Consent in the Face of a Gun

In the early morning of August 2, 1990, a woman was raped in Turner County, Georgia. That afternoon, while investigating the rape, police in neighboring Wolf County used the blue lights on their patrol car to get Eddie Jefferson to pull his truck over. According to the police, Jefferson was not a suspect at that moment, but they wanted to talk to him about the crime. Showing their weapons to Jefferson as they approached his truck, police told him they were conducting an investigation, and that they wanted to talk to him about it at the police station. Jefferson consented, and while his truck and two children were driven to his mother's home, he was taken to the police station.

When Jefferson arrived at the police station he was "interviewed" by the police, but was not Mirandized before questioning began. Unknown to him, the police had arranged for the rape victim to be positioned where she could hear, but not see Jefferson. When Jefferson began to speak, she put her hand to her mouth and began to cry. Based on her memory of his voice, she then in unequivocally identified Jefferson to the police as the man who had raped her.

At that point the police formally arrested Jefferson. Using the rape victim's voice identification as their basis for probably cause, the police procured a search warrant with which they obtained samples of Jefferson's hair and some articles of his clothing. These items were found to match, but not conclusively, evidence recovered at the rape scene. Relying principally on the victim's voice identification, the State successfully prosecuted Jefferson for the rape.

On appeal, Jefferson now argues that his "interview" was in fact an illegal custodial interrogation that violated his Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights, since he was placed in police custody without probable cause and was questioned without first being Mirandized. He asserts that the voice identification obtained at that time, as well as evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant based on that identification, should have been suppressed at his trial as tainted fruit of the illegal interrogation. He maintains that his lawyer's failure to request such suppression at his original trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The State argues that Jefferson's appearance for the police-station "interview" was entirely consensual and that, up until he was identified by the victim as the rapist, he was free to leave at any time if he so desired, because prior to that time he was not considered a suspect. Therefore the victim's identification of him did not occur during a custodial interrogation, so the police were not required to Mirandize Jefferson before beginning to question him.

How should the Court of Appeals rule? See Jefferson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 747, 459 S.E.2d 173 (1995).

Mercer H. Harz
Emory Law

Answer

(1) The Georgia Court held that the suspect was in custody based on an objective standard.  This was complicated by the fact that the State initially argued that the officers conducted the stop of Jefferson based on reasonable suspicion and then attempted to argue that he was not a suspect.  This contradictory position made the Court extremely skeptical.

"Jefferson was forcibly stopped by armed police officers who, without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, “requested” that Jefferson assist in their investigation by accompanying them to the police station for an interview. Under any circumstances such a request “ ‘may easily carry an implication of obligation, while the appearance itself, unless clearly stated to be voluntary, may be an awesome experience for the ordinary citizen.’ ”