Collective Information Doctrine

PROBLEM: Can collective police information be a basis for probable cause?

Austin police, investigating a murder, knew the background circumstances of the killing: knocks on the door at 2:30 a.m., shots fired, the assailant vanishes without being seen or heard. The victim's roommate, Lana Lee, told an Officer Kornfuehrer that the victim's former boy friend, Paul Woodward, had slashed the victim's automobile tires (as well as the tires of a date of the victim; there is no testimony as to the proximity in time of the slashings), that the victim was to testify against Woodward the following month in proceedings based upon that event, and that Woodward had threatened the victim in telephone calls in which he had attempted to persuade her to drop the charges for slashing. The nature of the threats not communicated to the officers.

Lana Lee also told officers that Woodward had a prior criminal record, and that the victim had recently moved from Tyler to Austin to get away from him. Officer Persohn glanced at the victim's diary, which confirmed her fear of Woodward.

On the basis of this information, a member of the Austin, Texas Police Department issued a statewide "BOLO" ("Be on the lookout") bulletin for a vehicle suspected of being driven by Woodward. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that, at this point, Austin police were without probable cause when the statewide BOLO was issued. At that time, police had failed to find a trace of Woodward in Austin; the Tyler police had not yet responded to Austin's request for a check on Woodward's home.

A dispatcher with the Colorado County Sheriff's Department received the message and relayed it to Riehs, a patrol officer who was then on duty. When Riehs saw a vehicle traveling through Columbus which matched the description of the vehicle that was contained in the "BOLO" message, he stopped the driver, who was later identified as Woodward.

Although the "BOLO" message did not authorize any law enforcement official to arrest appellant, nevertheless, soon after Riehs came into contact with appellant, he arrested him and subsequently booked him into the Colorado County jail. Thereafter, Riehs reported to a member of the Austin Police Department what he had done, and that person asked Riehs if he had found a gun inside of appellant's vehicle. Riehs responded he had not. On his own volition, Riehs returned to appellant's stationery automobile, which appears to have been left in a safe place when Riehs took appellant to jail, and, with assistance from a wrecker driver, Riehs entered appellant's automobile. After conducting a search and seize mission, Riehs found and seized a pistol, which finding was reported to an Austin police officer. Thereafter, police officers from Austin came to the Colorado County jail where they obtained custody of appellant and the pistol.

When Officer Reis found Woodward on a road leading from Austin, driving in a direction away from Austin, it was two hours after the killing, slightly more than ninety miles from the scene of the crime. The fact of Woodward's location, when combined with the information found by the Austin police -- but unknown to the officer to who stopped and arrested Woodward, and searched Woodward's car -- would have been sufficient for probable cause if one officer had all of the information at one time.

Should the information known to the Austin police be added to the information on Woodward's whereabouts known to the arresting officer in determining whether there was probable cause to stop Woodward and to search his automobile? See Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1984).
 

Answer
Yes.  Officers are permitted to rely on the credibility and probable cause formed by other officers who request the officer without probable cause to hold the suspect.  The collective information will be taken into account.  The officer was permitted to rely on the Be On the Lookout message.  The sum of information known by cooperating agencies or officers at the time of arrest is to be considered in determining if probable cause exists.