group of cars has been stopped, other traffic
proceeds without interruption until all the stopped cars have been
processed or diverted for further processing. Sergeant DePew also stated
that the average stop for a vehicle not subject to further processing
lasts two to three minutes or less.
Respondents James Edmond and
Joell Palmer were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint in late
September 1998. Respondents then filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves
and the class of all motorists who had been stopped or were subject to
being stopped in the future at the Indianapolis drug checkpoints.
Respondents claimed that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and the search and seizure provision of
the Indiana Constitution. Respondents requested declaratory and
injunctive relief for the class, as well as damages and attorneys fees
for themselves.
Respondents then moved for a preliminary injunction. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the
motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. A divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
the checkpoints contravened the Fourth Amendment. The panel denied
rehearing. We granted certiorari, and now affirm.
The Fourth Amendment requires
that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. While such suspicion is not an irreducible component of
reasonableness, we have recognized only limited circumstances in which
the usual rule does not apply. For example, we have upheld certain
regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to
serve "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."
See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (random drug testing of student-athletes); Treasury Employees
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug tests for United States
Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain
positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in
train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety
regulations). We have also allowed searches for certain administrative
purposes without particularized suspicion of misconduct, provided that
those searches are appropriately limited. See, e.g., New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (warrantless administrative inspection
of premises of "closely regulated" business).
We have also upheld brief,
suspicionless seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint
designed to intercept illegal aliens, United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), and at a sobriety checkpoint
aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road, Michigan Dept. of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). In addition, in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), we suggested that a similar
type of roadblock with the purpose of verifying drivers' licenses and
vehicle registrations would be permissible. In none of these cases,
however, did we indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
In Martinez-Fuerte, we
entertained Fourth Amendment challenges to stops at two permanent
immigration checkpoints located on major United States highways less
than 100 miles from the Mexican border. We noted at the outset the
particular context in which the constitutional question arose,
describing in some detail the "formidable law enforcement problems"
posed by the northbound tide of illegal entrants into the United States.
These problems had also been the focus of several earlier cases
addressing the constitutionality of other Border Patrol traffic-checking
operations. In Martinez-Fuerte, we found that the balance tipped
in favor of the Government's interests in policing the Nation's borders.
In so finding, we emphasized the difficulty of effectively containing
illegal immigration at the border itself. We also stressed the
impracticality of the particularized study of a given car to discern
whether it was transporting illegal aliens, as well as the relatively
modest degree of intrusion entailed by the stops.
In Sitz, we evaluated
the constitutionality of a Michigan highway sobriety checkpoint program.
The Sitz checkpoint involved brief suspicionless stops of
motorists so that police officers could detect signs of intoxication and
remove impaired drivers from the road. Motorists who exhibited signs of
intoxication were diverted for a license and registration check and, if
warranted, further sobriety tests. This checkpoint program was clearly
aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk
drivers on the highways, and there was an obvious connection between the
imperative of highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue.
The gravity of the drunk driving problem and the magnitude of the
States interest in getting drunk drivers off the road weighed heavily
in our determination that the program was constitutional.
In Prouse, we
invalidated a discretionary, suspicionless stop for a spot check of a
motorist's driver's license and vehicle registration. The officers
conduct in that case was unconstitutional primarily on account of his
exercise of "standardless and unconstrained discretion." We nonetheless
acknowledged the States"vital interest in ensuring that only those
qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these
vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing,
registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed."
Accordingly, we suggested that "questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops" would be a lawful means of serving this interest
in highway safety.
We further indicated in
Prouse that we considered the purposes of such a hypothetical
roadblock to be distinct from a general purpose of investigating crime.
The State proffered the additional interests of "the apprehension of
stolen motor vehicles and of drivers under the influence of alcohol or
narcotics" in its effort to justify the discretionary spot check. We
attributed the entirety of the latter interest to the State's interest
in roadway safety. We also noted that the interest in apprehending
stolen vehicles may be partly subsumed by the interest in roadway
safety. We observed, however, that "the remaining governmental interest
in controlling automobile thefts is not distinguishable from the general
interest in crime control." Not only does the common thread of highway
safety thus run through Sitz and Prouse, but Prouse
itself reveals a difference in the Fourth Amendment significance of
highway safety interests and the general interest in crime control.
It is well established that a
vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that officers walk a
narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the
Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search.
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Just as in
Place, an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry
into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than
the presence or absence of narcotics. Rather, what principally
distinguishes these checkpoints from those we have previously approved
is their primary purpose.
As petitioners concede, the
Indianapolis checkpoint program unquestionably has the primary purpose
of interdicting illegal narcotics. In their stipulation of facts, the
parties repeatedly refer to the checkpoints as "drug checkpoints" and
describe them as "being operated by the City of Indianapolis in an
effort to interdict unlawful drugs in Indianapolis." In addition, the
first document attached to the parties stipulation is entitled "DRUG
CHECKPOINT CONTACT OFFICER DIRECTIVES BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE."
These directives instruct officers to "advise the citizen that they are
being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint."
We have never approved a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Because the primary purpose of the
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth
Amendment.
Petitioners propose several
ways in which the narcotics-detection purpose of the instant checkpoint
program may instead resemble the primary purposes of the checkpoints in
Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Petitioners state that the
checkpoints in those cases had the same ultimate purpose of arresting
those suspected of committing crimes. Securing the border and
apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities,
and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in
pursuit of these goals. If we were to rest the case at this high level
of generality, there would be little check on the ability of the
authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law
enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a
routine part of American life.
Petitioners also emphasize the
severe and intractable nature of the drug problem as justification for
the checkpoint program. There is no doubt that traffic in illegal
narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude. But the gravity
of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what
means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.
Rather, in determining whether individualized suspicion is required, we
must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their
connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. We are
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of
individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue
their general crime control ends.
Nor can the
narcotics-interdiction purpose of the checkpoints be rationalized in
terms of a highway safety concern similar to that present in Sitz.
The detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense serves
broadly the safety of the community, and our streets would no doubt be
safer but for the scourge of illegal drugs. Only with respect to a
smaller class of offenses, however, is society confronted with the type
of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety
checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate.
Of course, there are
circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the
primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to
ordinary crime control. For example, as the Court of Appeals noted, the
Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a
dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.
The exigencies created by these scenarios are far removed from the
circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter
of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the
jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a
checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve
a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control.
Petitioners argue that our
prior cases preclude an inquiry into the purposes of the checkpoint
program. For example, they cite Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996) to support the proposition that "where the government
articulates and pursues a legitimate interest for a suspicionless stop,
courts should not look behind that interest to determine whether the
government's primary purpose is valid." These cases, however, do not
control the instant situation.
In Whren, we held that
an individual officer's subjective intentions are irrelevant to the
Fourth Amendment validity of a traffic stop that is justified
objectively by probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred. We observed that our prior cases "foreclose any argument that
the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved." In so holding, we
expressly distinguished cases where we had addressed the validity of
searches conducted in the absence of probable cause.
Whren therefore
reinforces the principle that, while "subjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis," programmatic
purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions
undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized
suspicion. Accordingly, Whren does not preclude an inquiry into
programmatic purpose in such contexts. It likewise does not preclude an
inquiry into programmatic purpose here.
Petitioners argue that the
Indianapolis checkpoint program is justified by its lawful secondary
purposes of keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying
licenses and registrations. If this were the case, however, law
enforcement authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for
virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or
sobriety check. For this reason, we examine the available evidence to
determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program. While we
recognize the challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry, courts routinely
engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence
as a means of sifting abusive governmental conduct from that which is
lawful. While reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is
predominantly an objective inquiry, our special needs and administrative
search cases demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions pursuant to a general scheme are at issue.2
[Today's holding] does not
affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like
airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to
ensure public safety can be particularly acute. Nor does our opinion
speak to other intrusions aimed primarily at purposes beyond the general
interest in crime control. Our holding also does not impair the ability
of police officers to act appropriately upon information that they
properly learn during a checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary
purpose, even where such action may result in the arrest of a motorist
for an offense unrelated to that purpose. Finally, we caution that the
purpose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the
programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of
individual officers acting at the scene.
Because the primary purpose of
the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ultimately indistinguishable from
the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the
Fourth Amendment.
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting.
The State's use of a
drug-sniffing dog, according to the Court's holding, annuls what is
otherwise plainly constitutional under our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: brief, standardized, discretionless, roadblock seizures
of automobiles, seizures which effectively serve a weighty state
interest with only minimal intrusion on the privacy of their occupants.
Because these seizures serve the State's accepted and significant
interests of preventing drunken driving and checking for driver's
licenses and vehicle registrations, and because there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the addition of the dog sniff lengthens these
otherwise legitimate seizures, I dissent.
Petitioners acknowledge that
the "primary purpose" of these roadblocks is to interdict illegal drugs,
but this fact should not be controlling. Even accepting the Court's
conclusion that the checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz were not primarily related to criminal law enforcement, the
question whether a law enforcement purpose could support a roadblock
seizure is not presented in this case. The District Court found that
another "purpose of the checkpoints is to check driver's licenses and
vehicle registrations," and the written directives state that the police
officers are to "look for signs of impairment." That the roadblocks
serve these legitimate state interests cannot be seriously disputed, as
the 49 people arrested for offenses unrelated to drugs can attest. And
it would be speculative to conclude given the District Court's findings,
the written directives, and the actual arrestsnthat petitioners would
not have operated these roadblocks but for the State's interest in
interdicting drugs.
Because of the valid reasons
for conducting these roadblock seizures, it is constitutionally
irrelevant that petitioners also hoped to interdict drugs. In Whren
v. United States, we held that an officer's subjective intent would
not invalidate an otherwise objectively justifiable stop of an
automobile. The reasonableness of an officer's discretionary decision to
stop an automobile, at issue in Whren, turns on whether there is
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The
reasonableness of highway checkpoints, at issue here, turns on whether
they effectively serve a significant state interest with minimal
intrusion on motorists. The stop in Whren was objectively
reasonable because the police officers had witnessed traffic violations;
so too the roadblocks here are objectively reasonable because they serve
the substantial interests of preventing drunken driving and checking for
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations with minimal intrusion on
motorists.
Once the constitutional
requirements for a particular seizure are satisfied, the subjective
expectations of those responsible for it, be it police officers or
members of a city council, are irrelevant. It is the objective effect of
the State's actions on the privacy of the individual that animates the
Fourth Amendment. Because the objective intrusion of a valid seizure
does not turn upon anyone's subjective thoughts, neither should our
constitutional analysis.
The only difference between
this case and Sitz is the presence of the dog. We have already
held, however, that a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics dog is not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not
require physical intrusion of the object being sniffed and it does not
expose anything other than the contraband items. And there is nothing in
the record to indicate that the dog sniff lengthens the stop. Finally,
the checkpoints success ratem49 arrests for offenses unrelated to drugs
[or 4.2% of the motorists stopped]only confirms the State's legitimate
interests in preventing drunken driving and ensuring the proper
licensing of drivers and registration of their vehicles. These stops
effectively serve the State's legitimate interests; they are executed in
a regularized and neutral manner; and they only minimally intrude upon
the privacy of the motorists. They should therefore be constitutional.
[W]hatever sense a
non-law-enforcement primary purpose test may make in the search setting,
it is ill suited to brief roadblock seizures, where we have consistently
looked at the scope of the stop in assessing a program's
constitutionality. [The reason] for not incorporating the "special
needs" test in our roadblock seizure cases is that seizures of
automobiles deal neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private
dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection. One's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of
freedom in its operation are significantly different from the
traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence. This
is because automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls. The lowered expectation
of privacy in one's automobile is coupled with the limited nature of the
intrusion: a brief, standardized, nonintrusive seizure. The brief
seizure of an automobile can hardly be compared to the intrusive search
of the body or the home.
Because of these extrinsic
limitations upon roadblock seizures, the Court's newfound
non-law-enforcement primary purpose test is both unnecessary to secure
Fourth Amendment rights and bound to produce wide-ranging litigation
over the "purpose" of any given seizure. Police designing highway
roadblocks can never be sure of their validity, since a jury might later
determine that a forbidden purpose exists.
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