CHAPTER 5 NOTES

Download for Microsoft Word

Arrest vs. Stop

1)                  Arrest

a.       Requires probable cause

2)                  Stop (Investigative Detention, Terry Stop)

a.       Requires reasonable suspicion

3)                  To determine whether a police action is a stop or arrest, courts look to a number of different factors:

a.       Amount of time the detention lasts

                                                                           i.      Florida v Royer 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

                                                                         ii.      “[Investigative detention] must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop”

                                                                        iii.      The courts also weigh the length of the detention in light of its purposes and the reasonable time needed to effectuate those purposes

b.      Techniques used to restrain the suspect

                                                                           i.      Were handcuffs used?

c.       The location of the suspect

                                                                           i.      Did they move the suspect?

                                                                         ii.      How far did they transport the suspect?

d.      What the officers said to the suspect concerning the purposes of the detention

àIn Terry, the court held that an investigatory stop by an officer armed with reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, will be committed, or is being committed is justified

Two example statutes dealing with such stops:

1)                  Nevada § 171.123

a.       Officer may detain a person under circumstances which indicate that a crime has been committed, will be committed, or is being committed

b.      May be detained for no longer than is reasonably necessary to carry out the stop and/or no longer than 60 minutes

2)                  Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1

a.       Officer may detain a person under circumstances which indicate the person has committed, will commit, or is committing either a felony or a dangerous misdemeanor

b.      May be detained no longer than 15 minutes or “for such time as is reasonable under the circumstances”

In Re M.E.B. (1993) 638 A.2d 1123

àAppellant (16 years old) appeals arguing that his confession to 2^nd degree murder should have been suppressed because it was gained pursuant to an illegal arrest

àVictim was shot twice in the doorway of a Laundromat

àPolice broadcasted description of assailant, asking for people to be on the lookout

à20 minutes later, a witness (Tracy Harris) called the police to report that she had seen the assailant nearby and in fact saw one boy, 14 year old ‘A’, next to the decedent in the doorway of the Laundromat

àShe went on to say that moments before the shooting, she saw Appellant and A standing together in the Laundromat

àFurther investigation revealed that the decedent had gotten into an argument with two young boys, moments before being killed

àThe two boys were picked up by two officers for questioning; but was it an arrest or a stop?

            àThey were informed that they were not under arrest

            àThey were handcuffed

            àTaken 10-15 blocks back to the crime scene

            àRemained at the crime scene for 5-10 minutes

àNext, they were transported to the witness, Harris, this took 2-3 minutes to arrive

àShe identified the two as who she had seen earlier at the Laundromat

àDuring the identification, A told one of the officers that in fact it was Appellant that was the shooter

àAppellant was placed under arrest and taken to the police station where he confessed

èAppellant claimed that when the boys were picked up originally, it amounted to an arrest, which would have required probable cause, which the officers did not have

àThe court held that the two boys were wanted for questioning and that’s why they were picked up not with intent to arrest them

àAdditionally, the whole detention lasted 12-17 minutes, which the court held did not convert the detention into an arrest

àThe handcuffing of the boys was not indicative of an arrest, rather it was a way for the officers to ensure their safety from two boys who they believed were involved in a murder

            àHandcuffing was a reasonable precaution under the circumstances

èAppellant also claimed that the information that he and the decedent had argued could not be considered in determining whether or not the officers had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the Terry Stop.

àHe claimed that this information was not available to the two officers at the time of the stop, so it cannot be considered

àThe court concedes that if that information cannot be considered then the Terry Stop was unlawful

àThe court relies on the “Collective Knowledge” Standard, articulating the test as:

à”whether a warrant if sought could have been obtained by law enforcement agency application which disclosed its corporate information, not whether any one particular officer could have obtained it on what information he individually possessed”

èBased on this test, the court holds that the corporate information possessed by the police reached the level of reasonable suspicion; therefore the Terry stop was justified

èCollective (or Corporate) Knowledge Doctrine when determining the presence or absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion

àCollective information the police have, even if no individual officer or department holds all of the information at the moment of the stop or the arrest

State v Steven Thomas (2005) 124 P.3d 48

àPolice receive tip from an informant that Brandon Prouse is attempting to sell to the informant 5-6 quarts of anhydrous ammonia, a highly toxic compound found in Methamphetamines

àThe police discovered that Prouse was wanted on a felony arrest warrant for a probation violation stemming from an aggravated battery conviction

àThe police began surveillance on a home that the informant told them Prouse could be found

àProuse walked out of the home into the yard but upon seeing the police and their order to “Stop,” Prouse ran back inside the home

àFour officers chased Prouse into the home, finally arresting him

àInside the home, the officers smelled the pungent odor of anhydrous ammonia

àIn plain view throughout the house were items consistent with a Meth lab, along with 6 other individuals, including appellant Thomas, the homeowner

àBecause of the overwhelming odor of the anhydrous ammonia and the safety risk associated with it, the officers ordered everybody outside

àOnce outside, the officers performed pat-downs on all individuals

àDuring the pat-down, Thomas admitted to possessing methamphetamine in his pocket

àThomas was arrested and while at the police station, he admitted that the Meth lab was his and that prior to the officers arriving, the lab had blown up

àThomas moved to suppress the evidence gained by the police, arguing that the arrest warrant for Prouse did not authorize their entry into his (a 3^rd party) home

            àThey needed a search warrant for Prouse

èNote: The key question here is whether or not the officers were in a lawful vantage point to see and seize the evidence that was in plain view

èThe court relies on Payton v New York in its analysis of the question of whether or not an arrest warrant authorizes entry into a suspect’s house

àDefendant wanted the evidence found in his apartment following his arrest excluded, claiming the Police had no right to enter his home with neither an arrest warrant nor search warrant

àPolice had probable cause to make arrests

                        àBUT no warrants

àIf there had been exigent (emergency) circumstances no warrant would be needed

àSame thing with consent

àIf Police had been given consent to enter, there would be no problem

àThe 4^th Amendment was written to remedy the use of general warrants

àThat’s why the language of “particularly describing the place…” was put in there

àThe court in Payton held: “[An arrest warrant gives police the authority to] enter a dwelling which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within”

àBut…there is no evidence that the officers in the present case, believed that Prouse resided or owned the premises entered, rather it was the home of a 3^rd party.

èWhat about police entry into the home of a 3^rd party?

            àFor this the court relies on Steagald v U.S.

àIn Steagald, the court held that absent exigent circumstances or consent, the home of someone not named in the arrest warrant may not be searched

àThe court contrasted the two types of warrants:

1)                  Search

a.       Protect against the unjustified intrusion of police into one’s home

2)                  Arrest

a.       Protects citizens against unreasonable seizures

àThe state argues that exigent circumstances existed which justified the entry into the home

            àThe Hot Pursuit Doctrine

àEnglish common-law “suggests that forcible entry into a 3^rd party’s home was permissible only when the person to be arrested was pursued to the home” (Steagald)

àWas this Hot Pursuit?

àThomas argues that it was not hot pursuit because there were no exigent circumstances present

àThe court counters that Hot Pursuit itself can be an exigent circumstance and that it would be unreasonable to expect officers to leave the scene after seeing Prouse and go get a search warrant at 2:00 AM

àThe entry into the home was justified

State v Jason Kiper (1995) 532 N.W.2d 698

àAppellant, Kiper, asserts that the evidence used at trial was illegally seized

àThe police had an arrest warrant for David Wanie

àWanie was convicted of permitting a minor to drive which was a $55 fine, he never paid, so a warrant was issued for his arrest

àAbout a month later, Officer Thomas sought to execute the arrest warrant on Wanie but knew that Wanie did not live at either of the addresses found on the warrant

àHe believed that he might find Wanie at Kiper’s house, after having seen him there six weeks prior

àThomas knocked on the door and a young man answered the door

            àThomas asked if David “Wane” (mispronouncing Wanie) was there

àThe young boy said no but Thomas thought that he saw Wanie inside the home

àThomas announced that he had an arrest warrant for “Wane”, but Wanie responded that there was no “Wane” there and walked away

àOfficer Thomas knew that this was Wanie because of his distinctive haircut, so he entered the home and followed Wanie

àWanie was trying to close a door but Thomas told him to stop

àThrough the partially closed doorway, Thomas saw drug paraphernalia and smelled marijuana

àThomas entered the bedroom and saw appellant standing next to a scale, bong, drugs, and other “tools”

àKiper was tried and convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance; he appeals

èThe court held that Thomas did not have probable cause to believe that Wanie would be inside Kiper’s home

àThomas admitted that the only reason why he thought Wanie might be there is because 6 weeks prior he had seen him there

èNext, the court held that Thomas needed a search warrant to enter Kiper’s home and arrest Wanie

àThe government argues that there were exigent circumstances present, so Thomas did not need a warrant

àThe court applies a test to determine the presence of exigent circumstances

à”Whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape”

            àThis boils down to four factors which constitute exigent circumstances:

1)                  An arrest made in “hot pursuit”

2)                  A threat to safety of a suspect or others

3)                  A risk that evidence will be destroyed

4)                  A likelihood that the suspect will flee

àThe court reasons that because Wanie was wanted on a $55 fine and because the police waited over a month to execute the warrant, the government cannot claim that there existed an exigency

àDISSENT Steinmetz

àJustice Steinmetz argues that Officer Thomas had probable cause that Wanie was there after Wanie walked by the front door and spoke to him

àHe feels that regardless of the nature of the underlying offense, Thomas should be able to enter the apartment and arrest Wanie

Arrest Warrant Framework

àIf an officer has an arrest warrant for X, what else does the officer need to enter the residence and arrest X, when X is:

1)                  Inside his own home

a.       Arrest Warrant

b.      Reason to believe X is inside the home

c.       Payton v New York (1980)

2)                  Inside the home of a 3^rd Party not named on the warrant

a.       Arrest Warrant

b.      Search Warrant

                                                                                                   i.      Based on probable cause that X is present in that location

c.       Keep in mind that the officer is “searching” for X inside of a home, so just like any other evidence, the officer would need a warrant; absent exigent circumstances or consent

3)                  What if the officer does not have an arrest warrant for X and X is in a public place?

a.       The officer may arrest him provided that he had probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, will be committed, or is being committed

b.      U.S. v Watson (1976)

àDo exigent circumstances apply in situations involving non-jailable offenses?

            àNo; see Welsh v Wisconsin (1984)

èDomestic Abuse

àA number of states have statutes mandating certain actions by police officers in domestic violence situations:

            àNot discouraging victims from reporting

àNot basing decisions as to whether to arrest solely on consent of the victim or request by the victim

àAllowing warrantless arrests of domestic abusers

Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (1984)

àExperiment that found that arrest is the most effective of the three methods at reducing domestic violence

àThe three methods were: Arrest; Counseling both parties; Sending assailant away from the home for a few hours

àThe Minneapolis Police were told which of the three methods to use in a given domestic abuse case

àThe decision which one to assign to the officer for that case was determined by a lottery

àArrest was the most effective at minimizing repeat offending by those arrested

àAdditionally, when the officer arrested the offender and sat down and listened to the victim, repeat violence was reduced even more

Paper Arrests: Citations

àCan one be given a citation instead of being arrested?  Or can one be arrested instead of simply getting a citation?

Patrick Knowles v Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113

àPolice pulled Knowles over for speeding

àState law authorized the officer to arrest Knowles and present him before a magistrate

àHe only issued a citation

àDespite having no reason to believe he would find drugs, he searched the car

àFound bag of marijuana and pipe

àThe government claims that the search was lawful under Iowa Code Ann. § 805.1, which states in part that issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest, “does not effect the officer’s authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search.”

àKnowles asserted that the search was unlawful because it could be not be justified under “search incident to a lawful arrest” doctrine found in U.S. v Robinson.

àIn Robinson, the court asserted two rationales for a search incident to a lawful arrest:

1)                  The need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody;

1)                  The officer did not need to search the car to disarm the suspect, he only needed to ask him to step out and pat him down

2)                  Additionally, the officer was not even taking him into custody, he was giving him a citation

3)                  Therefore the safety interest found in the first rationale is absent here

2)                  The need to preserve evidence for trial

a.       There is no evidence to be found in this case

b.      Nothing needed to be searched for

Gail Atwater v City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318

àDoes the 4^th Amendment forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense?

            àNo

àIn Texas, if a car is equipped with seat belts, all front seat passengers must wear them and all children riding up front must be secured, violation is a fine of $25-$50.

àTexas law authorizes the police to arrest anyone in violation of these seat belt laws

àPetitioner Gail Atwater was driving with her 3 year old son and 5 year old daughter in the front seat

àNone of the passengers were wearing a seat belt

àOfficer Turek observed the seat belt violation and pulled Atwater over

àAllegedly, Turek yelled at Atwater and told her she was going to jail

àHe called for backup and then asked to see Atwater’s license and proof of insurance

            àAtwater claimed that her purse had been stolen the day before

àAtwater requested to be able to take her frightened kids to a friend’s home nearby

            àTurek refused

            àSoon the friend arrived and took care of kids

àAtwater was handcuffed and driven to the police station, where she was put through the rigors of “booking”: Had to remove her shoes, jewelry, eyeglasses, and empty her pockets, her mug shot was taken and she spent an hour in a jail cell; she was finally released on $310 bond

àAtwater brought a suit under 42 USC § 1983, alleging that her 4^th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated

àThis is her civil suit

àThe court looked at the common-law to gain an understanding of an officer’s authority to arrest to better understand what the framers of the constitution would have thought to be reasonable

àThe court finds authorities that support Atwater’s position and others that support the City’s

àAs the court continues, there seems to be more and more support for the officer’s ability to arrest her

àGiving up on a historical argument, Atwater next asks the court to create a new rule:

à”When historical practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded on the 4th Amendment, courts are left to strike a current balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of reasonableness”

àThe court resists the case-by-case analysis proposed by Atwater, holding that it would leave too many officers, who are required to make split second decisions, unable to make such decisions accurately

àThe court explains by discussing the impossibility that an officer will know if this is a first time offense for the offender, if the drugs are over or below the limit to warrant arrest, etc.

àAdditionally, if the officer makes a mistake, they are vulnerable to § 1983 suits

àThe court refuses to create such a rule and holds that the arrest was not violative of her 4^th Amendment rights and confirms that “if an officer has probable cause to that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense, in his presence, he may, without violating the 4^th Amendment, arrest the offender”

èDISSENT Justice O’Connor

àJustice O’Connor points out the danger of allowing people to be arrested for such minor crimes

à”People arrested for all types of violent and nonviolent crimes offenses [are] housed together”

            àShe articulates her own rule of when a warrantless arrest may be made:

à”when there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the officer is "able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion" of a full custodial arrest”

àO’Connor fears that a policy that allows officers to arrest individuals for minor crimes will only exacerbate the already troubling trend of racial profiling

Use of Force in Making Arrests

Tennessee v Edward Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1

àTwo officers, Hymon and Wright, respond to a “prowler inside call” and arrive at the scene at 10:45 PM

àOnce at the home, they see a neighbor standing on her porch, gesturing toward the adjacent home

àShe told them that she had heard glass breaking and that someone was breaking in next door

àWright radioed dispatch to say they were on the scene and Hymon ran behind the house to investigate

àHe heard a door slam and a figure run across the backyard

àThe figure, Edward Garner, ran to the edge of the yard but was stopped by a 6 foot tall chain link fence

àOfficer Hymon shined the flashlight on Garner and saw his face and hands

            àHe did not see a weapon and was “reasonably sure” that Garner was unarmed

àHymon called out that he was the police, for Garner to halt, and then took a few steps toward him

àGarner attempted to climb the fence, so Hymon fired a shot and hit Garner in the back of the head, stopping him from eluding capture

            àGarner died on the operating table

à$10 and a purse were found on Garner’s person

àHymon was acting in pursuance of both Department policy and Tenn. Statute by firing at Garner

àTenn. Code § 40-7-108: “[if], after notice of the intention to arrest the Defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest”

àGarner’s father brought an action seeking damages, arguing that Garner’s constitutional rights were violated

àThe trial court found for the officer, holding that Garner assumed the risk of being fired upon by attempting to escape

àIn its analysis, the Supreme Court viewed the shooting as a seizure, therefore it was subjected to the reasonableness requirement of the 4^th Amendment

èTest: “To determine the constitutionality of a seizure "[we] must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion”

àWhat sorts of factors and interests does the court weigh?

1)      The societal interest of subjecting individuals to the judicial process

a.       Obviously killing the suspect frustrates this interest

2)      The police interest in letting suspects know that they will  be shot if they do not submit

a.       The presently available evidence does not support the notion that it will cause more suspects to submit

àThe court concludes that the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is unreasonable.

èThe court holds that “[deadly force] may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others” (Underline Added)

àIn regards to Hymon, the court concludes that he possessed no articulable basis to think that Garner was armed or that Garner posed any physical danger to him (Hymon) or others.

èDISSENT Justice O’Connor

àO’Connor sees the court as creating a 4^th Amendment right of burglars to flee police officers when the officer cannot lay his hands on the suspect

àShe argues that the court is not even answering the right question

àThe question in her mind is: Whether the constitution allows the use of deadly force to apprehend a suspect who resists arrest by fleeing the scene of a nighttime burglary?

àShe suggests that whether to use deadly force falls under the “rubric of police conduct” which requires swift action articulated in Terry

àThe court cannot make its determination in this case based on what would have been the preferable course of action;  Rather, O’Connor argues, the determination should focus on the situation as it existed at the time of the shooting and whether it is impermissible to use deadly force to apprehend a suspect who resists arrest by fleeing the scene of a nighttime burglary

èMore than 30 states follow the Model Penal Code Provisions on the use of force

àModel Penal Code § 3.07(b)

            à(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless:

(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and

(iv) the actor believes that:

(A) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or
(B) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed

 David Frisby, Florida’s Police Continuum of Force

àIn response to the vulnerability of police officers to civil suits based on their use of force in arrests, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement/Bureau of Criminal Justice Standards and Training (FDLE/CJST) formed the Use of Force Subcommittee to develop standards on the proper use of force

àThe Committee developed a matrix that determined the proper level of force used by the officer in proportion to the resistance level of the suspect

àAccording to the matrix, it is only when the suspect “makes overt, hostile attacking movements, with or without a weapon, with the apparent intent and ability to cause death or great bodily harm” is the officer justified in using deadly force against the suspect.

àAny officer that exceeds the recommended level of force must document acceptable justifications for the action

            àLook at the graph on page 364